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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effect of taxes and regulatory environment on underlying 
profitability of inward investment as well as the volume of investment. The aim of this 
research has three main objectives. The first objective is to understand how indirect taxes 
combine with direct taxes to affect the underlying potential returns to different economic 
activities and, hence, the attractiveness of different sector inward investors. The second 
objective is to examine the role of direct contact between government and business 
through taxation and regulation in affecting the overall volume of inward investment 
relative to other determinants. The third objective is to investigate the view that tax and 
governance (bureaucracy) affect firm performance and, by so doing, impact on efficiency 
seeking motives for inward investment. 
 
To address the first objective is analysed using a net incentive effect (NIE) 
approach. NIEs use I-O data to measure or simulate the combined effect of different taxes 
and different measures on underlying profit. The finding revealed that, for some sectors, 
indirect taxes represent a substantially larger loss of revenues to investors than do direct 
taxes on profits.  The findings also show that, unlike profit taxes, the burden of indirect 
taxation varies considerably between one sector and another.  This distorts the returns to 
investment in one sector relative to another. To achieve second objective it follows a 
similar approach to much empirical research by using regression analysis to estimate the 
effects of various different locational determinants, including tax and bureaucracy, on 
overall stocks and flows of inward investment. For this objective this study uses country 
level data and two variants of regression analysis to investigate the governance effect on 
inward investment – OLS and panel-fixed effects.  
 
A Chow test is used for parameter constancy to establish whether it was valid to 
combine higher income and lower income countries into a single sample for Asia. The 
finding showed regulatory efficiency was consistently found to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on inward FDI.  For other governance variables the results 
tended to vary according to estimator. Taking the panel fixed effects estimator (as less 
prone to omitted variable bias) good governance was found to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on inward FDI stocks for higher income countries but not 
for flows or stocks in lower income countries.  The total tax rate was found to have a 
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statistically significant effect on FDI inflows in lower income countries but not on inflows 
for higher income countries. 
Lastly, the third objective also employed regression techniques: in this case OLS and the 
LSDV estimators. Although the regression analysis is a useful first step some limitations 
are apparent. One key limitation is the role of firm heterogeneity.  To address these 
limitations a propensity score matching approach is also used. The finding suggests that, 
for most specifications, neither taxes nor bureaucracy had a statistically significant effect 
on firm performance for the pooled sample of all three countries.  This applies both to all 
firms (domestic and foreign) and to foreign firms only.  However, repetition of the 
analysis on a country by country basis yielded some perverse results which suggest a 
positive relationship between tax and firm performance (Indonesia) or a positive 
relationship between bureaucracy and firm performance (Philippines and Vietnam).  
These findings raise doubts about the possibility of dual causality and bias with the 
regression estimates. 
 
Propensity score matching was used to provide a check on the findings of the 
regression analysis, which also extended the number of performance indicators to four. 
The results of the matching analysis were clear.  For the pooled sample (all firms and all 
three countries), the sample of foreign owned firms and the sample of all firms for each 
individual country the results were the same: neither governance nor taxes had any 
statistically significant effect on firm performance. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
 
This thesis examines the role of taxes and governance (bureaucracy) in affecting 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in a number of Asian countries.  It analyses the 
effects of indirect taxes on the potential profitability of different sectors in three different 
countries. At the country level it provides regression analysis for a larger sample of 
countries of the impact of tax and bureaucracy, amongst other determinants, on aggregate 
inward FDI. Finally, for another three countries it analyses the effect of tax and 
governance (bureaucracy) on the performance of both domestic and foreign firms.  
 
1.2. BACKGROUND 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Asian countries have increased in the 
last 2 decades. Despite economic crises in the 1990s and 2000s, Asia has become an even 
more important potential location in receiving FDI. It has drawn attention from 
economists, researchers and policy makers, for example, on the relationship between 
economic growth and foreign investment in developing countries. The interest in such 
relationships increased since the significant turning point for Asia countries during 1980s 
to 1990s as FDI jumped from 20 percent to 40 percent.  China has been the largest 
developing country recipient of FDI of 35 percent since 1992. South, East and Southeast 
Asia received two thirds of FDI into the region, equivalent to 30 percent of the total. 
According to GATT/WTO (WTO, 1996) total FDI flows to developing countries have 
increased nine fold between 1982 and 1993. This significant increase in inward 
investment created increased diversification in the composition of the major FDI 
recipients. This has been reflected from a wide variety of location specific advantages 
such as natural resources. As the fastest growing economy in the world China become the 
most popular recipient of investment, leaving opportunities in other Asian countries such 
South Asian comparatively unexplored (UNCTAD, 2010).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14 
 
To encourage FDI, with its potential for economic growth, it is necessary to create 
a supportive and encouraging policy environment. Neo classical growth models of the 
Solow (1956), claimed that FDI can only effect on growth in short run. Nevertheless, FDI 
also affects endogenous growth as it generates increasing returns in production via 
externalities and productivity spillovers (Romer, et al., 1995). Developing countries are 
of particular interest to this study for two reasons. First, they are dependent upon 
interactions with the global economy and at the same time have internal weaknesses. Past 
experience (when South East Asia was hit badly hard by the economic crisis in 1997) 
shows that direct investment could be of substantial benefit to the economic development 
for those countries which tried to recover from the crisis. Countries such as Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and The Philippines, who were the most affected, decided to provide 
balanced treatment for foreign investors in order to restore their confidence (Thomsen, 
1999).  
 
Secondly, developing economies face problems with poverty and infrastructure. 
FDI has positive impact on the economy that offers a potentially important contribution 
to addressing both (Van and Sam, 2009). In order to service inward investment 
infrastructure is improved and this better enables the poor to better participate in the 
modern economy. In addition both the investment and the supporting infrastructure 
provide jobs in the modern, industrialised part of the economy. 
 
An important debate in the literature concerns the potential benefits and costs of 
inward FDI from the host country perspective. This can be seen from the recent survey 
of the literature (de Mello, 1997, 1999; Fan 2002; Lim, 2001). Most of these studies find 
positive effects of FDI on long-run economic growth through capital accumulation and 
technical or knowledge transfer especially under open trade regimes (e.g. Basu, 
Chakraborty, & Reagle, 2003). However, some studies indicate that these positive effects 
may be insignificant or negative (Carkovic & Levine, 2005) as FDI carries a risk of 
crowding-out for domestic investment as result of loss competitiveness.  Despite pros and 
cons of the impact of FDI on host country growth, it has been highlighted that political 
and economics are the significant factors for foreign investor to weight the risk. 
 
There is considerable diversity within the Asian region. Within the continent, the 
East and Southeast region is dynamic and rapidly growing. This region includes the newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong SAR, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
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Taiwan, the ASEAN countries and the People’s Republic of China. The economic 
integration and development of these economies is more advanced than in other parts of 
Asia. The global crisis disrupted financial markets in the US and Europe but affected 
Asian markets less. The GDP growth rate of the Asian economy was 7.4 percent in 2007 
(UNCTAD, 1996). GDP in Asia, especially emerging Asia, exceeded expectations. (Kas, 
2011). China was the most rapidly growing of the emerging economies (EMEs) of Asia, 
growing at more than percent.   
 
Important sources of FDI inflows into developing countries in recent years have 
been the foreign acquisition of domestic firms in the process of privatisation, the 
globalisation of production, and increased economic and financial integration (UNCTAD, 
1996). FDI is a viable alternative for financing development. It helps countries, especially 
developing countries, to boost their economies without creating debt. It also has inherent 
advantages for risk sharing, market discipline export orientation and the transfer of 
technology and managerial expertise (Birdsall, et all., 1995). Given the current and 
potential importance of FDI for Asia, particularly South East Asia, this study investigates 
the determinants of inward FDI in the region. It focuses on the effects of tax and 
governance in host countries. 
 
Disdier and Mayer (2004) documented that institutional factors have greater and 
more significant impact on affiliate performance in emerging economies compared to 
more mature economies. According to other studies (Child, Chung and Davis, 2003; 
Meyer, 2001, 2004; Hayo and Uhlenbrock, 2000), institutional factors such as political 
risk, government regulations, financial incentives, and environmental specific factors are 
more important in emerging economies because institutional immaturity raises 
transaction costs and risks. Developing countries tend to provide more incentives for 
instance lower tax to attract foreign investment. Szanyi (2001, p.30) states “investment 
incentives can play an additional role in motivating foreign direct investor”.  Loree and 
Guisinger (1995) claim that the host country tax rate has an important effect on US 
outward FDI. In addition, international business scholars has recognized the importance 
of country specific differences in political and institutional factors as determinants of 
foreign direct investment. Thus, the regulatory environment (especially taxes and 
governance) are the main focus of this thesis.  The study investigates the effect of taxes 
and regulatory environment on the underlying profitability of inward investment as well 
as on the volume of investment.  The underlying reasoning is that the government can 
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affect the returns to investment through its regulatory and tax regime and by the quality 
of its governance.  
1.3. RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES; KEY RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS  
 
1.3.1 The aims and objectives of the research are: 
1. To understand how indirect taxes combine with direct taxes to affect the underlying 
potential returns to different economic activities and, hence, the attractiveness of different 
sectors to inward investors. 
2. To examine the role of direct contact between government and business through 
taxation and regulation in affecting the overall volume of inward investment relative to 
other determinants. 
3. To investigate the view that tax and governance (bureaucracy) affect firm performance 
and, by so doing, impact on efficiency seeking motives for inward investment. 
 
1.3.2. The key research questions are: 
1. How important are indirect taxes, in relation to direct taxes, in affecting the potential 
profitability of inward investment in Asia?  (addressed in Chapter V) 
2. Do these distortions tend to provide unintentional incentives to invest in one sector 
rather than another? (Chapter V) 
3. To what extent are aggregate flows and stocks of inward FDI in Asian economies 
influenced by tax and governance issues? (Chapter VI) 
4. To what extent do taxes and governance affect firm performance and provide efficiency 
seeking reasons to locate inward investment in Asia? (Chapter VII). 
5. Do the effects of tax and governance affect domestic and foreign owned firms in the 
same measure or do they affect foreign owned firms differently? (Chapter VII) 
 
 
1.4. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
1. Chapter II provides a more detailed background to the study.  This is intended to set 
the context for the research. 
2. Chapter III is the review of literature.  This seeks, firstly, to provide the theoretical 
foundations for the research. It also reviews previous empirical research with the 
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intent of informing both the methodological approach of this research and provides 
the means to put key findings within a wider research context. 
3. Chapter IV gives details of methodology and data. The key methodological 
approaches covered are:  
• Input-output tables 
• Regression analysis; ordinary least squares (OLS), panel fixed effects and the 
least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model. 
• Propensity score matching. 
5. Chapter V is the first analytical chapter.  Its objective is to analyse how taxes, direct 
and indirect, affect underlying profit incentives for inward FDI in selected Asian 
countries. This first analyses the effects of indirect taxes on underlying profitability 
at the sector level. Both taxes, direct and indirect, will be, using a net incentive effect 
(NIE) approach. NIEs use I-O data to measure or simulate the combined effect of 
different taxes and different measures on underlying profit. Examples of studies of 
this type include Bond and Guisinger (1985), Guisinger (1989), Miller and Webster 
(2009).  
6. Chapter VI examines the extent to which taxes and other regulatory policies 
(bureaucracy) affect the volume of inward investment in Asian countries. It follows 
a similar approach to much empirical research by using regression analysis to 
estimate the effects of various different locational determinants, including tax and 
bureaucracy, on overall stocks and flows of inward investment. For this objective this 
study uses country level data and two variants of regression analysis to investigate 
the governance effect on inward investment – OLS and panel-fixed effects. A Chow 
test is used for parameter constancy to establish whether it was valid to combine 
higher income and lower income countries into a single sample for Asia.  
7. Chapter VII provides a detailed analysis of the effects of tax and bureaucracy on firm 
performance for three different Asian countries in 2009. It seeks to assess whether or 
not these government (governance) aspects have an impact on efficiency seeking 
motives to locate direct investment in these countries.  The analysis is again by means 
of regression techniques: in this case OLS and the LSDV estimators.  Although the 
regression analysis is a useful first step some limitations are apparent. One key 
limitation is the role of firm heterogeneity.  To address these limitations a propensity 
score matching approach is also used.   
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1.5. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
 
 The contributions of this study to knowledge are in the following areas: 
• There have been very few previous studies on taxes of FDI in ASIA (with the 
exception of China). This study therefore contributes to understanding of inward direct 
investment in Asia more widely. 
• The role of direct taxes (on corporate income) on inward FDI has been well 
explored in the literature but there has been much less attention devoted to the impact of 
indirect taxes, none specifically dealing with Asia. The contribution is not just to cover 
an under-researched topic: the analysis shows that ignoring indirect taxes is a potentially 
serious omission. 
• Many studies on inward FDI are conducted at country level. Indirect taxes such 
as import tariffs operate at the sector level.  This study provides insights as to how indirect 
taxes alter incentives to invest in one sector rather than another. 
• Although there are a significant number of country level regression studies of the 
determinants of inward FDI which include tax very few focus on Asia specifically. 
Likewise only a small number of such studies consider governance as a determinant. The 
focus on Asia and the use of both tax and bureaucracy as determinants is a contribution 
of this study 
• Within the FDI literature the effects of tax and bureaucracy on firm performance 
have been under explored. In consequence there is not a strong body of evidence to 
confirm or reject the view that tax and bureaucracy act as deterrents to efficiency seeking 
investment.  Such evidence is more scarce for Asia.  This study provides such evidence. 
 
1.6. KEY FINDINGS 
 
In the sector analysis the results suggest that the effect of indirect tax is broadly 
equivalent to introducing a ‘profit’ tax which varies by economic sector. The indicates 
the existence of a substantial potential distortionary effect on the pattern of South Korea’s, 
Indonesia’s and China’s inward FDI, resulting from the impact on relative profit 
incentives arising from indirect taxes. They provide significant profit incentives for 
investors to divert resources and hence, future production from one sector to another.  
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The country level analysis presented in this study provides evidence that 
governance affects inward FDI at the country level. The evidence suggests that lower 
income and higher income countries in Asia are behaviourally different with respect to 
key determinants of inward FDI.  The analysis does not consider the effects of governance 
on FDI in isolation but as part of a wider set of determinants of the location of FDI.  It 
suggests that treating governance in this way is important that to exclude other 
determinants might create biased and misleading results.  With some limitations the 
general finding was that good governance has a positive effect on inward FDI in Asia.  
There is also evidence that taxes have a negative effect on inward FDI. 
 
In the analysis using firm level data, the result suggest that taxes and governance 
have did not have a significant impact on firms performance for three Asian economies 
(Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam).  This implies that bureaucracy and taxes are 
not significant deterrents to efficiency seeking investment in any of those three countries. 
This supports the work of Ayyagari Emirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006) who reported 
the constraint of taxes and regulations are found to be unimportant relative to maintaining 
policy stability, keeping crime under control, and undertaking financial sector reforms to 
improve access to finance.  
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND 
 
 2.1. FDI AND ASIA ECONOMIES 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flow in developing countries increased 
dramatically in the 1990s (World Bank, 1995). The volume and type of FDI inflows are 
influenced by scale factors affecting the absorptive capacity such as size of domestic 
market, in conjunction with the growth of prospects of the host country (Bhasin et al., 
1994). The impact of FDI on developing countries economic growth has been widely 
debated in literature. The ‘traditional’ argument is that an inflow of FDI improves 
economic growth by increasing the capital stock, whereas the recent literature points to 
the role of FDI as the transfer of know-how (Lensink and Morrissey, 2001; Dunning, 
2009). 
 
International investor categorised countries around the world based on their level 
of economic development. It is measured based on a number of economic and social 
criteria, ranging from income per capita to life expectancy to literacy rates and developing 
countries are those with lower rating using this statistical measurement. In most cases in 
developing countries experience a shortfall between savings and the desired level of 
investment. This can be solved by capital inflows from several sources. Traditionally, 
countries seek external financing from official development assistance (ODA). This type 
of funding is provided by organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, Asia seems to aim for FDI. This can be 
seen from the extreme movement of capital inflow from FDI since the 1980s and it has 
become a phenomenon in Asian economies. FDI is different from other major types of 
external private flows into recipient countries because it is motivated largely by investors’ 
long term prospects of making profits from production activities that they control 
(Amerasinghe & Modesto, 2006). 
 
During the period 1981-2000 world FDI inflows rose faster than world Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and world exports. It increased almost five times as compared 
to the previous periods of 1970 and the 1980s (4.5 fold).  As yet, most FDI shares have 
gone to the developed world; however it began slowly merging with developing 
21 
 
economies in 2010. As a result FDI is becoming a more important part of economic 
activity.  
 
Asia has overtaken Europe and North America as a location for FDI inflows and 
now it is the largest destination. Existing literature (Bandera and White, 1968; Root and 
Ahmed, 1979; Torrisi, 1985; Schneider and Frey, 1985; Morrisey and Rai, 1995; Antoine, 
1979; Lim, 2008; Cheng and Tang, 1986) explains the reasons behind the concentration 
of FDI in certain locations: market size, the existence of suitable infrastructure, good 
institutions, good legal frameworks, consistent policy frameworks and good growth 
prospects. In Asia, aside from China, due to its accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), according to the World Bank (World Investment Report, 2010), the most popular 
countries for investment are the Republic of Korea and Singapore. Nonetheless, other 
regions in Asia have been receiving significant inflows of inward investment over the last 
two decades. 
 
Figure 12.1 FDI inflows, globally by groups of economies, 1980-2009 
  
 
 
 2.2 FDI IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES - ASIAN COUNTRIES 
  
  2.2.1 Trends 
Foreign direct investment is important for developing countries for several 
reasons. Not only does FDI add possible resources and capital formation, but also 
production technology, technical skills, innovative capacity and managerial/ 
organisational skills to the host country as well as access to internal markets. Lall (1978) 
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and Aggrawal (1980) outlined the basic case for expecting economic gains from inward 
investment and production relocation, including general types of collaborative ventures.  
 
Because of the impact of the global crisis 2008/2009, all aspects of economic 
activities have suffered including FDI. FDI inflows have declined in all three major 
groupings of countries – developed, developing and transition economies. Although 
inflows gradually improved back in 2010, it was interesting to note that the decline in 
developed countries was higher than in developing countries and transition economies.  
FDI inflows in developing countries declined by 24 percent but still were better than in 
developed countries which suffered a decline of 44 percent. The recovery in developing 
countries also is expected to be faster due the economies’ growth and reform as well as 
their increased openness to FDI and international production (UNCTAD, 2010). 
Recently, statistics also show that FDI flows in ASEAN countries are increasingly more 
diversified. ASEAN countries as traditionally hosts rather than sources for inward 
investment have upgraded their technology, and gained more experience to emerge as 
outward investors, especially at a regional level.  
 
FDI by sector and industry 
According to an United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) report, (UNCTAD, 2010) markets and prices in Asia have gradually risen 
since the global crisis. This has encouraged major companies to continue to have better 
financial positions and to maintain ambitious investment programmes. For example there 
has been an extensive investment programme by TOTAL, a French oil company (Harris, 
2009). Manufacturing industries such as agribusiness or pharmaceuticals that rely on fast-
growing markets have recovered from the crisis quickly. The manufacturing industries 
which were affected the most by the crisis, such as the automotive sector, are now 
recovering and are rebuilding their investment plans. However, other manufacturing 
activities which were more sensitive to the crisis continue to face a weak recovery.  
 
International investment in the service sector is expected to grow faster compared 
to manufacturing according to multinational enterprises’ (MNE) response to the World 
Investment Prospect Survey (WIPS) (UNCTAD, 2010). This may be because medium-
term prospects for services are generally superior to those for the manufacturing sector. 
In addition, many services MNEs, were focussed on the home market, and are now 
expanding to the international market involving ambitious investment abroad.    
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FDI by host country 
EU and North America remain in the top rank of FDI destinations. However FDI 
inflows also focus on developing and transition economies, especially East and South 
East Asia. Developing Asian countries are becoming increasingly attractive relative to 
other regions as can be seen from the chart below. For FDI inflows in developing 
countries as a whole, Africa is still at the bottom of future destinations for investment. 
However the movement of FDI inflows to tax haven economies are expected to decline 
further due to a higher standard of transparency and required information exchange on 
tax evasion. In addition, there are some improvements in the application of national 
treatment of domestic as well as foreign investment, also reducing incentives for round-
tripping.  
  
Multinational firms’ growing interest in developing and transition economies is 
not related only to cheap labour costs but also to large and/or fast- growing local markets. 
FDI inflows to developing and transition economies are not and will not only focus on 
labour intensive activities but it also in some cases may focus on innovative and 
technology intensive activities. The international trade literature (e.g. Batra and 
Ramachandran, 1980; Bhagwati and Srinavasan, 1983; Grossman and Helpman, 1991) 
focuses on the allocation aspects of FDI, cross border production.  In the context of 
multinational enterprises (MNE), FDI is considered to be a corporate strategy and profit-
maximising facing world-wide competition.  Regarding this concept scholars have 
identified four types of foreign based MNEs activity (Dunning, 1993): market seeking, 
resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking. The table below is 
adopted from Dunning’s theory of motive FDI seeking which is summarised by Nihal 
Amerasinghe and Justin Modusta (2006). 
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Table 1: Motive FDI seeking (Nihal Amerasinghe and Justin Modusta, 2006) 
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 2.2.2. Business climate 
 
Although ASEAN never fully recovered from the 1997 crisis, they have continued 
to appear to have rising levels of both investment and employment by foreign investors. 
In Indonesia for example, FDI inflows reached historical levels in 2010, at a time when 
global flows were still heavily impacted by the crisis. Of the top 20 host countries around 
the world, developing/ transition economies such as China, India and Singapore are 
among those top 20.  In fact, China is the second largest (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.2 Top host economies for FDI in 2009 (Number of items the country is mentioned as top priority by 
respondents) 
 
 
 2.2.3. Politics and economies in selected Asian countries - History 
 
China 
China is the strongest competitor in South East Asian countries in terms of FDI 
destinations in Asia. Since the early 1990s FDI inflows to China have exceeded by a wide 
margin compare to those which are flowing into its neighbour ASEAN countries ASEAN 
as shown in figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 3(2.3): FDI flows between ASEAN and China, 2000-2009 (million dollars) 
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China formally opened its door to foreign direct investment in 1979. Over time 
the FDI inflow gain momentum, a significant flow come from overseas Chinese mainly 
Hong Kong followed by Taiwan as they are largely ethnic Chinese, geographically close 
origins which means fewer costs and similar culture. Other determinant factors attractive 
for multinationals are China’s huge market size, liberalized FDI regime and improving 
infrastructure (Zhang, 2001). FDI flows into ASEAN countries also increased since 2002 
with the top investor in 2006 was Japan and for the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) investor, the spread to both regions (China and 
ASEAN) were synchronised until 2007. (Figure 2.3, FDI flows to countries in ASIA by 
OECD, page 10). 
 
The success of China in attracting OECD investors helps ASEAN (and other 
Asian countries) by attracting complementary FDI (Cheong and Plummer, 2009, P.14). 
As argued in Thomsen (2004, p.28), “FDI is not a zero sum game, with one country 
gaining at the expense of all others. Investment in China can stimulate greater FDI 
throughout East Asia, acting like a regional magnet for investors much as Singapore has 
done within ASEAN.” Both ASEAN and China share a global network of MNEs, which 
are complementary to each other to attract investment projects. The success of China to 
shift towards a more domestic demand-driven economic model and increased domestic 
wage may create new opportunities for ASEAN in terms of both attracting global FDI 
flows and investing in China. In order to bring these opportunities to fruition, ASEAN 
may need to adjust their economic policies and develop beneficial linkages between 
MNEs and local enterprises. Korea, as one of the closest countries to ASEAN, becomes 
the third largest investment partner after China and the United States. The relationship 
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between Korea and ASEAN helped to trigger increased interest by Korean investors in 
ASEAN countries. Traditionally, Korean investors focus on labour-intensive 
manufacturing and the primary sectors (60 percent) of total FDI from Korea to ASEAN 
in 2008 are diversified to more sectors such as real estate, services (finance and insurance, 
information technology services) and construction (UNCTAD, 2010). It means Korean 
companies are now interested in market-seeking investment in ASEAN countries.  
 
South East Asia 
 South East Asian countries’ growth path is export-oriented like most other Asian 
Countries. However they adopted less substantial industrial policies in transition to export 
compared to Korea and Taiwan. Not only that, but bureaucracy appears unclear and 
governments are pressured by political matters. Despite these problems, South East Asian 
countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have maintained stable monetary and 
fiscal policies over two decades, especially the Philippines under the Marcos government 
(Sachs, 1985). Malaysia, Thailand and Philippine geographically are neighbours and also 
member of regional intergovernmental organisation called Association of South East 
Asian Nation (ASEAN), however they have different industrial policy regime that can be 
described by the nature of relationship between the business and state (government). In 
Thailand, government favour to business until 1980s then, businesses were relatively 
weak and private business did not have institutional access to the government unless they 
have patron-client relations. Despite negative factors in Thailand that could affect 
businesses such as tight policy process by government, corruption, and the emergence of 
business-government corporation on East Asia lines in other sectors, There has no 
evidence those factors has encouraged both foreign and local investment in export-
oriented manufacturing (Doner, 1991a).   
 
In Malaysia and Indonesia, ethnic politics is important. The government makes 
different distinctions in their relationship with Chinese and native people (Malaysia, 
Bumiputra; Indonesia, Pribumi). The governments in these two countries appear to have 
conflict control over Chinese business in order to ‘protect’ native business interests. It is 
conflictual because politics often control its activities in order to favour the native 
business interest rather than being fair for all businesses including Chinese. In Indonesia 
the goal of advancing Pribumi (native) has been the political theme that have vote support 
and politics channel did not exist for private sector to articulate its demand. Similar in 
Malaysia, where the party system pressure government to support Malay (local) 
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entrepreneurs. As result the business was done through informal and personal network 
rather than formal and follow the rules. The conflict relationship between government 
and Chinese capital has been mitigated as it develops mutual relationship through politic 
support provided by Chinese enterprise through political funds. 
 
Particularly in Indonesia, subsidies and protection of the ‘native’ segment of the 
private sectors in import-substituting and non-traded goods have been disturbed by 
corruption ties with Chinese business. Both Indonesia and Malaysia try to replace the 
‘weakness’ of the native local private sector with government-owned enterprises, which 
in turn have become centres of power, patronage and corruption (Haggard, 1998). A 
similar environment exists in the Philippines. The relationship between government and 
business is very close, but under conditions of an economically-powerful and diversified 
oligarchy, policy makers make little distinction between public and private roles, and 
weak institutions for structuring the business-government connection in an efficient and 
growth-promoting way. Instead the result has been an ineffective industry policy 
dominated by cronyism (Haggard, 1998).   
 
 
Thailand 
 Thailand has a relatively stable history of macroeconomic and non-interventionist 
policy at industry level. The government has limited intervention in the market as 
domestic performance has been considerably strong. This is because the domestic 
environment has a combination of business links to a highly competitive export sector, a 
relatively small manufacturing sector, and a highly institutionalised culture of traditional 
Thai polity that minimise or stop a rent-seeking and import-substitution coalition. 
 
Thailand had a period of greater government levels of involvement in the early 
1950s. The involvement came from a military that created state-owned enterprise with 
the intention of limiting the power of Chinese entrepreneurs (Noah, 1985). Although 
under the military regime, the government did not intervene and gave substantial 
independence to Sino-Thai business. The reform did not eliminate the clientele and 
corruption but its negative consequences were tackled by a centralized budgetary policy, 
the independence of a central bank, and the competency of a good economic bureaucracy. 
Different leaders had different styles. During 1981-1984, through a Joint Public Private 
Consultative Committee (JPPCC), the government tried to be directly involved in the 
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private sector. JPPCC served government as a channel business demand on government 
but also provided a base for government to have both political liberalization and economic 
reform (Laothamtas, 1992). During the first half of the 1980s, business operated in a 
political and institutional context, government having full control over the overall 
economic policy agenda.  
 
A study by Laothamtas (1992, 1994) and Christensen (1992) argues that business 
had more success in penetrating government through two events; first, trade liberalisation 
measures were blocked (1980s) and second, subsidies to exporters were increased. Such 
polices should be fine if they are not excessive and may assist the transition of competitive 
firms into world markets. 
The limits on the ability of political parties to raise funds and the common practice of 
vote-buying (wealthy entrepreneur buy vote for particular party to win the election) which 
is increase the closer relationship between politicians and private sector supporters. This 
mutual benefit relationship creates an economic policy characterised to a greater extent 
by corruption and rent-seeking.  
 
Malaysia 
 In contrast to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have similarly hostile policies 
towards the Chinese minority. Thailand has accommodated this interest since the 1960s 
but not Indonesia and Malaysia. This political fact is added to all aspects of economic 
policy. Malaysian economic policy can be understood through the relationship between 
the main political party (UMNO- United Malays National Organisation) and the allied 
Malayan Civil Service (which together exercised monopoly control over the government 
since independence), and the Chinese business community (Jesudason, 1989; Bowie, 
1991; Koon, 1997). Malaysia experienced a deficit in the 1970s but its high domestic 
saving rates and benefits from trade taxes enabled it to finance the country without 
inflation. The openness of the Malaysian economy helps to maintain low inflation and 
consistent exchange rate policies. 
 
Industrial policy has placed Malaysian the authorities in a dilemma between two 
imperatives: the political interest which responds to the Malay political base and the 
promotion of the Chinese private sector and foreign investors in the name of economic 
growth. The British inherited Malaysian institutional system with its political insulation 
and conservative orientation, plays a key role in understanding how to solve this dilemma. 
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With this this type of political influence and its openness have created both incentives 
and opportunities for rent-seeking.  Prior to the1960s, Malaysia had a strong bureaucratic 
system which dominated the formulation of policy and pursued a course which enabled 
Chinese capital to flourish. The government concentrated on agriculture and neglected 
the importance of infrastructure. The protection was relatively low (Lim, 1992). 
Malaysia’s dualistic strategy is similar to the Korean-Taiwan economic model in the late 
1980s. On the one hand, government strategy was to encourage foreign investment in 
offshore processing industries so that Malaysia could capture more than just its share of 
Japanese investment (Jesudason, 1989: ch6). On the other hand Malaysian strategy was 
to have essential state involvement in the economy such as state-owned and other 
government bodies owned by entrepreneurs. The Malaysian problem was not in 
bureaucracy, as it has a highly competent cadre of British-trained higher civil servants 
(Leigh, 1992;118). It was the political structure which increasingly limited the 
bureaucracy in defining a coherent policy course.  
 
The Malaysian government created instruments to limit Chinese entrepreneur 
movement in the economy through protection, licensing, quotas and government 
contracts. As government prioritised the state-owned entrepreneur in their policies, it then 
gradually became a political empire for the ruling party. Bowie (1994) analysis shows the 
consequences of Malaysian policy which unfairly supported state-owned business were 
inefficiencies and losses in particular projects and erratic growth. Not until the early 
1990s, when the government realised they faced significantly deteriorating economic 
performance, did they start to re- address their policies toward liberalization. The timing 
of the policy change could not have been better as despite the domestic shake-out among 
a number of politically-connected groups, Japanese foreign investment boomed.  
 
Indonesia 
 Indonesia and Malaysia share similarities in the political dynamics of their 
business-government relations. Political structure and political power changed over times 
but one factor is consistent; the link to the power of Chinese-Indonesian capital. Similar 
to Malaysia, the ruling coalition’s central dilemma was the relative economic weakness 
of the ‘indigenous’ Indonesian private sector alternative (Robinson, 1986; MacIntrye, 
1991). This economic preference led to government intervention and to the fostering of 
Indonesian local businesses. The dominant political party (Golkar) did not act as a 
mediator for business interests. Using political power, it directly favoured state elites 
31 
 
(managers of state-owned enterprise, the military, and the president’s family and, 
ironically, the very large Chinese firms) that government’s policy was normally designed 
to contain. Business-government in Indonesia has been through several stages. Initially, 
after democracy, independence created a set linkage between indigenous people and the 
Chinese through party politicians, bureaucrats and the segment of local capital (Robinson, 
1986). During Soekarno’s (first Indonesia president) power (1940s), the government 
applied a strategy called Guided Economy. Under this strategy the focus of rent- seeking 
and backing moved away from parties towards senior civil servants and the military. In 
addition, government focus shifted in a decidedly more statist direction and the stated-
owned firms grew fast. Guided Economy was found unsuitable in the early 1960s as it 
caused a deficit. Technocrats attempted to reform, but the bureaucracy, army, and 
Soekarno military policy disrupted the program. 
 
Indonesian stabilization started under the Soeharto regime (second president who 
was in power for 20 years) in the 1966 Soeharto was assisted by a group of western-
trained economists who designed a stabilisation plan that included a constitutional 
provision that expenditure could not exceed revenue. This new regime under the Soeharto 
Government increased its intervention in the economy. It was built on an explicitly 
corporatist model in which the parties -including the one in power -were involved in 
favour of vertical, state-sponsored interest organisations, including for the businesses of 
the Chinese capitalists (MacIntyre, 1991). 
 
The political structure in Indonesia exhibits greater intervention in domestic 
economy compared to Malaysia. In the 1980s, the new form ‘states’ enterprise was mostly 
owned by the Soeharto family. The Indonesian political economy played a crucial role by 
its impact on the swings in oil price (MacIntyre, 1993). Yet MacIntyre (1992) argues that 
secular trends in the Indonesian political economy may come to play a more important 
role in supporting the trend toward liberalization as the private sector begins to organize 
and to press its claim on the government. While business interest varies by sectors, his 
assessment is that their demands are not necessarily limited to rent seeking; rather, their 
interest increasingly lies in rationalising government regulation of business, limiting 
gross cronyism and promoting a more consistent and predictable framework (it is not 
quote). Their concerns provide a good sense of the lingering weakness of the Indonesian 
industrial policy system. 
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The Philippines 
 In the 1950s, The Philippines had a greater economic potential compared to the 
other countries in the South East Asia region. By the 1980s, The Philippines could not 
keep their economic performance steady; in fact, the government was forced to fight with 
the most challenging adjustment crisis in the region. This poor economic performance 
was as a result of the government adopting the outward-oriented policies at the behest of 
the World Bank and IMF (Bello et. al., 1982). However this criticism is not true as 
domestic structure contributes more to poor economic performance than international 
pressure, particularly a combination of a deeply-entrenched class structure and weak 
political institutions, which have prevented the government from adopting more open and 
export-oriented policies.  
 
The problems were not only because of government support for businesses or poor 
public administrators (Hutchcroft, 1994). The main problem was that the country has 
proven incapable of providing the basic legal and administrative structure for a market 
economy to function. The Philippines economic characteristics could be traced back to 
the nature of its business-government relations. Business organisations, mostly facilitated 
by the highly concentrated nature of family groups, concentrated more on manufacturing 
and service instead of agriculture as the basis of extensive countrywide protection.  
 
The democratic institutions adopted from the United States during the colonial 
period provided opportunities for rent-seeking. In the late 1960s, the country was run by 
Marcos, during which the government attempted to develop a more centralized industrial 
policy capacity, particularly around the board of investments (Doner, 1991a). However it 
was not welcomed by the powerful oligarchy groups which tended to diversify the 
economy towards import-substituting activities. With the announcement of martial law, 
the social politic was no longer ruled by elected politicians. On this occasion the Marcos 
government in charge could build a new a base for foreign support but the real centre of 
decision- making power resided with the Marcoses. As a result a range of projects were 
handled by the Marcos family. The transition to new a democracy changed the 
government relationship with the private sector. The Marcos family and cronies had 
significantly reduced access to government and as a result the private sector non-crony 
opposition gained influence. However, the dominant family Marcos could still get access 
to government indirectly through their support for political candidates. Under the Aquino 
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administrator, the political will was not strong enough to reform the relationship with the 
private sector until Fidel Ramos was in power.  
 
2.2.4 Summary 
 
South East Asian has increasingly nominated become the largest defence market 
in the world for the next few years. This prediction arise from the apparent retreat of 
political authoritarianism over 25 years in this region. Although democracy picture is still 
not the same as UK or US countries have been framed but countries like  Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Philippine, claim by some, are dictatorship in many ways tried 
their hardest to copy “democracies”. In another way to understand the political dynamics 
in South East Asian is to focus on how elites role across the region in participating to 
regulate political conflict. This rising urban middle classes are taking a part in democracy 
only if it is in their favour or suit their interests. The other factors also important in 
shaping the region politic dynamic are religion, ethnic and the power of monarchy. The 
ethnic factor was rather strong in Indonesia and Malaysia as they have similarly hostile 
policies towards the Chinese minority in contrast to Thailand and Philippine.   
   
South East Asia’s openness to trade and investment is important for the world 
economy as many of its countries moving from inward-looking economies dominated by 
agriculture production, to industrialised, outward looking open to trade and capital flows. 
In addition the political system works also has significant influence on how open the 
countries toward investment. It shows below Malaysia was the most favourite place 
accessed of doing business (the chart shows ranking against 180 countries, with ‘0’being 
the top/most favourably assed country, Asian Development Bank, 2009).  
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Table 2(2.2) : Table summary 
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Malaysia economy has been described very open, with gross export roughly equal 
to GDP and net trade (export less import) worth 20% of economic output. This openness 
led the country to have the best growth rate in the region during 1980s and 90s (Asian 
Development Bank, 2009). However the openness of country toward investor did not 
make the country become the most favourite place of doing business. Like Malaysia, 
Thailand was quite open to international trade but it was one of the least accessed country 
for doing business. The chart made it clear that Transparency is more likely that factor 
which support for companies prefer place of doing business. Another example from 
Philippine, although foreign capital flows increase, the environment of long term-
investment was not favourable and transparency among other reason such as shifting 
regulation, and corruption are the reason of Thailand was in the low rank of accessed 
place for doing business.    
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CHAPTER III: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) that contemplate foreign direct investment 
(FDI) have to take the host country’s characteristics into account, including the quality of 
institutions such as government, and the taxes that potentially affect the cost of MNE 
activity within the country. Government factors such as policies, bureaucracy, and 
regulation in host country, has changed in the attitudes towards FDI along with the 
ongoing process of integration of the world economy. The attitude is no longer one of 
control, or of placing restrictions on entry and the operation of foreign owned firms; these 
are being replaced by encouraging policies and conducive environments for FDI inflow 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). This attitude of encouragement also means that the cost of 
doing business in a host country is lower due to attractive taxes.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the theories of FDI and its determinants to 
provide a framework for an empirical investigation of the impact of government factors 
and taxes, among other FDI determinants. This study concentrates on the inward FDI that 
flows into host countries, therefore the review focuses on empirical studies, beginning 
with the location determinants of FDI, especially Dunning’s paradigm, then narrowing to 
the role of government and taxes (direct and indirect) as determinant at both country and 
firm level. The final section of this chapter identifies the gaps in the existing literature 
and summarizes the contribution of the study.  
 
The theoretical variety of approaches on FDI determinants requires categorisation 
of the theories by their common threads (Dunning, 1973; Cantwell, 1991). Some theories 
may be viewed as static and some as dynamic. Static theories only focus on factors that 
lead to the decision in favour of FDI, while dynamic theories consider more factors, such 
as the interaction with host industries or host countries. The FDI literature is growing 
rapidly since firms evolve into multinational organisations. Hymer (1960) was the first to 
systematically explain matters relating to the advantages of large multinationals, 
imperfect markets, and control. The issues were whether firms are better off locating 
37 
 
production in a foreign country rather than licensing or exporting. Vernon (1966) 
developed a theory on technological advantages, using it as the strategic market 
implication of the product life cycle. He then in the later study (Vernon, 1979) reassessed 
his own theory, emphasizing that multinational firms are now more geographically 
dispersed than the product cycle itself and that cycle has considerably shortened. Later 
on, a different aspect of FDI was analysed by scholars including Buckley and Casson 
(1976) and Caves (1982). However, Dunning (1973, 1981) was the first to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the advantage of ownership, location and internalisation (OLI) 
of FDI, although he received criticism for being repetitive, as will be explained in the 
next section. Nonetheless OLI theory provides a structure for a wide variety of variables 
that are believed to be important. The OLI framework has been widely used in empirical 
studies to investigate the locational determinants of FDI and will be reviewed further in 
the next section.  
 
3.2. FDI THEORY 
3.2.1. OLI theory – Ownership (necessary condition) and Internalisation (sufficient 
condition) 
 
Dunning discovered that ownership and location advantages are the factors that 
explain why US affiliates were not as productive as their parent companies, but were 
more productive than their local competitors in the UK. He explored this finding whilst 
working towards his PhD in the 1950s. In the 1970s, Dunning wrote about ownership and 
location. This time he included the Removal of the European Common Market agreement 
(ECM) in the discussion. This removal would cause some realignment of the location 
economic activity in the ECM. It would also be likely to affect the competitive position 
of firms of different national origin and, in consequence, the ownership of production in 
the ECM (Dunning, 1993b). 
 
The eclectic or OLI paradigm has remained the dominant analytical framework 
for explaining a variety of operationally variable determinants of FDIs and the foreign 
activities of multinational enterprises, as described in Caves (1982, 1996) and Dunning 
(1993). The comprehensive analysis by Dunning of eclectic paradigms explains three sets 
of independent variables as motives for foreign production undertaken by MNEs 
(Dunning, 1993). These three components comprise three sub-paradigms. First, 
competitive advantages of enterprises which conduct activities to engage in FDI (or 
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increase their existing FDI), and which are specific to the ownership of the investing 
enterprises. In the eclectic paradigm these are represented as O-ownership advantages. 
Assuming that all things are equal, ownership creates greater comparative advantage for 
investing firms, especially when compared to local enterprises. The second sub-paradigm 
is locational attraction (L). Enterprises choose alternative countries or regions to conduct 
MNEs’ value added production activities. The more immobile the resources or created 
endowment which firms need to use jointly with their competitive advantages (beneficial 
in a foreign rather than a domestic sense), the more firms will exploit the O advantages 
by engaging with FDI. The third sub-paradigm of OLI theory is a framework to explain 
alternative ways in which firms may organise the creation or exploitation of their core 
competitive advantages, given the locational attraction of other countries or regions. With 
internalisation, firms will be able to provide a variety of inter-firm non-agreement by 
buying and selling goods and services and integrating intermediate product markets.  
 
Similarly to internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 1985, 1998; 
Hennart, 1982, 1989; Rugman, 1982, 1996), the eclectic paradigm believes the greater 
the net benefits of internalising cross-border intermediate product markets, the more firms 
are likely to engage with FDI rather than licensing or franchise agreements with a foreign 
firm. In FDI activities, ownership is a necessary condition for a firm, as ownership 
advantages give essential rights and internalisation advantages in order that FDI activities 
have sufficient impact. Given the advantages of ownership, location advantages are 
believed to have additional value for a firm, whether through internalising its intermediate 
product market within its own home or in a foreign country.  
 
This study specifically focuses on determinants of FDI location, however in 
theory it would be profitable for a firm to locate outside its home country if ownership 
and internalisation are achieved, and therefore it is necessary to review the other two 
factors in depth.  
 
Ownership 
The growth of international production has been assessed by economic and 
business theory as dependent on the uniqueness of firms’ sustainable competitive 
advantage in relation to their foreign competitors (Dunning, 2000). Traditional 
neoclassical theory argues that FDI is impossible as all firms have equal access to the 
same resources within their own countries and also have access to immobile resources in 
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other countries. The eclectic paradigm, put forward in 1977, argued that Ownership (O) 
specific advantages reflected the capabilities of the home countries firms to invest (access 
to resources) and FDI would occur when the benefit of exploiting these advantages offset 
the opportunity cost of doing so (Dunning, 1988). 
The extant literature on ownership recognised three main O specific advantages:  
a. Advantages related to the possession and exploitation of monopoly power. These 
advantages are able to create some kind of barrier to other firms’ entry to final product 
markets (Bain, 1956; Hymer, 1960; Caves, 1971, 1982; Porter, 1980, 1985). 
b. Advantages of having a bundle of scarce, unique resources or capabilities. This 
gives other firms which do not have such advantages entry to factor or intermediate 
product markets (Dunning, 1985; Brash, 1966; Safarian, 1966). These identified 
advantages are a contribution from resource-based and evolutionary theories of the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Cantwell, 1994; Dosi, 
Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg and Soete, 1988; Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery, 1995; 
Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1991). See also the writings of Teece (1981, 1984, 1992) and of 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997). 
c. Advantages relating to competencies of the managers to identify evaluate and 
organise resources and capabilities from other countries or regions, and to coordinate with 
their existing resources for long-term benefit under their jurisdiction, including 
transaction costs, learning and accumulated knowledge. 
 
In the last decade O specific advantages have changed, with greater emphasis 
on’their capabilities to access and organise knowledge intensive assets from around the 
world. In order to integrate this, firms need to engage not only with their existing 
competitive advantages but also with other firms in complementary value-added 
activities. Hence, the importance of alliance capitalism, and the need for firms to 
undertake FDI to protect as well as to exploit, their existing O specific advantages 
(Dunning, 1995). As a result, multinationality has expanded as an intangible asset in its 
own right. In response to this, MNEs have changed their orientation, leading to a relative 
decline in market-seeking (MS) and resource-seeking (RS) FDI, both of which exhibit 
more of the static O advantages of investing firms. Such movements (MS and RS) still 
remain, helping to explain a major part of first-time FDI, especially in developing 
countries (Dunning, 1999). However, the decline of static O advantages is followed by 
an increase in dynamic O advantages, which are efficiency-seeking (ES) and strategic-
asset-seeking (SAS). In order for ES to be achievable: (a) the investing firm must already 
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be producing in at least one foreign country, and (b), both for intermediate and final 
products, trade must not be constrained by natural or artificial cross-border barriers. SAS 
FDI focuses on having intellectual capital located in more than one country, and on it 
being economically preferable for firms to acquire this outside, rather than within their 
home countries. In order for these four motives (MS, RS, ES and SAS) to be successfully 
explained by FDI theories related to O advantages, each of the motives needs 
modification.  
 
According to Eirik Furubotn and Svejotar Pejovich, (1974) there are three types 
of ownership: the right to use, the right to enjoy an income flow generated by an asset, 
and the right to change an asset’s form and substance. Related to foreign ownership, firms 
will choose to retain full control over their foreign operations and the right to change the 
form and substance of the asset. Some studies argue that ownership is not important in 
the presence of sufficient competition (Caves and Christensen, 1980; Borcherding et al., 
1982; Millward, 1988). A study by Chibber and Majumdar (1999) using data from Indian 
firms supports the view that, after allowing for a number of critical firm and environment-
specific factors, different categories of foreign ownership have varying impacts on a 
firm’s performance. This study suggests that if foreign investors wish to enjoy relatively 
superior returns in a host country, they should think in terms of investing at levels that 
will provide them with control. 
 
Internalisation 
Studies of foreign direct investment often focus on internalisation advantages as 
an explanation for firms investing abroad. For instance, a study by Dunning (1979) and 
Rugman (1980) suggests that, in some industries high transaction costs induce firms to 
‘internalise’ their foreign activities via FDI rather than export or employ a contract 
mechanism. The modern theory of multinational enterprise applies an internalisation 
approach in two main ways: (1) firms choose the least cost location for each activity they 
perform, (2) firms grow by internalising the market up to the point where the benefits of 
further internalisation are more than the costs (Buckley, 1988). Neither of these 
propositions is independent as the internalisation of markets will interact with the least 
cost location.  
 
Dunning in his eclectic paradigm, included ownership advantages in his FDI 
analysis which according to Buckley is double counting with internalisation. The concept 
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of internalisation is to maximise profit as a strategic move. Buckley and Casson (1976) 
adopted internalisation of markets initially to develop a model of growth of the firm but 
this has often been abandoned by later scholars who take factors such as technology 
capability and/or marketing skill and/or management skills as given (Buckley, 1983a). 
 
Some earlier studies have highlighted the reasons firms decide to invest abroad 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976; Casson, 1979; Caves, 1971; Coase, 1973; McManus, 1972), 
however Dunning’s eclectic Theory (1979) and Rugman’s internalisation approach 
(1980) have become the dominant paradigms that explain those decisions. The eclectic 
theory and internalisation approach are similar in the way they explain the existence of 
firm-specific or ‘ownership’ and country-specific advantages or ‘location’ advantages as 
the most important factors. However, both studies are agreed that this is not sufficient 
without ‘internalisation’ advantages. Moreover, these two theories fundamentally differ 
in that Dunning (1997) proposes that each of the advantages has to be satisfied 
individually for FDI to occur. In contrast, Rugman’s (1980) internalisation approach, 
concentrates on the existence of firms’ internalizing advantage as he argues that the other 
two advantages (ownership and location) are assumed to be already embodied in the 
firm’s production function. 
 
Generally, if an imperfect market exists, internalisation advantage will be 
essential. It is difficult to measure the importance of internalisation advantage; so many 
works and empirical tests have been done to distinguish where the ownership advantage 
ends and the internalisation advantage begins. The common parameter used in some 
studies is an industry’s research and development (R&D) intensity (Horst, 1972; 
Dunning, 1980, 1988; Grubaugh, 1987; Kumar, 1987; Ray, 1989 Yu, 1990). R&D is 
thought to capture the firm-specific assets so that if the market mechanism breaks down, 
an internalisation advantage is created. Another variable that a number of authors have 
also used is a firm’s advertising/sales ratio (Grubaugh, 1987; Kumar, 1987; Yu, 1990), 
which assumes that money spent on advertising and marketing generates firm-specific 
assets through brand recognition and product differentiation. Although the OLI paradigm 
is the theory applied by this study to investigate factors that influence the inflow of 
foreign direct investment in host countries, however, location (L) factors are the main 
focus to be measured as part of the FDI determinant.   
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3.2.2. Location  
 
For the most part, neither economics nor business literature has given much 
attention to the role of location in the emergence and growth of cross-border activities. 
Location-related theories were initially designed to explain location production within a 
nation. However, in the last decade, interest in location-related theories has been shown 
by various experts. These include: economists (Audretsch, 1998; Krugman, 1991, 1993; 
Venables, 1998) and industrial geographers (Scott, 1996; Storper, 1995; Storper and 
Scott, 1995) in the spatial concentration and clustering of economic activity; economists 
concerning the role of exchange rates in affecting the extent, geography and timing of 
FDI (Cushman, 1985; Froot and Stein, 1991; Rangan, 1998); and business scholars 
(Porter, 1994, 1996; Enright, 1991, 1998) in relation to the idea that an optimum 
locational portfolio of assets is a competitive advantage in its own right. 
 
Other theories such as international theory recognised locational advantage as an 
independent factor of transference resource. The OLI paradigm has always acknowledged 
the importance of countries’ locational advantages as a key determinant factor of MNEs’ 
foreign production (Dunning, 1998). There have been numerous studies on the 
geographical distribution of FDI and the location of the particular value-added activities 
of firms (Vernon, 1966; Knickerbocker, 1973; Rugman, 1979). There have been many 
empirical studies of where to locate FDI (Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996); most studies on 
location produce different explanatory variables which depend on the motives of FDI, the 
sectoral composition, the home and host country of the investing firms, and other specific 
considerations. In other words, scholars have extended rather than replaced standard 
theories of location to explain cross-border value-added activities. In addition, some 
studies have embraced new locational variables; e.g. exchange rate and political risks, the 
regulation and policies of super-national entities (Brewer and Young, 1999), different 
cultures, and the different values between domestic and international location choices 
(wage level, demand pattern, policy related variables, supply capabilities and 
infrastructure).  
 
The importance of the knowledge-based global economy and asset augmenting 
FDI leads scholars to take a more dynamic approach to both the logistics of the location 
of firms’ activities, and to the competitive advantages of nations or regions. In the 
previous case, firms need to consider not only the cost of: traditional factors endowments, 
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transport costs, current demand levels and patterns, and type of agglomeration economies 
(Marshall, 1920), but also of related distance transaction costs (Storper & Scott, 1995), 
dynamic externalities, knowledge accumulation, interactive learning (Enright 1991, 
1998; Florida, 1995; Malmberg, Solvell & Zander, 1996), spatially related innovation and 
technological standards (Antonelli, 1998; Solvell & Zander, 1998), increasing dispersion 
of created assets, and of the need to conclude cross-border asset augmenting and/or asset 
exploiting alliances (Dunning, 1995, 1998). Dunning (1977) established a concept of 
investment development paths, which he alleged explain the relationship between the 
levels of inward and outward FDI of particular countries and their stages of economic 
development. Dunning concluded that countries at an early stage of development attract 
inward investment because of their L (Location) advantages (e.g. their possession of 
natural resources and/or of low-cost labour), and at later stages, more efficiency- seeking 
related advantages.  
 
Most literature reviews on MNE activity during the 1970s and 1980s focus on 
decisions to export from a home country and a foreign base (Hirsch, 1976; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Buckley & Pearce, 1979; Davidson, 1980; Dunning, 1980; Horst, 1972; 
Kravis & Lipsey, 1982; Moxon, 1975; Root & Ahmed, 1978; Schneider & Frey, 1985; 
Vernon, 1974). Once a decision is made to produce outside the home country then a 
location is chosen as the next step. By the 1980s, from MNE activities literature, it has 
become clear that MNEs heavily depend on three motives for their foreign value-added 
activities (market, natural resource and efficiency seeking), and Dunning (2009) posits 
that the increase in the new form of cross-border FDI creates another motive for FDI- the 
strategic asset motive.  
 
Resource/Labour-seeking motives  
The main purpose of firms which engage in resource/labour-seeking FDI is to 
obtain specific resources in a host country at lower real cost than their home country 
(Dunning, 1993). In traditional theory, these factors of production are assumed to be 
immobile among nations (locations), therefore they become comparative advantages for 
nations (locations). Firms that possess firm-specific advantages employ these advantages 
to operate abroad to seek low-cost natural resources or labour forces. In principle, firms 
would engage in resource-seeking FDI when they successfully produce or process 
technology with low-cost labour to make delivered cost in the host country, or other 
markets, lower than the cost of exports to the host country (Hymer, 1976).   
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Market-seeking motives 
Dunning (1993) recognised that firms seek market expansion for a variety of 
reasons, such as to: expand existing domestic buyer-supplier relationships in host 
countries; obstruct or avoid being obstructed by rivals’ entry into a particular host 
country; produce products close to local markets; lower transportation costs; and, to 
benefit from investment incentives. Some studies investigated whether market-seeking 
FDI would be more likely to occur in developed than developing countries (Lecraw, 1991; 
Kumar, 1998; Van Hoesel, 1999).  
 
Efficiency-seeking motives 
The motivation of efficiency-seeking FDI is designed to rationalise the structure 
of resource-based or market-seeking FDI. Efficiency-seeking is characterised by supply-
oriented variables, especially related to the comparative advantages of immobile assets, 
e.g. labour, land and infrastructure (Hoover, 1948; Hotelling, 1929; Isard, 1956; Losch, 
1954; Lloyd and Dicken, 1990). There are two types of efficiency-seeking FDI. The first 
is designed to take advantage of differences in availability and relative cost of factor 
endowments in different countries. The second takes advantage of economies of scale 
and scope and of differences in consumer tastes and supply capabilities (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). 
 
Strategic asset motives 
With strategic asset motives, firms intend to source advanced technology, 
marketing and management expertise. They are more likely to invest in developed 
countries than less developed countries because most advanced strategic assets and 
sophisticated customer segments tend to be concentrated in developed countries (Kumar 
1998; Dunning, 1998). Recent studies have noted that firms invest in foreign countries 
not only to exploit but also to develop their specific advantages or acquire the necessary 
strategic assets in the host country (Almeida, 1996; Chang, 1995; Dunning, 1993, 1995; 
Frost, 2001; Shan and Song, 1997; Teece, 1992). This is supported by Kogut and Chang 
(1991), who found that Japanese firms tended to form a joint venture (JV) with US firms 
to source US technology. Another study that recognises Japanese firms’ FDI in the US 
found that it was motivated mainly by capability development (Chang, 1995). For the last 
two decades, the movement of FDI has tended to be strategic and has made location the 
most considered aspect. To find the right location, firms require technical knowledge, 
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learning experience, management expertise and organisational competence. This 
statement is supported by scholars such as Bandera and White (1968), Scaperlanda and 
Mauer (1969), Vernon (1966, 1974) and Wells (1972). The OLI paradigm is arguably 
still the dominant theory used by foreign direct investment studies scholars, however it is 
not free from criticism as will be highlighted below.   
 
3.2.3. Recent criticisms of OLI 
 
Ownership advantages reflect when superior productivity is transferable within 
the organisation at national or international level. For instance, subsidiaries should 
perform better or at least as well as their parent organisation, and considerably better than 
their local competitors. Thus, when the subsidiaries perform the same or worse than their 
local competitors, and hence, much less well than their parent companies, this could be 
due to the non-transferable characteristics of the host economy or location-specific factors 
(Dunning, 1993). 
 
Dunning extended his research on factors other than ownership (O) and location 
(L) by explaining that a firm’s activity abroad related to the way in which it organised the 
generation and use of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction. This factor, 
termed internalisation (I), fully explained the extent and pattern of the foreign value-
added activities of firms. It could also explain why such firms chose to generate and/or 
exploit their O specific advantages internally over acquiring or selling these, or their 
rights, through the open market. These three factors form a paradigm which explains the 
scope and geography of value-added activities by MNEs. 
 
Proposition of the eclectic paradigm: 
1. Firms of certain nationalities hold competitive advantage over other nationalities in 
supplying any particular market or set of markets. These advantages may come from the 
privilege of ownership or access to asset-generating income. 
2. The advantages of internalising the markets for value-added reasons. 
3. The extent to which firms choose to locate these value-adding activities outside their 
national boundaries. 
As the person behind the concept of the eclectic paradigm, Dunning believes that 
this paradigm is best regarded as a framework for analysing the determinants of 
international production rather than as a predictive theory of the MNE.  
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The eclectic paradigm was presented by Dunning for the first time in 1976. It has 
been criticised on the basis that this paradigm is broader than other theories of 
internalisation; such us the Uppsala model (1975, 1977), the transaction cost theory 
(1975) and the Proterian framework of the 1970s. In theory, internalisation is built from 
a combination of firms’ internal and external factors and the eclectic paradigm combines 
exogenous factors such as location and internal factors raised from ownership and 
internalisation. The OLI concept emerged from Dunning’s thesis on the comparative 
advantages of US subsidiaries in the UK in the 1950s. He investigated whether firm’s 
productivity due to the more proficient way US managers organised their resources. 
Dunning stated that the different productivity levels were partly explained by location (L) 
and partly by ownership (O). A specific characteristic of the outcome was that US 
subsidiaries were more productive than the local UK competitor (O) but less productive 
than the parent companies (L).  
 
Criticism of the variables of OLI 
It has been claimed that the explanatory variables in OLI are so numerous that the 
value each produces is almost equal to zero or extremely small. With regard to this 
argument, Dunning made three important points. The first was that every variable 
presented by OLI is well- grounded in economic or organisational theory. For instance, 
variables in location (L) include labour cost, tariff barrier, the presence of competitors 
and agglomerative economics which are contextually related to location theory. 
Internalisation (I) has the same root as the location variables which all relate to the costs 
and benefits of the different modalities of coordinating multiple economic activities. 
These two paradigms emphasise a similar argument to those underlined by the Coasian, 
Willimasonian and Penrosian theories of firms, that the higher the net innovation, 
production and transaction costs, the greater will be the incentive for firms to engage in 
FDI. The second important point of this criticism is that Dunning emphasised that the 
‘eclectic paradigm does not offer a full explanation of all kinds of international production 
but rather points to a methodology and a basic set of variables which contain the 
ingredients necessary for any satisfactory explanation of particular types of foreign value-
added activity’ (Dunning, 2001). The third point is that most criticism is directed towards 
general FDI and MNE activities, whereas general or partial theories like eclectic 
paradigm only explain some kinds of FDI and, the product cycle theory has little 
relevance to resource-based FDI.   
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Similar to Dunning, Knickerbocker’s (1973) oligopolistic interaction approach is 
entirely dependent on the existence of a particular type of market structure. Kojima’s 
(1971) normative macro-economic theory cannot easily incorporate intra-industry 
investment. Aliber’s theory (1970, 1971) is only relevant for explaining multinational 
activity in different currency areas, and the risk diversification thesis by Rugman (1980, 
1997) cannot simply explain much about strategic asset-seeking FDI. So if the studies 
above apply to different aspects of FDI and MNE activity, so does the eclectic paradigm. 
Dunning also emphasised that the OLI paradigm is a triumvirate, each element of which 
supports the others. For instance a firm’s response to its exogenous location factors might 
also be because the firm itself influences its ownership advantages, including its ability 
and willingness to internalise markets. He also underlines that over time the separate 
identity of the variables becomes more difficult to justify. 
 
Conclusion on OLI  
The eclectic paradigm has an interest in explaining the international production 
of all firms from a particular country or group of countries, so that Dunning underlines 
that it is not for comparison with other international theories of the firm. Dunning 
admitted that ownership has direct links to internalisation, although he has emphasised 
that the OLI paradigm factors are not independent factors. In order to prove why 
internalisation is not under ownership he states that internalisation puts the internalising 
firms at an advantage relative to non-internalising firms.  
 
Dunning responds to the criticism about the factors that determine the wave of 
M&As (Merger & Acquisition) or Greenfield investments which can only be explained 
by a reconfiguration of traditional OLI variables. The theory of asset acquisition (asset 
augmentation) seems to challenge research for long time and some insight into this have 
been presented by scholars such as Tom Wesson (1993, 1997, and 2001) and Shige 
Makino (1998). Dunning, linking this with O advantages, admitted that it is difficult to 
deny that the variables determining the wave of M&As are the same as those determining 
inbound greenfield or acquisition M&As. From this perspective, the eclectic paradigm 
can only be explained by a reconfiguration of traditional OLI variables.  
 
Despite some of the criticisms on the eclectic paradigm, this theory is still 
extensively used by scholars to explain FDI for these reasons (Dunning, 1988):  
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1. The main focus of the eclectic paradigm is on explaining the international production 
of all firms from a particular country or group of countries, not of the individual firm, so 
that this theory is not appropriate for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the 
paradigm with other international theories. 
2. Although some O-specific advantages can be the direct result of firms internalising the 
market for their intermediate products across borders, because this internalisation gave 
the internalising firms relative advantages compared to non-internalising firms, it is 
appropriate to refer to internalising as a specific advantage. 
3. Traditional eclectic paradigms may be uncomfortable dealing with the dynamics of 
international production. However, this theory can help to explain why an industry’s or 
country’s international investments may be different at two points in time. This can be 
explained by introducing changes in the exogenous or endogenous variables.  
4. The eclectic paradigm has an add-on dynamic component as an extension of its 
constituent parts to embrace asset-augmenting FDI and cross-border non-equity ventures. 
In addition, it has a clearer acknowledgement of the increasing role of the access to 
ownership of resources and capabilities which positions this paradigm as the dominant 
analytical framework for examining the determinants of MNE activity.  
 
This study focuses on factors that determinant FDI, and especially on location. 
Although factor L (location) from the OLI paradigm is the main reference, it is necessary 
to cite and explore the role of the other two factors, ownership and internalisation, in the 
decision to choose FDI over export. This study explores the effect of location factors on 
foreign direct investment in three separate chapter analyses at the industry (chapter V), 
country (chaper VI) and firm level (chapter VII) in several South East Asian countries. 
The industry analysis will emphasise the role of taxes (direct and indirect) as a 
determinant factor in some South East Asian countries plus China; the country analysis 
will focus on governance and corporate tax, using wider country data sets in South East 
Asia; and finally, the firm level analysis chapter will focus on the regulatory environment, 
including foreign ownership and tax, that impacts upon a firm’s performance. The 
reminder of this literature chapter will therefore be structured around these three topics.   
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3.2.4. The effect of tax on the profitability of inward FDI 
 
The theoretical literature on FDI and tax is extensive. There are three main streams 
of literature, coming respectively from the fields of international trade theory (Brander 
and Spencer, 1987; Dixit, 1984; Ethier, 1986; Ethier and Horn, 1990; Helpman, 1984; 
Hillman and Ursprung, 1993; Horstman and Markusen, 1987, 1992; Katrak, 1977; Lahiri 
and Ono, 1997, 1998; Motta, 1992; Ono, 1990; Smith, 1980), public finance (Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998; Keen, 1991; Janeba, 1995; Wildasin, 1989), and international business 
organisation (Casson and Pearce, 1987; Dunning, 1993). The impact of international tax 
differences on FDI is of increasing focus in theoretical analyses (Fuest, Huber and Mintz, 
2005). The multinational’s preference of location choice is the starting point of empirical 
analysis (Dunning, 1981). The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981) identifies three 
advantages which need to be present for multinationals to decide to invest abroad, one of 
which is the advantage of location (L) offered by a host country. Multinational firms 
should be able to realise their firm-specific advantages compared to local enterprises to 
compensate for the cost of setting up activities in a foreign country. This broad 
perspective on FDI gives room for scholars to consider other factors which influence the 
decision. Besides the type of investment (horizontal and vertical), the theoretical 
perspective on the multinational’s investment in a world of international tax differences 
underlines the importance of other factors influencing FDI, such as tax competition and 
tax incentives, on both income (direct) and non-income taxes (indirect). Direct income 
tax is a portion of individual or business income that is directly paid to government. This 
tax is also known as statutory tax and is imposed at different rates in different countries; 
for instance, Indonesia has a 20 percent corporate tax rate and China 25 percent. Indirect 
tax, on the other hand is less clear, as it is part of goods and services that are initially paid 
to the government by an intermediary, who then adds the amount of the tax paid to the 
value of products or services and passes on the total amount to the end user. Unlike direct 
taxes, indirect tax rates vary across industry.  
 
 In relation to the attraction of FDI (competition in FDI) in recent years, there has 
been a growth in tax competition literature (mainly in the field of public finance). To 
avoid a ‘race to the bottom’, coordination and harmonisation of tax rates have been of 
political interest in Europe for more than 45 years (Neumark 1963). Theoretical studies 
in public economies suggest that tax competition is harmful and tax coordination useful 
(Wilson, 1999; Feld, 2000; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Fuest, Huber and Mintz, 2005). 
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Tax competition (race to the bottom) is potentially harmful as it would erode tax revenue 
and cause tax distortion. It forces governments either to reduce expenditure or to raise 
other taxes that lead to a reduction in welfare. Empirical literature on tax competition has 
vastly increased in recent years resulting in arguments that are as diverse as the theoretical 
analyses (Hines, 1997, 1999; Devereux 2006). The literature supports the view that there 
is a constant association between tax and FDI which has developed somewhat over the 
years. This study investigates this same principle, the association between taxes and FDI, 
with emphasis on less obvious factors, such as indirect taxes, which potentially affect 
profitability. Although this study does not focus on tax competition and tax incentives, 
however, the literature needs to be explored and included due to the fact that lower taxes 
are more attractive.  
  
Tax competition 
The logical assumption is that, if other factors are constant, producers will move 
to whichever country has the lowest tax rates. But this is not necessarily the case, as 
countries with generous welfare states can offer capital, the advantages of an established 
infrastructure, accumulated experience, and have the ability to hold on to mobile factors 
of production, even levying higher tax rates. Wilson (1999) writes: “A central message 
of the tax competition literature is that independent governments engage in wasteful 
competition for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure 
levels.”  
 
A study by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) looked at the impact of tighter goods 
market integration on international tax harmonisation and tax competition when 
agglomeration economies are significant. Becker et al. (2012) explored the tax 
competition across German municipalities since tax is levied at national level and has a 
negative impact on attracting MNEs, employment, and fixed assets invested. The host 
country’s government intervention on taxes (tariffs, quotas, tax holidays and training 
grants) would have substantial effects on the profitability of FDI, as posited by Guisinger 
(1995) who stated that effective protections significantly reduce the burden of taxation.  
 
Before analysing the impact of tax on FDI it is important to identify the variables 
which determine cross-border investment activities, according to the OLI framework by 
Dunning (1977, 1981). Location becomes significant when transport costs are high and 
market size and prices are lower in the home country (Markusen, 1995). Most empirical 
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studies looked at country or company levels of data to explore the impact of tax on 
investment, but not many did so at the sector level. A study by Stowhase (2002) 
investigated whether in the primary sector, investment is mostly resource-driven so that 
tax rates and other economic parameters become irrelevant. He found that in Germany 
and the UK investment in agriculture and mining was not driven by tax incentives, unlike 
the tertiary sector which reacts very sensitively to tax rate changes. 
 
Tax incentives 
Governments award incentives to enterprises through their policies to attract 
investment. The inducements are designed to be measurable in order to increase the rate 
of return of a particular FDI undertaking or reduce cost or risk (UNCTAD, 2000). A study 
by Morriset and Pirnia (2001) reports that tax havens will attract FDI and a host country 
needs to understand how the taxes affect the composition of FDI. Another study by Coyne 
(1994) suggests that small investors are generally more responsive than larger ones to tax 
incentives. It because small companies have a limited budget and human resource, so that 
host countries with better tax incentive would be more attractive.  This is related to the 
cost structure of small companies with a limited budget and human resources,  
 
The advantages and disadvantages of tax incentives are relatively difficult to 
measure, but it is still important to take them into consideration, as countries need to 
realise that the market is imperfect. According to UNCTAD (2000), a regular review of 
the incentives regime will provide significant benefit for government in order to avoid 
revenue leakage. It can be done by eliminating excessive incentive or unnecessary tax 
breaks for investors. With this regular review of their policy, government could design 
incentive that will attract investment. A very early study by Barlow and Wender (1995), 
that surveyed 247 US companies, found that only 10 percent of companies listed taxes as 
their foreign investment strategy. They also found that 11 percent mentioned the host 
government. Although these numbers appear to be quite low, these factors are more 
attractive than other factors such as currency convertibility, guarantee expropriation, and 
host country politics.  
 
Sectoral investments offer an attractive exemption from import duties on capital 
goods, equipment, material parts and inputs related to the production process (UNCTAD, 
2000). From a slightly different perspective, a study by Robinson (1961), using panel data 
at firm level, surveyed 205 companies to identify differences of opinion between 
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government and the business community related to the major factors influencing a 
company’s decision to invest. Most studies completed in 1984 used only US examples. 
Accountable institutions, such as Ernst & Young (1994) and Fortune/Deloitte & Touche 
(1997) found that in developing countries the effectiveness of tax is still of considerable 
importance to FDI.  
 
Competition between countries trying to attract investors can be intense. Investors 
normally make a short list of targeted locations, especially if the potential host countries 
have a similar demographic. For instance, in a study by Charlton (2003) based on a 
General Motors case for investment in Asia in 1996, the shortlist was reduced right down 
to the Philippines and Thailand. Using tax as an incentive, the competition was fierce. 
Thailand was the most attractive location as it not only matched incentives offered by the 
Philippines, but also added a 100% tax refund on exporting car raw materials and a $15 
million grant for a General Motors training institute. 
 
Tax incentives would be seen differently in different types of companies. The 
impact of tax rates for example will generally be higher in export-oriented companies 
than in domestic- seeking markets or location advantages ‒ see Reuber (1973) and 
Guisinger (1985) ‒ and a start-up company would prefer incentives that reduce initial 
expense while existing companies would target profit (Rolfe, 1993). Some interesting 
studies into companies’ behaviour towards tax incentives also made by Hartman (1984) 
and Boskin and Gale (1987) found that host tax regimes impact differently on company 
finances, such as equity or debt. The study is supported by Hubbard (1990) and Grubert 
(1998) pointed out that US companies use debt to finance foreign investment in host 
countries which have higher tax regimes, and equity where tax regimes are lower. This is 
because the debt generates interest deductions for the subsidiary which reduces taxable 
income. In emerging markets, a popular form of tax incentive is to reduce corporate 
income tax with a tax holiday or temporary rebates. For example, some Asian investment 
tax codes have included tax holidays but have different rebates and periods of abatement 
depending on the government’s objectives (Morriset and Pirnia, 2001). 
 
These types of incentives may not provide help for unprofitable companies but 
governments can use other tax instruments. Following existing literature, the focus here 
is on indirect tax and the role of governance, especially corporate governance, in making 
good decisions regarding strategic investment. Although incentives for indirect tax such 
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as exemption from custom duties have been restricted in most international and bilateral 
trade treaties, they do still exist. This study does not explore in detail the technicality of 
how tax rates are set but rather focuses on the influence of taxes (formulated by the 
authorities/government) on the inflow of FDI. However, it is important to distinguish 
between income taxes and non-income taxes.   
  
The effect of Income and non-income tax (indirect tax) on FDI 
Desai Hines’s (2001) study investigated the impact of multiple tax instruments on 
host country tax systems. One of tax instruments is income tax, this instrument that the 
home country (the US) can claim as a tax credit on foreign income but it does not apply 
to non-income tax such as property tax, labour income tax or personal income tax. 
Different elements of the literature argue about taxation and FDI, and especially about 
the impact of host country taxes on the probability that a multinational will choose a 
particular location for investment. Bartik (1985) found that a significantly negative 
elasticity statutory corporation tax influenced new plant in 50 US states. In a similar 
study, Papke (1991) reported that for newly established firms in US (explored in 50 
states), different industries respond differently toward effective tax rates. Devereux and 
Griffith (1998) also found a significant adverse impact of the average effective tax rate 
on the probability of US firms locating in France, Germany or the UK. Nonetheless, most 
of the literature mentioned above highlighted the association between FDI and corporate 
income tax rather than non-income tax (indirect tax), although indirect tax could be large 
and had significant impact on FDI (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2003; Slemrod, 1995).  
 
 The effect of tax on corporate income has been discussed and analysed in 
traditional literature concerning investment. This has highlighted that not only the tax rate 
but also the depreciation allowance and tax burden will differ for different sources of 
finance. The role of corporation tax for production and investment decisions should rely 
on a broader set of tax components rather than only on statutory corporate tax rates 
(Devereux and Griffith, 2002). A study by Egger and Loretz (2006) suggested applying 
both unilateral and bilateral effective tax rates among OECD economies using effective 
marginal tax rate (EMTR) and effective average tax rate (EATR) to explore the impact 
of corporate tax on the production and location decisions among OECD economies. 
 
Buettner and Wamser (2006) support Desai and Hines’s (2004) view that there is 
a significant effect, not only from direct tax but also indirect tax on capital invested in 
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property, plant and equipment. In that study (Buettner and Wamser, 2006) the results for 
corporation income tax are consistent with the traditional view that their impact is due to 
an increase in cost of capital. Tax other than income tax, such as taxes on goods and 
services used as inputs, might have a substitution effect on capital, dependent on whether 
the input sources (land, property or labour) are supplied elastically. Import duties would 
have the same consequences for goods and services if the foreign subsidiary relies on 
imports of intermediate inputs. 
 
Most studies of FDI and tax explore types of fiscal incentive trends which offer 
full or partial tax holidays or rate reductions (Overesch and Rincke, 2008). One similarity 
when looking at a variety of taxes and other measures is that they all vary considerably 
between one sector of the economy and another. This is important as it implies distortion 
in the allocation of resources. The Bureau of Economics in the US analysed the data of 
multinational US firms in 1982, 1989, 1994 with regard to their FDI activities and the 
result indicated that indirect tax influences the location of profit-generating business 
activities (Desai et al., 2004). Associated with one of the study objectives is a need to 
consider more of the underlying profit incentives for inward FDI in Asian economies. 
Developing countries are interesting to look at in this study as they still depend on world 
economic movement and have vulnerable internal matters. From past experience when 
South East Asia was hit hard by the economic crisis of 1997, direct investment could be 
of substantial benefit to the economic development of those countries which tried to 
recover from the crisis. Countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, that were the most affected, decided to provide balanced treatment for foreign 
investors in order to restore their confidence (Thomsen, 1999).  
 
It is part of foreign corporations’ strategy to search for favourable tax treatment, 
and in response to that, governments create a special scheme to attract multinational 
activities. But this could be exploited by firms that legally avoid tax and leave 
governments with a loss of potential revenue (Devereux, Griffith, Klemm, 2002). In order 
to counter this situation governments started to look into solutions other than income tax. 
As mentioned in Desai, Foley and Hines’s (2004) studies, indirect tax in the US is usually 
greater than income tax. From a general perspective, taxes affect capital invested in 
production. Recent FDI activities seem to adjust inputs to combine with output decisions 
(Grubert and Mutti, 1991) thus the choice of locations for production is important. The 
location decision based on the expected profit of an investment in each alternative 
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location serves not only to compare the tax but also sales and market conditions for the 
product (McFadden, 1974).  
 
Location decisions might be affected in different ways by direct and indirect taxes 
on production, depending on the tax structure. Income tax puts pressure on output only 
through its effect on the cost of capital. There are two ways capital input could be affected 
by taxes; the first is related to the possibilities of substituting input in production and the 
second is related to the output effects. If the input (goods or services) is elastically 
supplied, tax raised would have no impact upon the cost of capital, and thus no impact on 
the location decision. On the other hand, if the input does not come originally from 
suppliers it might increase the prices thus affecting location choice (Egger and Merlo, 
2011). The study by Buettner and Wamser (2006) is consistent with the conventional 
view that the impact of corporation income taxes is due to an increase in the cost of capital 
but other non-income taxes such as sales and skilled labour taxes have an adverse effect 
on investment. 
 
An obvious hypothesis is that higher taxes discourage FDI (De Mooji and 
Ederveen, 2003). However, Hartman’s papers (1984; 1985) were the first to highlight a 
way in which certain types of FDI may surprisingly not be very sensitive to tax. Several 
studies, including Hartman (1984, 1985) and Slemrod (1990), point out that the effect of 
taxes on FDI can vary considerably depending on the type of tax, measurement of FDI 
activity, and tax treatment in the host and parent countries. The main discussion in most 
literature is about how the policies to deal with double taxation may affect tax 
responsiveness. To protect MNEs from double taxation, two standard treatments are 
commonly offered by the home country: a credit or a deduction of foreign tax payment 
made by the MNE. The findings of Scholes and Wolfson (1989) with regard to this 
statement are counterintuitive; they show that US FDI comes from MNEs which under a 
worldwide system would be likely to increase when US tax rates increase. This is because, 
under a credit system (in the US) a domestic investor will bear full of the added US tax 
and MNEs under a worldwide taxation system would not see any increase.   
 
Swenson (1994) investigated the differential impact the US 1986 tax reform 
would have on FDI across industries and found that FDI did indeed increase with greater 
average tax rates, but not using effective tax rates. Hines (1996) and Coughlin et al. (1991) 
examined whether state level taxes affect the location of US inward FDI as MNEs may 
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differ in their responses based on whether they face a territorial-tax or worldwide-tax 
system in their parent country. The evidence from literature seems convincing that a credit 
system to deal with foreign taxes from an MNE makes taxes in the host country relatively 
insignificant. 
 
There are still some gaps in the literature as most evidence uses average tax rates 
as the variable interest which has clear errors-in-variable issues, and whether average or 
effective tax rates are preferred as a measurement of tax liability is rarely discussed. Only 
recently has the literature begun to examine other related corporation taxes. For instance, 
Desai et al. (2004b) provided evidence that indirect business taxes have an effect on FDI 
in the same way as corporate taxes. In relation to studies in Asia, Lucas (1993) 
emphasised an interesting finding on taxes in Asia and South East Asia, that FDI inflows 
are estimated to be less elastic with respect to the cost capital (including taxes) than 
wages. An interesting study by Chantasasawat et al. (2004), investigated the role of China 
in diverting inflowing FDI away from other Asian economies, in this case eight East and 
South East Asian countries. Although some evidence does show the movement of FDI 
inflows in China has had an effect upon the rest of the Asian economies, lower corporate 
taxes and higher degrees of openness play a larger role in attracting investment. 
   
Investment along with location decisions can be affected by various taxes. Of 
these, the effects of direct and indirect tax depend on the details of the tax, the production 
technologies and on the market conditions under which the firm operates on its input and 
output sides. According to Hartman (1984), in the last decade most countries, especially 
OECD countries, have competed to reduce their company tax rates to improve their 
investment climate for foreign companies. A few subsequent papers have extended, 
modified or criticised Hartman’s paper, including Boskin and Gale (1987), Newlon 
(1987), Young (1988), and Murthy (1989). Most previous empirical studies focused on 
corporate taxation and FDI employ statutory corporate tax rates for reasons of data 
availability (Hines, 1997, 1999; Mutti and Grubert, 2004). However, tax treatment of FDI 
is generally a complex issue therefore using the statutory rates can be misleading. An 
effective tax rate could capture the interaction of various tax rules within the investment. 
Scholes and Wolfson (1989) argue that the strong inflow of FDI in the US after the Tax 
Reform Act 1986 increased average tax. This is because of the existence of other general 
equilibrium effects of taxes such as good infrastructure. Grubert and Mutti (2000) used 
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more than 500 US tax returns to construct an aggregate data set on average tax rates and 
investment in plant and equipment by US multinationals in 60 locations.  
 
The effect of taxes on FDI has been a topic of discussion in many studies as 
mentioned above, but the effect of indirect tax, particularly on FDI roles, has not really 
been established. A paper by Desai and Hines (2001) used US outward investment and 
found that both direct and indirect taxes have an impact on FDI. Research into indirect 
tax is still relatively limited; the most recent paper was by Buettner and Wamser (2009) 
who looked at the effects of indirect and trade taxes in a sample of host countries for 
German outward FDI. 
 
3.2.5. Governance and FDI: A focus on South East Asia 
 
Asian economies increasingly became a topic in FDI literature as their rapid 
growth relative to other world regions after the mid-1980s meant they became the most 
dynamic region in the world. Following this success, scholars tried to examine these 
countries’ dynamic phase and sought to reduce their heterogeneity in the process of 
estimation (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2000). Using different methods with the same 
location or vice versa, some studies produce different arguments concerning what 
influences FDI activities. Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) used panel data and time series to 
examine the Granger causality relations between GDP, exports and FDI in eight Asian 
countries and found that panel data causality analysis produces superior results to time-
series causality analysis. Studies of FDI in Asia are very limited, especially with regard 
to taxes as the determinant factor.  
 
FDI literature tries to explain variations in FDI inflow and what country-specific 
features encourage or discourage such flow. Singh and Jun (1995) and Caves and 
Blognigen (2005) provide comprehensive reviews of the features that have been 
identified by both theoretical and empirical literature. Determinant factors for investment 
in a location have been suggested in numerous empirical studies in developed countries 
(Culem, 1988; Friedman, Gerlowski & Silberman, 1991; Head, Ries & Swenson, 1995; 
Nachum & Wymbs, 2005; Shaver, 1998; Shaver & Flayer, 2000). Not until early 2000 
did FDI determinants of location focus on transition economies (Boudier-Bensebaa, 
2005; Campos & Kinoshita, 2003; Cieslik & Ryan, 2005; Deichmann, 2001 , 2003, 2007).  
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Factors that influence foreign investment by one country differ from those that 
would influence another; some regions even differ from other regions within a country. 
Childlow et al. (2009), using a multinomial logit model to examine location-determinant 
FDI, show that knowledge seeking factors alongside market and agglomeration factors 
are the main ones that influence inflowing FDI in one part of a region of Poland 
(Mazowieckie, including Warsaw), while other areas are influenced by efficiency and 
geographical factors.  
 
For some countries, FDI plays an important role, including saving them from 
financial crisis. Some Asian countries (especially in 1997/1998) see FDI as a vital source 
during crises, especially in the export sector. Their openness towards foreign investors 
depends on their established policy. In most developing countries, the legal system is still 
not strong enough to put policy in place. For instance, in China, although the country has 
established a comprehensive environmental regulatory framework with a range of laws, 
regulations and standards, the strength and the enforcement are much weaker than in 
developed countries. One might argue that some developed countries relocate their ‘dirty’ 
activities to take advantage of less strict environmental regulations (Pearson, 1987; Dean, 
1992; Copeland and Taylor, 1994).  
 
The magnitude of the effect of government policies on FDI in a country depends 
on the other countries’ (especially in the same region) policies. The Asian financial crisis 
in 1997 and the current world financial crisis are viewed by many as an opportunity to 
implement regulatory and institutional reform to attract more FDI. Investor confidence 
will increase investor activity (Bremner, Thornton, Prasso & Foust, 1997; Magnusson, 
1997). Good governance, in place as part of government policy, is important for 
developing countries, as mentioned in a study by Globerman and Shapiro (2002). This 
study uses the authors’ own composite index to examine the effects of governance 
infrastructure on FDI for developed and developing countries from 1995 to 1997. 
 
An earlier similar discussion concluded that there was no confidence to invest 
between ASEAN neighbour countries (Indonesia to the Philippines and vice versa) 
because of a poor institutional environment (Huang, Morck and Yeung, 2004). Also, it 
was believed that there was no increase in FDI between ASEAN countries because of 
governments’ slow recovery from the crisis of 1997. After the crisis, ASEAN countries 
such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines created reforms to 
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recover. For instance, Singapore rebuilt internal reforms and created restrictions on 
international competitiveness (Chia, 1998). Malaysia focused on its banking system 
(Athukorala, 1998), while Indonesia and Thailand focused on implementing political, 
institutional and regulatory reforms (Chowdhury, 1999 & Poon, 2001) but still failed to 
attract FDI (ASEAN, 2004). One of the reasons why there was no increase in inward FDI 
between ASEAN countries was perhaps because other non-ASEAN countries took the 
opportunity to fill in for the lack of FDI activity. Since the crisis, many studies have 
explored what the ASEAN countries needed to prioritise. Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000) believed that good governance and legal systems are 
important for economic growth and this was supported by Levine (1998, 1999). 
 
Asian countries, as newly industrialised economies, need to pay more attention to 
good governance, especially the separation of control from ownership. The agency 
problem between controlling and outside shareholders is potentially serious, particularly 
for large firms with many subsidiaries (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2000; 
Claessens et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; Nam, 2001a, 2001b). Kaplan, in a study in 
1997, mentioned that corporate governance regulation by Stock Exchange Commission 
(SEC) 1992 influenced the structure of US corporate governance in the 1990s. In that 
regulation, there were two significant changes. One was the lowering of shareholder’s 
costs against underperforming management whilst loosening the rules for shareholder 
communication. The other regulation demanded that public companies provide more 
detailed disclosure regarding top executive compensation and its relation to the firm’s 
stock performance. This study is supported by Alba, Park and Wang (2009) who hold that 
the reshaping of US corporate governance in 1992 had a negative impact on Japanese 
M&A FDI into the US. 
 
Although since the recent global financial crisis Asian economies are considered 
still to be growing but with a lagged development of their legal systems, there are still 
social problems such as corruption. Corruption has been recognized as a challenge in 
most countries in Asia, including China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Korea. 
FDI determinant modelling is complex. A study by Wei (2000) mentioned that the 
‘popular press and policy circles seem to believe that corruption does reduce inward FDI, 
but this to not always the case when evidence shows that Indonesia, Thailand, and China 
still attract large FDI in spite of their perceived high record of corruption. This is 
supported in studies by Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Hines (1995), who found no 
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negative impact on FDI from corruption. However, some more recent analyses have 
reported a statistically significant negative impact of corruption on FDI (Wei, 2000; 
Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). 
 
Institutions are expected to be an important determinant of FDI activity, especially 
for less-developed countries. Poor institutional activity will give poor legal protection of 
assets, increase the cost of doing business and finally lead to poor infrastructure and 
expected profitability falls. Estimating the significance of the effect of institutions on FDI 
is difficult as there are no accurate measurements of institutions. The common measures 
are a composite index of a country’s political, legal and economic institutions, developed 
from survey responses from officials or businessmen familiar with the country. Wei’s 
papers (2000a,b) show that a variety of corruption indices are strongly and negatively 
correlated with FDI, though this contradicts the finding by Wheeler and Moody (1992) 
who did not find such evidence. Hines (1995) anticipates a negative impact from applying 
the 1977 US foreign Corrupt Practice Act which postulated penalties for US multinational 
firms found to be bribing foreign officials with respect to US FDI. This study provides 
hope of even more convincing evidence in the future. 
 
In theory, the encouragement of inward investment can be explained in terms of 
compensation for externalities by the host government. As mentioned earlier, Dunning 
(1996) identified four motives for MNE activity: resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, 
market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking. UNCTAD (1998) added two other FDI 
determinants, namely, the host country’s policy framework and the capacity for business 
facilitation. Business facilitation capacity refers to the provision of a healthy government 
conducive to foreign investors. The movement of capital motivates governments to create 
a desirable tax policy for FDI and provides pressure to harmonize the local tax system 
with the international system, especially for indirect tax which can be unclear. This 
government motives (capital movement), in competing to attract investors, extend this 
study to explore other policies, especially in Asian countries, such as their regulations 
and related measures, particularly with respect to government policies (bureaucracy) 
which have similar effects on the profitability (potential and actual) of inward investment. 
Most investors, especially those who are risk averse, would be cynical about issues such 
as weak of corporate governance, legal systems, and human rights records which are 
known to be common in most Asian countries. FDI expects to have a positive relationship 
with good governance, including bureaucracy, however previous studies on the 
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determinants of increasing or decreasing FDI concentrate more on other factors, like the 
size of the host country, macroeconomics such as inflation, exchange rates, labour costs, 
and the host country’s risk profile, but not many look at bureaucracy (Froot and Stein, 
1991).  
 
Tax policies on FDI are different in each country. In some countries, policies not 
only reflect differences in their economic structure but also historical relationships with 
investing countries. Based on income, lower income countries rely on tax holidays and 
import duty exemption, whereas higher income countries offer investment allowances or 
accelerated depreciation but tax in general would impact the net return on capital. As it 
influences capital movements between countries, the tax effect would be one of the 
priority considerations for each country’s policymakers. Thus, this research will also 
evaluate how tax and other policy or regulatory problems affect multinational companies.  
 
This study will also examine the extent to which other policies, regulations and 
related measures, have similar effects on the profitability, either potential or actual, of 
inward investment in Asian countries. Theories predict that foreign investment has a 
positive effect on the governance of a country (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In addition, 
as foreign corporate practices are more likely to be superior to those prevailing in the host 
economy; foreign ownership participation may provide information and encourage the 
adoption of superior practices in areas such as information disclosure, internal checks and 
balances, and accounting standards (OECD, 2002).  
 
The other important issue is to conduct an appraisal of the extent to which these 
distortions in underlying profitability have influenced observed FDI flows. The final 
objective for this research will be to use the information gained to identify policy 
implications for governments towards inward FDI, with particular reference to selected 
Asian countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, China and South Korea). Many studies have 
been done which identify the influencing factors of FDI, namely the advantages and 
disadvantages for the host country. This research will explore a new angle on the aspects 
related to specific tax instruments and government (bureaucracy). 
 
Location advantage as a source of market imperfection has been highlighted on 
the FDI operation by Dunning’s third explanatory condition of FDI, and hence the 
government policies run by host countries are increasingly important. Several studies 
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argue that countries with government policies that support exchange rates, corporate taxes 
and FDI incentives, will contribute to a more favourable institutional environment and 
are more likely to have a positive impact on affiliate performance in host countries (Child 
et al., 2003; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Lee & Caves, 1998; Luo, 2003; Luo & Peng, 
1999; Pangarkar & Lim, 2003).  
 
FDI movements vary according to the nature of FDI strategy. For instance, the 
entry mode of export or import-oriented capital source (Guisinger, 1985; Root, 1982). 
Government regulation also has an important impact on this strategy as government 
policies on subsidies and restrictions could increase market imperfection. 
Internationalisation literature provides no explicit details of the impact of government 
policies on FDI, however it does implicitly expose the possible deterrent to FDI; foreign 
firms’ lack of familiarity with host government policies (Bhagwati, 1988).  
 
Government policies on trade protection should make firms more likely to 
substitute affiliate production for exports to avoid the costs of trade production. This is 
commonly named tariff-jumping FDI. Comparatively few studies test this hypothesis, 
perhaps because the theory is fairly simple and general. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Kogut 
and Chang (1996), and Blognigen (1997) examine this using industry-level measures. As 
pointed out by Buckley and Casson (1981), one can think of exports as involving lower 
fixed costs, but higher variable costs of transportation and trade barriers. This suggests 
the transition from exports to FDI once the foreign market’s demand for the MNE’s 
products is large enough (Markusen, 1984). Blognigen (2001) considers that trade flow 
may be either in finished products or intermediate products. He examines product-level 
trade and FDI data for the Japanese 10-digit Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) and finds 
that new FDI in the US by Japanese firms increases Japanese exports of related 
intermediate inputs for these products, whereas it leads to a decline in Japanese exports 
of the same finished products. 
 
In numerous studies, the host countries’ economic location includes market size 
as indicated by Gross Net Production (GNP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or growth 
rates as indicators of macroeconomic conditions which have frequently been found to be 
positively correlated to FDI (Contractor, 1991). Some may argue that market size does 
not explain the cost reduction strategy of FDI and how foreign firms compete with local 
markets. Nevertheless, it explains the importance of government policies in at least two 
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ways. First, fiscal and monetary policies that stimulate or deter growth are important for 
market size and growth rates for all goods and services in the economy. Second, 
government budgets are important for market size and growth rates as they have a direct 
or indirect effect on some sectors of the economy. The other important government policy 
on internationalization is its role in the determination of exchange rates, especially when 
currencies are overvalued or undervalued by purchasing power parity (Contractor, 1991). 
The common hypotheses relating to FDI is FDI flows in to the host country’s which has 
lower currency than home country’s (Aliber, 1970, 1971; Froot and Stein, 1989; Caves, 
1988). 
  
Brewer (1993) investigated the impact of government policies and market 
imperfection on FDI. Market imperfection occurs when the perfect market assumptions 
are violated; for instance, foreign-made cars are more expensive when bought from 
countries that do not have a manufacturing base. Market imperfection can be 
decreased/increased by government policies and also applies to FDI. Internalisation 
theory views government policies as creators of market imperfection, making FDI less 
attractive.  
Government policies that are relevant: 
- Monetary policies (money supply, foreign exchange rates, and interest rates). 
These policies potentially improve firms’ competitive position by enabling them to export 
to foreign countries from an under-valued currency to an over-valued currency (Aliber, 
1970, 1971; Caves, 1988; Froot and Stein, 1989).  
- Capital controls and other restrictions on the transfer of international funds. Both 
policies directly affect capital controls which restrict outbound FDI and fund transfers. 
For instance, remittances of profits that affect inbound FDI (Bruck and Lees, 1968; 
Itagaki, 1989).  
- Transfer pricing policies. This type of policy restricts firms in terms of the pricing 
of the goods and services that are transferred internationally between related firms within 
the corporation group. This policy aims to protect domestic firms but discourages FDI as 
a consequence. There is extensive literature on the economic and legal aspects of transfer-
pricing (Booth and Jensen, 1977; Copithorne, 1971; Hirschleifer, 1976; Lall, 1973; 
Lessard, 1979; Mathewson and Quiirin, 1979; Nieckles, 1976; Prusa, 1990; Rugman and 
Eden, 1985). Transfer-pricing is closely related to tax-issues (Boskin and Gale, 1987; 
Caves, 1982; Hartman, 1984; Jun, 1990; Root and Ahmed, 1978; Slemrod, 1989; Young, 
1988). 
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- Competition policies potentially discourage foreign firms from undertaking FDI 
projects. This type of policy is usually absent in developing countries or applied 
ineffectively (Brewer, 1993). 
- Labour relations policies. One aspect of FDI strategy is low cost labour, so 
government policy on a minimum wage or holiday leave can potentially deter inbound 
FDI in host countries and encourage outbound FDI (Bewer, 1993). 
- Intellectual property rights and other government licensing policies (patents, 
trademarks, copyright and licensing agreements). This type of government rule can affect 
the relative attractiveness of FDI (Bewer, 1993). 
 
Firms need to analyse the host country’s government regulation from a 
comparative cross-national perspective. Individual national policies will not impact FDI; 
rather, the effects of one government’s regulations are dependent on their features 
compared to another government’s regulations. In a bilateral host-home relationship, 
policies can either offset or reinforce the effect of one another’s policies on FDI. The 
home country can adopt subsidies on inbound FDI and restrict outbound FDI while the 
bilateral partner (host country) does the opposite (Contractor, 1991; Guisinger, 1985). 
The effects of government policies on FDI depend on the changes in policy as well as the 
difference in the levels of policies of one country compared to those of others. For 
instance, developing countries tend to liberalise their policies towards FDI, and this 
affects inbound FDI in a country dependent on the relative scale of that country’s policies 
compared to other countries’ changes. FDI is a multidimensional, evolutionary process. 
Government policy effects differ across FDI decisions and flows (inbound or outbound), 
it depends on the types of FDI such as new establish FDI, reinvestment of earnings, 
funded by long-term or short-term debt. In addition to that, timing when the FDI was 
conducted is also important. . The table below (Table 3.1) summarises how policies affect 
host and home countries’ FDI:               
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Table 3(3.1): Policy impact on FDI 
 
Source: Government policy effect on FDI (Brewer, 1993)   
 
Froot and Stein (1991) provide evidence using imperfect market conditions to 
analyse why a currency appreciation may increase FDI by a firm. This is because 
appreciation of the currency leads to increased wealth and provides the firm with more 
low-cost funds to invest relative to the firm’s counterparts in foreign countries that 
experience devaluation of their currency. However, Klein and Rosengren (1994) provide 
evidence that exchange rate depreciation increases FDI using various samples of US FDI 
disaggregated by country source and type of FDI. Another study that supports the effect 
66 
 
of exchange rates on FDI is by Blonigen (1997) who, using industry-level data on 
Japanese merger and acquisition FDI into the US, finds a strong hypothesis that exchange 
rates increased inward US acquisition FDI by Japanese firm. Similar studies were also 
conducted by Grubert and Mutti (1991), Swenson (1994), and Kogut and Chang (1996). 
Lipsey (2001) and Desai (2004) examine the effect of large sudden exchange rate swings 
during the financial crisis of the late 1990s and find that FDI flows are stable. Due to 
uncertainty and expectations about future exchange rate movements, Cushman (1985) 
investigated this unpredictable movement. He finds evidence that an expected real 
appreciation of the home currency increases FDI, while the current level of exchange rate 
has no consistent significant impact. Studies by scholars such as Campa (1993), Goldberg 
and Kolstad (1995), and Tomlin (2000) had similar findings that exchange rate 
uncertainty will increase FDI by risk-averse MNEs if such uncertainty is correlated with 
export demand shocks in the markets they intend to serve. 
 
FDI, in terms of capital-scarce developing economies, implies access to not only 
capital, but also advanced technology and know-how, managerial expertise, global 
marketing networks and best-practice management systems of corporate governance. As 
a result of globalisation, increasing multinational enterprise production movement 
networks increase several functions from one location dispersed over multiple countries, 
in order to maximise the benefits offered by different locations. Some East Asian 
countries/locations, such as Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, experience 
developments which have stronger advantages for attracting FDI compared to other 
countries on the same continent, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand (Guha and Ray, 2004). The initial advantage was mainly to exploit cheap labour, 
however rising wages are likely to have thinned this advantage over time. So if China, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore continue to attract high FDI, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand must have some dynamic source advantage other 
than low labour costs.   
 
             The movement of FDI flows varies from more advanced countries to less 
advanced countries. Hattari and Rajan (2009) investigate trends and drivers of intra-Asian 
FDI flows, using the gravity model to test fourteen developing Asian countries for the 
period 1990-2005. This study indicates that intra-regional activity between emerging 
Asian economies is driven by economic factors such as market size (host country), export 
intensity, real exchange rate changes, financial depth, institutional factors (political risk 
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and legal system), and openness.  
Herzer et al. (2007) re-examined the FDI-led growth hypothesis for 28 developing 
countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, and found there was no clear association 
between the growth impact of FDI and the level of per-capita income, the level of 
education, the degree of openness and the level of financial markets in these countries. 
The study further explained the reasons for the failure to find a relationship, which might 
simply be because FDI as a share of GDP during the data period (1970s and 1980s), was 
rather small, so too marginal to have a serious growth impact. Also, the paper does not 
consider the range of possible factors that may affect the FDI-growth relationship, such 
as the difference between countries and types of FDI and the destination sector.  
 
For countries with developing economies ‒ most countries in Asia ‒ FDI has 
become increasingly important as a source of funding to help in debt crisis and to balance 
loan and equity capital in private foreign capital inflows (Chuhan, Perez-Quiros & 
Popper, 1996). In addition, FDI for those countries’ governments can also be a medium 
for acquiring skills, technology, organisational and managerial practices and access to 
markets. Noorbakshs, Paloni and Youssef (2001) evaluated the argument that developing 
countries might enhance their attractiveness as locations for FDI by pursuing policies that 
raise the level of local skill and build up human resource capabilities and they found that 
these factors (skill and human capital) were significant determinants of FDI inflows and 
increasingly so through time.  
 
Only a few studies have been conducted on heterogeneous firms and their 
decisions concerning foreign activities, this is partly because of a limited availability of 
micro data. Most studies on determinants of FDI have been undertaken based on 
aggregate (country-level) data. Dunning et al. have provided macro (country) level data 
demonstrating the increased internalisation of many nations over the past decade. 
Rugman and Verbeke (2004a) argued that the country-level data gathered by Dunning et 
al. broadly supported the idea that regions matter, however it was not highlighted enough 
of the significance. Meanwhile, firm-level data refutes any simplistic notion of global 
integration and its benefits.  
 
Firm-level data on FDI is usually used to analyse firms’ performance and has been 
adopted in many empirical studies (Guisinger et al., 1989; Sullivan, 1994; Contractor et 
al., 2003; Lu and Beamish, 2004; Hennart, 2007). Firm level data can capture individual 
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strategic decisions made by corporations that seek to compete and look for paths of 
international expansion. The importance of firm-level studies has increased in discussions 
aimed at understanding the underlying forces that motivate FDI; for instance, how 
multinational activity affects national labour market requirements. Yet access to 
empirical evidence is mostly based on aggregated data, as firm-level data has so far been 
available for only a limited number of source countries.  
 
3.2.6. The Firm level impact of ownership, taxation and the regulatory environment 
on firm performance  
 
Literature on performance differences among firms is a dominant issue in the field 
of strategy management (Hawawini, Subramanian and Verdin, 2003). In industrial 
organisational tradition, industry structure is the dominant factor of firm performance 
(Porter, 1985), however recent strategic management studies have made a significant 
contribution to explaining that firm specific-factors are the main determinant on firm 
performance (Rumelt et al., 1994; McGahan and Porter, 1997). Most empirical studies on 
performance use the banking industry as a sample, while this study uses manufacture 
companies sample based on sectors e.g. food or textile. Some of the literature on 
ownership effect on firms’ performance is influenced by the property rights hypothesis 
(Galbreath, 2005; Pradeep and Majumdar, 1999), which emphasises that foreign 
ownership displays relatively superior performance.  
 
Some studies have argued that ownership is not important in the presence of 
sufficient competition (Caves and Christensen, 1980; Borcherding et al., 1982; Millward, 
1988). The article written by Dollar et al. (2005) investigated investment climate and firm 
performance through profit and rewards (worker wage). The study used the assumption 
that greater productivity means greater rewards under fairly general (product market) 
conditions and with two different data sets (local firm and all firms), drew the conclusion 
that investment climate matters for productivity levels, wages, profit and growth rates.    
 
A study by Hallward-Dremier et al. (2006) revealed that both ownership and 
investment climate matter to measures of investment, productivity and growth. This is 
because they found evidence that firm performance in the banking sector has a positive 
correlation with foreign and private ownership, light regulatory burdens, limited 
corruption, technological infrastructure and labour market flexibility. A poor investment 
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climate will have an influence at both firm and industry levels. At the firm level it tends 
to impact on the cost of production. Meanwhile, at the industry level, it relates to market 
structure and competition. Manufacturing and high-value service sectors will most likely 
have the most impact as they require more intensive use of ‘inputs’ of logistics, 
infrastructure, and regulation (Collier, 2000). Early studies used industry-level (or even 
country-level) data to examine macroeconomic factors such as exchange rates, taxes and 
tariffs as determinant factors of FDI, while more recent work has used firm and plant data 
to explore these hypotheses. 
 
A later chapter of this study firm performance is measured based on the sale and 
profit made by the firm. These factors could be influenced by external factors such as 
market structure or internal factors such as efficiency and effectiveness in business. In 
the strategic management literature, there are two streams that influence a firm’s 
performance. They are Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and the Efficiency 
Paradigm (EP). SCP implies that a structured market is more important than a competitive 
advantage (Buzzell, Gale & Sultan, 1975; Miller, 1986; Miller & Freisen, 1986; Smith, 
Gutherie & Chen, 1989), while EP supports unit business activities through their 
competitive advantage (Wernerfetl, 1984; Rumelt, 1984; Hamel & Prahalad, 1990; 
Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1991). Although the 
two paradigms have slightly different views, both SCP and EP have identified the factors 
that influence a firm’s performance. SCP literature focuses on industry factors which link 
directly between industry structure and performance through the activities of buyers and 
sellers (Scherer, 1980), whereas EP focuses on unit business activities (unique resources). 
Supporters of EP do not believe there is a link between performance and industry 
structure. EP assumes all private industries (non-government regulated), regardless of 
their structure, are competitive (Demzet, 1973). 
 
In the Industrial Organization Economics literature, the main argument for SCP 
was that an industry’s characteristics are a firm’s determinant factor’ (Porter, 1980). 
Another study by Scherer (1980) also investigated the consistent differences in 
performance between industries. Theoretical frameworks from the SCP model 
highlighted the existence of a deterministic relationship between market structure and 
profitability. The SCP model constrains the behaviour of its component firms, which 
leads to industry-specific performance differentials between firms (Mason, 1939). An 
important line of research within this stream is the role of a firm’s size as a factor in 
70 
 
explaining performance through profitability (Baumol, 1967; Hall and Weiss, 1967). The 
presence of barriers in firms prevents mobility and competition between industries (Caves 
and Porter, 1977; McGee and Thomas, 1986) and reduces the resources available to a 
firm. 
Schmalensee’s 1985 study was the initial investigation to find the contribution of 
industry and firm factors to overall profitability using market share to measure 
heterogeneity among firms. The study reported that industry membership accounted for 
around 20 percent of observed variance, and that market share accounted for a negligible 
amount. This left a total of 80 percent of variance unexplained. To respond to 
Schmalensee’s study, Rumelt (1991) tried to explain the remaining 80 percent with 
further investigation. He extended the data to four years from one year and added more 
terms to measure inter-temporal persistence in industry effects, year effects, corporate 
effects, and effects from corporate/industry interaction. The results showed that industry 
membership explains 9 percent of the performance and 44 percent was explained by 
business unit activities, which raises the debate on the relevance of industry, business unit 
factors and diversification as determinants of profitability. Research tends to lead to the 
assumption that the relationship between market share and performance is ambiguous 
(Prescott et al., 1986), so EP appears to challenge the interpretation of SCP through the 
relationship between market structure and the performance of firms’ efficiency. 
 
EP views a return above average as effective competition (Brozen, 1979; 
Demsetz, 1973; Schumpeter, 1942) and firms can achieve that through satisfying demand 
with lowering costs which over time will increase their share of the market. Unlike SCP, 
EP analyses the dynamic environment by understanding and predicting the result of a 
process. Dierickx and Cool (1989) applied a process approach to explain that unique 
resources are not traded but can be developed over time to enhance reputation.  
 
The SCP paradigm takes competition into consideration but only focuses on how 
firms compete with known rivals in a familiar industry structure. EP allows firms to 
develop broader competition through unique resources and satisfies current and future 
customers. This concept assumes that an industry is heterogeneous and emphasizes the 
relationship between a high concentration industry and profitability and a high 
concentration industry and entry barriers. An article by Jacobsen (1988) finds that 
concentration has an insignificant effect on profitability when other factors are controlled. 
Rumelt (1991) stated that the most important rents (profit) are generated by resources or 
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market position as units of business rather than membership of a group of industries. Most 
studies which support EP should focus on a unique resource as a firm determinant of 
performance (Wernerfetl, 1984; Rumelt,1984; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; 
Conner, 1991; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1991), not on the industry alone 
(Porter, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1987; White, 1986; Miller, 1986; Miller & Freisen, 1986; 
Smith, Gutherie & Chen, 1989). 
 
Factors that influence a firm’s performance 
Of the two paradigms, SCP concentrates on industry variables and EP 
concentrates on a firm’s characteristic variables. Investigating the determinant factor 
using a firm’s level data is similar to an approach used by some authors in the 
macroeconomics (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) or 
social infrastructure literature (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000; 
Dollar and Kraay, 2003). This study specifically follows Dollar, Hallaward-Dremier and 
Mengistae’s (2005) investigation of firms’ determinants of performance that focus on the 
investment climate (infrastructure, role government, and regulation) and ownership. 
Hallaward-Dremier et al. (2006) revealed that both ownership and investment climate 
measure the attraction of investment, productivity and growth as they found evidence that 
firm performance has a positive correlation with foreign and private ownership, light 
regulatory burdens, limited corruption, technological infrastructure and labour market 
flexibility. From studies above, it is clear that the factors which influence firm’s 
performance come from outside and inside of the firm.  
External factors 
- Investment climate 
An article written by Dollar et al. (2005) investigates investment climate and firm 
performance through profit and rewards (worker wages). The study used the assumption 
that greater productivity brings greater rewards under fairly general (product market) 
conditions. Using two different data sets (local firm and all firms), the study concluded 
that a government’s role in providing an effective regulatory framework for infrastructure 
(telephone lines, power), open access to international competition and finance seems 
more important than general issues such as governance and corruption. 
- Competitive condition 
Firms which have export-oriented strategies are more conducive to superior 
microeconomic performance. Harvey Leibenstein (1976), stated that firms that have a 
relatively greater level of export sales face competitive pressure from firms in overseas 
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markets. Imported finished products will also affect the competition for domestic 
industry. However, there is no evidence of how this will impact on firm performance. The 
study by Bastos and Nasir, (2004) suggests that competitive pressure is the most 
important factor driving productivity levels in Eastern Europe and Central Asia compared 
to government regulation and infrastructure.  
- Government and regulatory policies 
The role of government in firm performance has been discussed in a number of fields 
amongst them interest group pluralism, class theory, public choice, organisation theory 
and business politics strategy (Shaffer, 1995). The public choice model underlines that 
firms can negotiate in order to gain government favours, such as sanctioned entry barriers 
and favourable subsidies. Strategic management scholars focus on the effect of 
government regulation between industries and try to control the political agenda for their 
competitive gain.  
 
Internal factors 
- Organisational factors 
A firm’s size can influence performance for several reasons. The bigger the firm, 
the better its capability to diversify and its ability to exploit economies of scale. Although 
large firms have the potential to generate larger returns on assets or sales, they also have 
the potential to be less efficient because of the loss of control by top managers over 
strategic and operational activities within the firm (Williamson, 1967). The size of the 
firm can also influence the capture of market power since some data cannot include 
controls for market structure that are important drivers of economic performance. Some 
studies include a firm’s age as a control variable which suggests that older firms are more 
experienced so they benefit from learning and enjoy a superior performance compared to 
newcomers (Gold, 1981). The other organisational factor which can influence 
performance is diversity. Related diversification is one way to exploit a firm’s excess 
capacity (Penrose, 1959) which may lead to better performance (Rumelt, 1974).  
- Heterogeneity 
Variables under this category are advertising, marketing and distribution. Firms 
spend significant amounts on advertising, marketing and distribution activities with the 
expectation that they will achieve potentially greater profitability. Advertising can lead 
to product differentiation, while marketing leads to more information about a firm’s 
product availability and distribution and widens the physical range of coverage in the 
heterogeneity market. A wide breadth of literature has found that there is a positive 
73 
 
relationship between advertising and firm-level performance (Comanor & Wilson, 1974). 
Evidence also indicates that firms with greater ownership are more capital intensive 
compared to domestic firms (Agarwal, 1979). Fixed assets are the item which should be 
used to measure the intensity of a firm’s operation in order to capture this factor.  
- Dynamic disturbances 
General business conditions have a strong impact on performance. Richard Caves, 
(1992) captured this using inventory and sales growth variables.  
- Top management cohesion  
Top management cohesion is one of the important determinant performance 
factors. It has been highlighted by resources-based viewpoint (RBV) group studies which 
support that resources and capabilities as the main drivers of sustainable competitive 
advantage, especially to those resources which are valuable, rare, difficult and costly to 
imitate and are not substitutable (Barney, 1991b). Strategy literature describes the 
resource-based view as giving superior industry returns (SIR) (Mauri & Micheals, 1998). 
Barney (1991a) defines resources as ‘all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, 
attributes, information, knowledge etc. controlled by a firm that enable a firm to conceive 
of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness’ (p.101). Top 
management’s control of the direction and performance of the firm probably means 
(Smith et al., 1994) that RBV is a logical concept which points out that key intangible 
resources can be a strategic asset to the firm’s top management team. A study by Mullen 
and Copper (1994) found that cohesion is positively associated with team performance, 
provided that the team adopts norms of high performance. Michel and Hambrick (1992) 
and Smith et al. (1994) found a positive relationship but neither established cohesion as 
an intangible strategic asset (SA). 
 
Top management team cohesion (TMTC) qualifies as an SA characteristic which 
is rare, difficult and costly to imitate for several reasons. First, there is a similarity of 
background, experience and values (Hogg, 1992). Second, TMTC has unique historical 
conditions so that it is rare and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991b). Third, it is a socially 
complex phenomenon as it has the unique attributes of team members and their attraction 
to one another and the team (Barney & McEwing, 1996). Fourth, TMTC has invisible 
resources, making it hard to imitate (Godfrey & Hill, 1995). Fifth, even if a competitor 
could imitate the team, the result could be ambiguous (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990). Sixth, 
it is very costly; if a competitor tried to replicate the model, they would have to change 
the entire top management team. In order to explore the internal factors that contribute to 
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firm performance, the strategy literature provides a wide range of studies, and it is 
necessary to include management role as part of company strategy.   
 
Foreign firm performance in developing countries 
The common characteristics inherent in a developing country are incomplete 
markets and various forms of market failure; most cases experience this on market 
takeover. The reasons behind the weakness of the market for corporate control and 
enterprise performance in developing countries are that there is no information about true 
company performance, the cost transaction of a takeover is high and the regulation in 
such countries is very rigid because of often-justified fears of monopoly and foreign 
exploitation. Governments in developing countries tend to have a big influence on market 
takeovers so that the success or failure in the takeover process is dependent to a large 
extent on the ability of a potential raider to garner government support. Based on these 
weaknesses characteristic ownership will not matter significantly in developing countries 
(Sarkar, 1998). Empirical studies which highlight the relationship of ownership-
performance within the institutional specifics of a developing country are investigated by 
Kim (1981), Hill (1982), and Mohamed (1992), although the result is still not clear.  
 
Industry factor vs. firm-specific factors’ determinant  
Industry theories of industry factors, and RBV, favour firm specific factors when 
considering which one influences performance. Initial work on this concept was by 
Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991) followed by a number of empirical studies 
examining the relative importance of these two factors.   
 
Industry  
In industrial organisational economics literature, the main arguments concerned 
the structural characteristics of industries as primary determinants of performance (Porter, 
1980). Other studies such as Scherer (1980) investigated the consistent differences in 
performance between industries. The theoretical framework from industrial 
organisational economics is the SCP model, which highlighted the existence of a 
deterministic relationship between market structure and profitability. This model 
constrains the behaviour of its component firms, which leads to industry-specific-
performance differentials between firms (Mason, 1939). An important line of research 
within this stream is the role of firm size as a factor explaining performance through 
profitability (Baumol, 1967; Hall, 1967; Weiss, 1967). The presence of barriers to 
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mobility for firms within a group of industries (Caves and Porter, 1977), the dimension 
of competition between industries (McGee and Thomas, 1986) and a resource- based 
view of the firm influence firms’ performance between industries. Research tends to lead 
to the assumption that the relationship between market share and performance is 
ambiguous (Prescott et al., 1986), and this is supported by Schmalensee (1985), whose 
study results show that market share actually has a negligible impact on performance. 
 
Firm-specific factor 
Firms have specific intangible assets such as technologies and managerial skills 
which enable them to have multiple plants. The potential for market failure connected 
with these assets leads MNEs to engage in FDI activity through internalization. Early 
theories on this concept include Williams’s work on transaction costs and the 
development of the OLI paradigm by Rugman (1980) and Dunning (2001). FDI literature 
suggests that R&D is almost constantly proved to have a positive correlation with firms 
becoming multinational. Morck and Yeung (1992) found that publicly-traded US firms, 
announcing foreign acquisitions, experienced positive abnormal returns to their stock 
only if they had a significant level of R&D and advertising intensity. However, some 
evidence provided by Kogut and Chang (1991) and Blonigen (1997) showed that firms 
that are lacking R&D or innovation relative to their industry competitors are the ones 
most likely to engage in FDI.  
 
Human capital (training and education) has a direct impact on productivity 
through workers, better decisions, and organisation of work or supervision (Rosen, 1982; 
Gemmel, 1997). Technology capital (value of patents, accumulated R&D expenditure) 
also has an effect on productivity as a source of innovation, and consequently contributes 
added value. Microeconomic literature focuses on the static effect of human capital in the 
form of training that has a significant rate of return on investment (Bartel, 1992). A later 
study by Black and Lynch (1996) proved the opposite ‒ that training expenditure had a 
significant rate of return for the year 1990 but not for the later year sample of 1993. 
 
Conclusion 
Governance and taxes are not unique variables in determining the flow of foreign 
direct investment, however their impact is less explored in Asian countries. The 
magnitude of the impact depends on the country’s condition, policies, and also its history. 
Despite their complicated and dysfunctional bureaucracy, Asian economies increasingly 
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became a topic in the FDI literature as their rapid growth relative to other world regions 
after the mid-1980s meant they became the most dynamic region in the world. Although 
these economies are considered to be growing following the recent global financial crisis, 
albeit with a lagging development of their legal systems, they still suffer from social 
problems such as corruption.  
 
 The theoretical variety of approaches on FDI determinants requires categorisation 
of the theories by their common threads (Dunning, 1973; Cantwell, 1991) in which 
location is one of the most common determinants. Location advantage as a source of 
market imperfection has been highlighted on FDI operation by Dunning’s third 
explanatory condition of FDI, and hence the government policies of host countries, 
including their tax and bureaucracy are increasingly important. Despite criticism, 
Dunning’s OLI theory has been used extensively in empirical studies to investigate 
locational determinants of FDI. The eclectic paradigm sets out to explain the international 
production of all firms from a particular country or group of countries, so Dunning 
underlines that it should not be compared with other international theories of the firm. 
Dunning admitted that ownership has direct links to internalisation, although he 
emphasized that the OLI paradigm factors are not independent. Both taxes and 
government bureaucracy are among the set of determinant factors of FDI location that 
have vastly increased and need to be explored.  
 
 The impact of international tax differences on FDI is of increasing focus in 
theoretical analyses (Fuest, Huber and Mintz, 2005). The multinational’s preference of 
location choice is the starting point of empirical analysis (Dunning, 1981). The eclectic 
paradigm (Dunning, 1981) identifies three advantages that must be present for 
multinationals to decide to invest abroad, one of which is the advantage of location (L) 
offered by a host (investment destination) country.   
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CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
   
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The general approach of this thesis is based on the OLI paradigm associated with 
Dunning (1977, 1993). The particular focus is on the location aspects of this body of 
theory.  This is a theoretical foundation and not an empirical methodology.  It has given 
rise to an extensive empirical literature on the determinants on inward FDI covered in the 
review of literature  The methodology employed here is in the same tradition, applied to 
a number of different Asian countries. 
 
Asian economies have heterogeneous backgrounds with respect to their political 
and legal systems, socio-cultural differences, development stages, and the degree of 
economic dynamism, which are expected to affect the location choice of the investor. 
Dunning (1977, 1993) developed a comprehensive explanation through an eclectic 
paradigm on FDI activities. Location advantages can be investigated through host country 
specific variables, while both ownership and internalisation advantages can be 
investigated through firms’ specific factors. This study tries to capture the three 
advantages through country data analysis to examine location advantages and firm data 
analysis to examine ownership and internalisation advantages.  
 
Looking at the concept of economic efficiency, the eclectic paradigm suggests 
that foreign firms are motivated to exploit location specific advantages provided by a host 
country through internalising their firm specific advantages. Dunning (1977, 1993) 
formulates four primary motivations for FDI as a location choice, namely market-seeking, 
nature-resource seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset seeking and these motives 
are tested in this study as part of determinant factors. An institutional approach however 
emphasizes that foreign firms also require institutional legitimacy in order to survive and 
succeed in challenging foreign environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The crucial 
difference between these two approaches in addressing the issue of location FDI lies in 
the primary criterion for selecting a location. The eclectic paradigm focuses on economic 
efficiency as the determinant of location choice, so that the ability of institutions to reduce 
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costs in uncertain environments such as MNE investment strategy is the form of similarity 
of the institutional approach to an MNE investment strategy (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & 
Wright, 2000). On the other hand, the institutional approach regards institutional 
legitimacy as the primary criterion (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990).  
 
In the case of this study, I examine the impact of the uncertain environment factors 
as a result of government regulation of FDI and how tax policies interact with the other 
four motivation factors suggested by Dunning on FDI inflows. Based on institutional 
environment support, regulative system will influence future behaviour (Trevino, 
Thomas, and Cullen, 2008). In order to gauge the impact of taxes and government 
regulations on FDI, this study applies the quantitative method. This research will be based 
on data and information from secondary sources. The data is acquired from sources such 
as Input-Output (I-O) tables from each Asian country, World Investment United Nations 
conference of Trade Development (UNCTAD), and World Government Indicators. 
Different levels of data will be analysed using pluralistic approaches to be able to gain 
detailed knowledge about the data (Creswell, 2009). This study examines the causality 
using an econometric model and tests it with three type of regression (OLS, fixed effect 
and Propensity score matching).  
 
This study analyses the interaction of taxes and governance on inward FDI in 
section. It starts with exploring taxes by sector (Chapter V), using I-O tables to access 
three pieces of information: 1. to measure the different capacity of tax of the business 
sector in selected Asian countries; 2. to identify business sectors most affected by taxes; 
3. to access how far differences in taxation between Asian countries have led to 
differences in patterns of firms’ performance by industry. The next analysis to be 
discussed in Chapter VI uses country level data to explore and investigate determinants 
of governance on FDI location. This part of the analysis applies a model which specifies 
using a panel regression analysis and three different panel estimation techniques (pooled 
ordinary least square, fixed effect and score matching analysis) in this study. The last part 
of the analysis in this study uses firm level data to explore how taxes and governance 
variables impact firms’ performance. On this last section of analysis, OLS, panel fixed 
effect and propensity score matching are used to measure the impact of government and 
tax on firms’ performance.  
 
79 
 
4.2. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
 
For the purpose of this research study, a philosophy of positivism was adopted. 
Due to the nature of study, which explores the impact of tax and governance, it is crucial 
to ‘observe and describe reality from an objective viewpoint’ (Saunders et al.2014). As 
the research uses secondary data during data collection, this philosophy allows for an 
emphatic stance to be adapted and the opportunity to ‘observe, discover, derive and test 
theories in objective way’ (Saunders et al. 2014). Unlike the philosophy of interpretivism, 
which has stance of a social science, the philosophy of positivism has a stance of a natural 
science (Saunders et al. 2012). This enables the research study to become more reliable 
and objectives, rather than rely on certain object viewpoints. As stated by Beck (1979) 
(cited by Cohen et al., 2011) “ All genuine knowledge is based on sense experience and 
can only be advanced by means observation and experiment” , which relates to the 
research topic of exploring the impact of tax and governance on FDI. Pragmatism was 
another philosophy that was deemed unsuitable for this research study, as like 
interpretivism, it “relates to social study” (Saunders et al. 2012). Moreover, Saunders et 
al. (2012) states that positivism is highly appropriate in economics research.  
 
4.3. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
An inductive research approach works from specific to general. It starts from 
observations, finds patterns, creates hypotheses and finally forms a theory from these 
hypotheses (Saunders et al. 2012). A deductive approach works from general to specific. 
It starts from developing a theory (out of previous findings), derives hypotheses from this 
theory, make observations and finally uses these to reject or to accept the hypothesis. 
In this instance, the research approach is focus on inductive method as it does not involve 
formulation of hypotheses and this study tries to answer research questions, aims and 
objectives.  
 
4.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY  
 
This study applies deductive approach which it  was to use secondary data to test 
various key hypotheses about the role of tax and governance as determinants of inward 
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FDI in selected Asian economies.  These issues are explored at three different levels: 
country, industry and firm.   
  
4.5. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
As discussed earlier the approach of this study is to seek to assess the effect taxes 
and governance have on inward FDI in selected Asian countries. In order to investigate 
the impact of these two main variables, this study creates three different objectives and 
analyses. 
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Figure 4(4.1): Model specification and hypothesis 
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4.6. OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
A wide empirical literature has evolved concerning the determinants of the 
location of FDI with a special focus on the effect of tax and governance on FDI allocation. 
It can be classified along three dimensions: the type of data used (time series, cross-
section, panel data), the level of aggregation, and the stage of transnational investment 
decisions analysed in the relevant studies (Deveruex, 2006). 
 
Aggregate time series data are used by many scholars (Hartmant, 1984; Boskin & 
Gale, 1978; Young, 1988; Murthy, 1989; Slemrod, 1990; Cassou, 1997; Grubert & Mutti, 
1991; Hines & Rice, 1994; Hines, 1996) and it has been a pioneer in FDI research. On 
empirical tax studies, the early approach by Hartman (1984) has been selected by 
researchers, which used longer time series and varied the underlying data as well as the 
specification (Boskin and Gale, 1987; Newlon, 1987; Young, 1988; Murthy, 1989). 
However, the panel data analysis of aggregate FDI is the one that found that location 
choice is indeed affected by taxation (Senson, 1994; Billington, 1999; Broekman and van 
Vliet, 2001).  
Like many empirical studies the foundation is the locational aspects of OLI theory. The 
preferred location of FDI is closely related to the comparative advantages of the countries 
and industries provided the FDI enters a tradable sector of the economy. Foreign investors 
would not enter countries or industries with no advantages and with low returns on their 
investments. In this study the model commences with sector analysis and continues with 
country level and then firms’ level analysis. Each stage of analysis are presented in the 
following chapters. 
 
4.6.1. Industry sector analysis 
 
In this part of the analysis, this study investigates the effects of indirect taxes on 
profitability by sector between selected Asian countries. This section uses input-output 
(I-O) tables for three Asian countries (Indonesia, China and South Korea) to investigate 
the effects of indirect tax on underlying profitability. This chapter presents estimates by 
industry of the importance of indirect taxes in relation to gross operating surplus using an 
average effective tax rate to measure the actual expenditure by each sector in each 
country. Input-Output tables for individual countries provide details of their specific 
production structure. The table describes the inter-related and mutually dependent 
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relationship between industries. The tables can be used to identify taxes paid by business 
on production. This study will look closely at the significance of these taxes in relation 
to profits. 
 
I-O tables have been increasingly used to analyze production costs and policies. There is 
wide body of literature which uses I-O tables in various applications. One such study is 
by Chamberlain who used traditional techniques using I-O tables to access household 
burdens and the economic impact of US government policy.  
The data sources used were Input-Output Supply Use table 2005 Industries Intermediate 
Consumption in 2005 called the ‘Combined Use’ matrix. The ‘Combined Use’ matrix 
provides detailed analysis of the production account for all three selected Asian 
economies, on an annual basis at current prices. The Input-Output Supply-Use table is 
supplemented with information contained in sectors statistics for China, South Korea and 
Indonesia regions datasets from the Department of Statistics of each country. 
I-O analysis is applied to domestic industry Supply-Use (SU) data to estimate energy and 
emissions resulting from each sector. I-O tables are compiled using data from national 
accounts as well as other national economic sources to show economic transactions 
between all product sectors of the national economy (Acquaye and Duffy, 2009). 
 
To identify the indirect taxes paid by sectors, the I-O analysis method quantifies 
the interrelationships amongst the sectors of each of the selected Asian economies. An I-
O table describes the flow of goods and services between all individual sectors of a 
national economy over a stated period of time, say, a year (Leontief, 1986, p.19-20). Each 
sector’s production structure describes, quantitatively, the inputs it uses and the outputs 
it produces (Lin and Francis, 2004). Breaking the economy down to display transactions 
of all goods and services between industries and final consumers (Lin and Francis, 2004), 
the I-O table used here describes the three selected Asian national economies.  
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The structure of I-O SUTs used here is as follows: 
 
Table 4(4.1): Input Output table 
 
 
 
The I-O model can be divided into four quadrants. The first quadrant of the I-O 
model is the exchange of goods and services which are both produced and consumed in 
the process of current production. This is usually referred to as the inter-industry flows 
or intermediate demand/intermediate consumption. The second quadrant is the final 
demand for the output of each producing sector. Final demand is the demand, use or 
consumption of products and services by, say, households. In the third quadrant primary 
inputs to the productive sectors are represented. These are not part of the output of current 
production as defined by the first quadrant. These are the taxes, subsidies, employee 
compensation etc. The fourth quadrant represents the primary inputs that go directly to 
the final demand sectors. In an I-O table the total value of output for each productive 
sector i.e. the row total, is always equal to its total expenditure on inputs i.e. the column 
total (O’Connor and Henry, 1975). However, no such equality is imposed on final demand 
sectors or on the primary input sectors (Ciaschini, 1988; O’Connor and Henry, 1975; 
Leontief, 1986). 
 
 
 
 
SUPPLY 
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
 
USE 
Industry Industry Final demand at purchaser’s prices 
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
 
Domesti
c supply 
at basic 
prices 
Im
p
o
rt
s 
g
o
o
d
s 
an
d
 s
er
v
ic
es
 
D
is
tr
ib
u
to
r’
s 
tr
ad
in
g
 m
ar
g
in
s 
T
ax
es
 –
su
b
s 
p
ro
d
. 
T
O
T
A
L
 S
U
P
P
L
Y
 
Int. demand 
at purchasers 
prices 
T
o
ta
l 
in
t.
 d
em
an
d
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
N
P
IS
H
s 
G
en
er
al
 g
o
v
t 
G
ro
ss
 f
ix
ed
 c
ap
it
al
 
v
al
u
ab
le
s 
C
h
an
g
e 
in
 i
n
v
n
tr
s 
E
x
p
rt
s 
g
o
o
d
s/
se
rv
. 
to
ta
l 
d
em
an
d
 
Total int. 
con. 
Taxes-subs. 
Prod 
Employee 
compens. 
GOS 
TOTAL 
OUTPU
T 
 TOTAL 
OUTPUT 
85 
 
4.6.2. Country level analysis 
 
The country level analysis more closely follows the empirical literature on the 
determinants of inward FDI based on the predictions of OLI theory. The relevant chapter 
analyses the effects of tax and government regulation on inward FDI at the country level. 
This is estimated as part of a wider specification of the determinants of the location of 
FDI. The main interest variables influencing FDI in this section will be national tax and 
regulation. The other control variables are established from the OLI concept of motives 
FDI (market size, resources, efficiency, and strategic asset seeking). For this part of the 
analysis, economic regressions are applied (OLS and fixed effect) to 23 countries during 
the period 2002-2020 (nine annual observations for each). The data are collected from 
several sources such as UNCTAD (FDI measures), World Development Indicators 
(market size, natural resources and other control variables), and World Bank Governance 
Indicators. The data for the country level analysis were taken from the World 
Development Indicators database produced by the World Bank. The sample comprised 
22 different Asian countries which are divided to two categories, higher income and lower 
income country (see table below).  
 
Table 5(4.2): Lower and Higher income countries in ASIA 
 
The firm level analysis used data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam conducted in 2009. The study focuses on firm performance 
as reflected in the questionnaire responses given by firms in host countries.  Only 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Philippine had directly comparable questionnaires so that only 
these three countries in South East Asia could be used.  
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4.6.3. Firm level analysis 
 
In this part of the analysis, the study will explore the effect of government and 
taxes on firms’ performance in three Asian countries Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Vietnam. Using data for both domestic and foreign owned firms, it addresses how firm 
performance is affected by governance and tax in a host country whilst achieving overall 
profitability objectives. This part of the study uses a regression approach. The regression 
models used in this section are OLS and a cross-sectional least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) model. The data were taken from World Bank enterprise surveys for each of a 
number of Asian countries. These surveys are conducted based upon a standardised 
questionnaire however the questionnaire actually employed in any one country can vary 
quite significantly between one country and another.  At best this creates a time 
consuming task of matching replies to the same question set in different questionnaires 
and at worst it creates problems of compatibility which prevent some countries being 
combined into the same sample. For details of World Bank enterprise surveys see: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
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CHAPTER V: THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON THE 
PROFITABILITY OF INWARD FDI: A SECTOR LEVEL 
ANALYSIS  
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The key objective of this analysis is to examine the effect of taxes on inward 
investment. In particular it considers the effect of indirect taxes, which are rarely 
considered in the context of FDI. It assumes that the fundamental motivation of 
companies is profit maximisation, so (all other things being equal) that the lowest tax on 
profit is the most attractive option.  This is possibly why some locations are more 
attractive than others for foreign investors. This chapter also highlighted of applying the 
effective tax rates rather than simply comparing statutory tax rates imposed by selecting 
Asian countries, as part of investigation of the possible impact of taxes on foreign direct 
investment.  
 
Recent research has tended to focus on effective rather than statutory tax rates. 
Effective rates vary in a more arbitrary and unpredictable way than statutory rates. With 
indirect taxes it is even more likely that effects will vary between one industry and 
another. For example, taxes on energy or labour can be expected to affect energy intensive 
or labour intensive industries much more than others. There have been very few previous 
studies on taxes of FDI in ASIA (with the exception of China). This chapter therefore 
contributes to understanding of inward direct investment in Asia more widely. The role 
of direct taxes (on corporate income) on inward FDI has been well explored in the 
literature but there has been much less attention devoted to the impact of indirect taxes, 
none specifically dealing with Asia. The contribution is not just to cover an under-
researched topic: the analysis shows that ignoring indirect taxes is a potentially serious 
omission. Many studies on inward FDI are conducted at country level. Indirect taxes such 
as import tariffs operate at the sector level.  This chapter also provides insights as to how 
indirect taxes alter incentives to invest in one sector rather than another. 
 
 
The measurement of indirect taxes is complex. In most cases there are numerous 
taxes, levied on a variety of different tax bases. Calculation of average effective rates in 
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relation to the tax base is not the most satisfactory way to assess the impact on FDI, which 
is more likely to be related to expected profits than, say, energy costs in isolation. To 
overcome this, this study does not use average effective tax rates in the normal way but 
calculate a similar measure in which the total expenditure on a number of indirect taxes 
is expressed as a proportion of gross operating surplus. In effect, this calculates a package 
of indirect taxes as an average effective profit tax ‘equivalent’. A study by Desai et al 
(2004) which investigated the impact of taxes, direct or indirect, on foreign direct 
investment found that there was a strong association between the three.  The evidence 
indicates that direct and indirect tax affect American multinational firms in the allocation 
of their assets, and this is something from which host countries could learn when 
competing for foreign investors.   This study analyses the direct and indirect taxation of 
selected Asian host countries and how this affects them relative to international 
competition. 
 
In an ideal situation it would be possible to construct a sample comprising a time 
series, not just for a sample of industries in a single country, but for a number of countries. 
This study attempted to do this, but the data are only available for a single year in some 
Asian countries. To establish the difference between countries in the burden of tax in 
different sectors, this study uses an input-output methodology to consider how national 
taxes affect current and potential profitability in different sectors of an individual 
economy. The underlying reason for such an examination is to analyse how national taxes 
currently affect and have affected the underlying profit incentives to undertake 
investment in one country and in one sector rather than another. Although no specific 
distinction is made in the analysis between domestic and foreign investment the analysis 
is particularly relevant for the location of inward foreign direct investment where firms 
can choose the most favourable location.  
 
Indirect as well as direct taxes have the potential to significantly affect the 
underlying profit incentives for investment. This effect can vary considerably by sector 
and by country. This chapter analyses the effect of taxes on sectors; the effect on countries 
is analysed in a separate chapter. The aim of this chapter is to understand whether or not, 
and if so to what extent the underline profit incentives for FDI in different sectors are 
changed by the taxes, both direct and indirect, of the chosen host countries. So the focus 
here is to determine how taxes affect the underlying profit incentives for inward FDI in 
the Asian economies of Indonesia, China and South Korea. Using these countries’ data, 
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this chapter presents estimates from industry of the importance of indirect taxes in relation 
to gross operating surplus using average effective tax rates to measure the actual 
expenditure by each sector in each country. 
 
 
5.2. TAXES AND FDI 
 
There has been considerably research on FDI flows in Asian economies. In line 
with the growth of inward FDI across different sectors, foreign investors have realised 
the importance of the Asian markets in terms of their size, fast economic growth, and the 
low labour costs for their operation and investment. The huge Asian population can be 
one of the big attractions as there are more potential customers. Most of the studies on 
FDI have focused on looking at which are the main investors and recipient countries but 
little has been written about the role played by production cost differentials and taxes in 
attracting FDI at a sectoral level. Vu, Gangnes and Noy (2008) have shown that FDI 
inflows are not uniformly distributed across production sectors in China and Vietnam 
because of government policy and tax treatment.  
 
Many studies have found that variables such as Research and Development 
(R&D), factor cost differences, advertising expenditure, wages, trade costs, market size 
and taxation attract FDI in developed countries (Carr, Markusen & Maskus, 2001; Disdier 
& Mayer, 2004; Hanson, Mataloni & Slaughter, 2001; Yeaple, 2003). However, these are 
not necessarily the most important factors in developing countries given the existence of 
a deficient infrastructure, high financing constraints, weak institutions, and a lack of 
skilled labor. Most of these variables will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
Taxes should influence investor decisions with regard to location of their 
investment. However, some studies have found that taxes have no impact at all; some 
have found a negative robust impact and a few studies have found a positive impact 
(Carlton, 1983; Moore, Steece & Swenson, 1987; Hines, 1996; Ondrich & Wasylenko, 
1993; Papke, 1991).  By the 1980s, MNEs focused heavily on motives such as market-
seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking for their foreign 
value-added activities (Berhman, 1972; Dunning, 1986). More recently this analysis has 
been extended to include other influences, such as institutional factors, which have 
included entry, performance and exit requirements imposed on FDI, degree of corruption, 
90 
 
competition policy, innovatory and tax systems, environmental regulations, and human 
rights (Trebbi, 2002; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2004; World Bank, 
2006).  
 
In international business studies, researchers have identified the essential factors 
for foreign investors when choosing a location in which to invest. Mayer (2004) has found 
that institutional factors have a far greater and more significant impact on affiliate 
performance in emerging economies compared to more mature economies. According to 
other studies (Child, Chung & Davis, 2003; Meyer, 2001, 2004; Uhlenbreck, 2004), 
institutional factors such as political risk, government regulations, financial incentives, 
and environmental specific factors are more important in emerging economies because 
institutional immaturity raises transaction costs and risks. Developing countries tend to 
provide more incentives for inward foreign investment than others with the intention of 
increasing the transfer of know-how through employment Szanyi (2001, p.30) states that 
“investment incentives can play an additional role in motivating foreign direct investors”. 
Advanced countries tend to have a more stable infrastructure and system in place which 
attracts foreign investors. However, the subject of taxes is always mired in debate. Loree 
and Guisinger (1995) claim that the host country tax rate has an important effect on US 
outward FDI due to double tax charges. 
 
In recognition of the importance of taxes in FDI, countries have often used 
taxation policy incentives as a competitive tool for attracting more FDI. A UNCTAD 
(2000) survey reports that 85 per cent of countries in Asia have offered tax incentives 
such as tax holidays and tax tariff reductions as a way of attracting investors. Public 
finance-based studies have found evidence that the location of FDI is sensitive to tax 
policies (Wilson, 1987; Janeba, 1995; Huizinga & Nielsen, 1997; Haufler & Wooton, 
1999; Wilson, 1999; Ludema & Wooton, 2000; Davies, 2003, 2005; Devereux & 
Hubbard, 2003; Baldwin & Krugman, 2004; Raff, 2004; Borck & Pfuger, 2006; 
Bucovetsky & Haufler, 2008). The effects of taxes on FDI have been discussed by both 
international and public economists. A noticeable hypothesis is that higher tax 
discourages FDI (De Mooji & Ederveen, 2003). However, some articles in the literature 
have highlighted why such a hypothesis may be misleading. The effects of taxes on FDI 
can vary depending on the type of tax, measurement of FDI activity, and tax treatment in 
the host and parent countries. 
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Studies on tax and FDI mostly explore the impact of direct income or corporate 
tax on FDI in multi-country samples. Nonetheless such studies are rare in developing 
countries. Available studies in developing countries have, to a large extent, concentrated 
on the impact of direct taxes on FDI (Cheng & Kwan, 2000). This study aims to 
investigate the effects of taxes, and indirect taxes in particular, on FDI. The focus is on 
establishing how indirect taxes may distort and deter patterns of inward investment in 
ways that are not really intended by the host governments. 
 
This particular section investigates the effect of direct and indirect taxes on the 
profitability of inward investment in several Asian countries. This study uses a measure 
similar to the average effective indirect tax rate but in relation to gross profit surplus 
rather than tax bases for a large sample of industries. To establish the difference in the 
patterns of tax implications in the selected Asian countries, it uses an I-O methodology 
to consider how national taxes affect current and potential profitability in the different 
sectors of an individual economy. The underlying reason for such an examination is to 
analyse how national taxes currently affect, and have affected, the underlying profit 
incentives to undertake investment in one country, and in one sector rather than in 
another. Although no specific distinction is made in the analysis between domestic and 
foreign investment, the analysis is particularly relevant to the location of inward FDI 
where firms can choose the most favourable location. This approach enables further 
simulations to be conducted to assess the extent to which different tax policies create 
differences between countries in terms of the effects of taxes on underlying profits, and 
the extent to which different production conditions create varying effects on profitability 
from essentially similar rates of taxation. The analysis focuses on taxes as normally 
applied rather than on any specific tax incentives for inward foreign investment. Some 
consideration is given to such special tax incentives but this is not the main focus of the 
study. Indirect taxes are at least as important as direct taxes in their effects on corporate 
income.  
 
To assess the effect of taxes on the underlying profit of inward investment, this 
study uses I-O tables for several Asian countries. The use of I-O tables to analyse the 
impact of tax is in line with prior studies on US tax policy (Guisinger, 1989), where 
Guisinger investigated how home country taxes have influenced firms’ decisions to invest 
in another country. This chapter made use of the data per sector produced and used by 
industry in Indonesia, South Korea and China. Each country uses a different format for 
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sector data, so it is necessary for that data to be made uniform and categorized using the 
same coding standard found in the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS). The data is interacted with this study main variables of interest (Government 
and tax) but at this stage, only taxes have been taken into account in order to observe the 
difference in patterns of tax imposed on each sector of the industry. 
 
5.3. SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This section uses I-O tables for three Asian countries (Indonesia, China and South 
Korea) as an initial means of investigating the effect of indirect tax on profitability. Input-
Output tables for individual countries provide details of their specific production 
structure. The table describes the inter-related and mutually dependent relationship 
between industries. The tables can be used to identify taxes paid by business on 
production. This study will look closely at the significance of these taxes in relation to 
profits. 
 
I-O tables have been increasingly used to analyze production costs and policies. 
There is wide body of literature which uses I-O tables in various applications. One such 
study is by Chamberlain (1995) who used traditional techniques using I-O tables to access 
household burdens and the economic impact of US government policy.  
 
The data sources used were Input-Output Supply Use table 2005 Industries 
Intermediate Consumption in 2005 called the ‘Combined Use’ matrix. The ‘Combined 
Use’ matrix provides detailed analysis of the production account for all three selected 
Asian economies, on an annual basis at current prices. The Input-Output Supply-Use table 
is supplemented with information contained in sectors statistics for China, South Korea 
and Indonesia regions datasets from the Department of Statistics of each country. I-O 
analysis is applied to domestic industry Supply-Use (SU) data to estimate energy and 
emissions resulting from each sector. I-O tables are compiled using data from national 
accounts as well as other national economic sources to show economic transactions 
between all product sectors of the national economy (Acquaye and Duffy, 2009). 
 
To identify the indirect taxes paid by sectors, the I-O analysis method quantifies 
the interrelationships amongst the sectors of each of the selected Asian economies. An I-
O table describes the flow of goods and services between all individual sectors of a 
93 
 
national economy over a stated period of time, say, a year (Leontief, 1986, p.19-20). Each 
sector’s production structure describes, quantitatively, the inputs it uses and the outputs 
it produces (Lin and Francis, 2004). Breaking the economy down to display transactions 
of all goods and services between industries and final consumers (Lin and Francis, 2004), 
the I-O table used here describes the three selected Asian national economies.  
 
The industry analysis of environmental taxes is primarily based on information 
compiled for the annual I-O SUTs (Input-Output Supply-Use Tables). Information on the 
use of products is generally used as a proxy for allocating the environmental tax payments 
(Lin and Francis, 2004). Although the inter-sectoral flow as represented by an I-O table 
can be thought of as being measured in physical units, in practice most I-O tables are 
constructed in value terms i.e. £ million. Such I-O tables expressed in value terms can be 
interpreted as a system of national accounts (Leontief, 1986, p.21).  
The structure of I-O SUTs used here is as follows: 
 
Table 6(5.1): Input Output table 
 
 
 
The I-O model can be divided into four quadrants. The first quadrant of the I-O 
model is the exchange of goods and services which are both produced and consumed in 
the process of current production. This is usually referred to as the inter-industry flows 
or intermediate demand/intermediate consumption. The second quadrant is the final 
demand for the output of each producing sector. Final demand is the demand, use or 
consumption of products and services by, say, households. In the third quadrant primary 
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inputs to the productive sectors are represented. These are not part of the output of current 
production as defined by the first quadrant. These are the taxes, subsidies, employee 
compensation etc. The fourth quadrant represents the primary inputs that go directly to 
the final demand sectors. In an I-O table the total value of output for each productive 
sector i.e. the row total, is always equal to its total expenditure on inputs i.e. the column 
total (O’Connor and Henry, 1975). However, no such equality is imposed on final demand 
sectors or on the primary input sectors (Ciaschini, 1988; O’Connor and Henry, 1975; 
Leontief, 1986). 
 
 
Research methods require data, analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2009). This 
study uses a quantitative method in which the data for inward FDI is collected from a 
variety of sources including the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, UNCTAD, ASEAN 
and the OECD. Suitable I-O tables are hard to find and the Asian economies sample will 
consist only of those tables that are available. Part of a future program of work could be 
to identify further such tables. Each country produces its industry segregation in a 
different format. In order to standardize the data and to compare the same sectors in 
different countries, data belonging to similar sectors will be allocated the same codes in 
this sample a two-digit sector classification has been used resulting in 77 sectors in each 
country.   
 
The data used at this stage has been derived from the latest I-O tables (Indonesia 
2008, China 2007, and South Korea 2005). None of these countries produces new I-O 
data unless there are significant changes in their trade. The data represents the 
intermediate industry consumption in those years structured or arranged in the ‘Combined 
Use’ matrix. The ‘Combined Use’ matrix provides a detailed analysis of the production 
account for each country’s economy, on an annual basis at the current prices. I-O analysis 
is applied to domestic industry Supply-Use (SU) data to estimate tax rates imposed in 
each sector. I-O tables are compiled using data from national accounts as well as other 
national economic sources to show economic transactions between all product sectors of 
the national economy (Acquaye & Duffy, 2009). 
 
To identify the taxes paid by producers, the I-O analysis method quantifies the 
interrelationships between the sectors of the selected Asian countries. An I-O table 
describes the flow of goods and services between all individual sectors of a national 
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economy over a stated period of time, for example, a year or five years (Leontief, 1986, 
p.19-20). Each sector’s production structure describes, quantitatively, the inputs it uses 
and the outputs it produces (Lin & Francis, 2004).  Industry analysis of indirect taxes is 
primarily based on information compiled for the annual I-O SUTs (Input-Output Supply-
Use Tables). At the time of writing, the latest available I-O SUTs cover the following 
periods: China 2007, South Korea 2005, and Indonesia 2008. Although the inter sectoral 
flow, as represented by an I-O table, can be thought of as measured in physical units, in 
practice most I-O tables are constructed in value terms such as million US dollars. An I-
O table expressed in value terms can be interpreted as a system of national accounts 
(Leontief, 1986, p.21). 
 
Direct tax 
Direct tax on income or profits is borne entirely by the individuals or groups who 
pay it. Unlike indirect tax, direct tax is based on the ability to pay principle, which for 
individuals can sometimes work as a disincentive (the more they earn the more tax they 
need to pay, although ways can be found to minimize their direct tax legally. However, 
this dissertation does not discuss in detail the accounting side of direct tax, but uses the 
information on tax rates applied in the sample countries (Indonesia, South Korea and 
China). The rate of direct tax is announced by the government at the beginning of a 
financial year. Some countries apply progressive tax rates, when tax rates increase as the 
taxable base amount increases. Unlike income tax, corporate tax applies a flat rate and it 
is measured by statutory tax, which is widely used in comparing taxes across countries.  
 
A study by Devereux and Sorensen (2005) analysed the substantial tax rate change 
over the years in OECD countries. In the 1980s, 15 out of 19 countries had very high tax 
rates in excess of 40%), and by 2004 none of those countries’ tax rates were more than 
40%. Over the years, there has been a continuous fall in tax rates due to competitive 
pressure. Since there are factors such as inflation and depreciation allowance which 
change the base of taxable amounts, the statutory tax rate is not the sole reason for an 
investment decision. Hence, more importantly the effective Average Tax Rate (i.e. 
combination of the tax rate and the tax rate is used to measure the impact of tax as a 
significant factor in inward FDI location decisions and capital flows. Income tax on a 
business’s profits will increase the effective cost of business capital, and hence will cause 
a re-allocation of capital from the high income tax rates sectors to those with lower 
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income tax rates. In this study direct tax is included only for comparison to show the 
importance of indirect tax to underlying profit. 
Indirect tax 
 
The nature of indirect tax, which shifts the burden of tax on production and the 
sale of commodities and services, could cause distortion. This is due to the fact that 
indirect tax is added to the sales price of the taxed good without touching purchasing 
power in the first place. Numerous empirical studies have explored the degree of 
influence of tax in FDI decisions. Many of them examine this from an outward investor 
perspective, while only a few concentrate on inward investment. From a location 
perspective, the theories and studies underline the same concerns; it is the perspective 
that differs. In considering factors which influence FDI, this study is by no means 
different from the majority of the literature from the home countries’ point of view but 
differs slightly in terms of perspective. This study examines how tax overall, especially 
indirect tax, and governance factors, can have an impact on the profitability of inward 
investment in selected countries in Asia, and how these countries respond to open 
economics in a competitive environment. 
 
The majority of existing studies on tax and FDI relate to corporate income from 
FDI in different locations. Only a few consider indirect tax and governance using 
industry-level data. So far, none of them have combined the effects of both in a single 
study in the selected Asian countries of Indonesia, China and South Korea. In view of 
this, this study seeks to investigate how both direct and indirect taxes, coupled with host 
country regulations, affect the patterns of FDI and FDI’s overall profitability in particular 
sectors in each of the countries under study. For example, in Indonesia and China, 
corporate tax rates are the same but the treatment of each business sector (e.g. agriculture 
and oil) is different, whilst the agriculture sector in Indonesia is highly subsidised 
compared to its Chinese counterpart (see Table 5.2). In addition, other forms of indirect 
taxation, like property tax and employers’ national insurance, which are applicable in the 
various business sectors of each country, differ significantly. Hence, these differences 
affect the overall profitability of FDI and influence inward FDI location decisions.  
 
Using I-O analysis to estimate the indirect taxes imposed on each industry sector 
each of the selected countries has different categories of industry. China has 150 sectors, 
Indonesia has 178, and South Korea 78 sectors. In order to compare these three countries, 
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this study segregates the sectors based on NAIC codes so that every country has the same 
categories (77 industry sectors). In this examination, the focus is the net tax on production 
which was paid by the producer in each sector. Based on I-O tables, this section will 
investigate the way in which high or low tax rates are imposed in each sector by 
calculating the operating surplus, and the net production on tax and subsidies (vertical 
column). 
 
Indirect taxes by industry 
This section (Table 5.2) presents the estimates, by industry, of the importance of 
indirect taxes in relation to gross operating surplus. In many respects these are similar to 
average effective tax rates in that they measure the actual expenditure by businesses on a 
range of different taxes, net of subsidies. However, they are not average effective rates in 
a strict sense as these net taxes are measured in relation to gross operating surplus not in 
relation to their tax base. By definition, the tax base for these indirect taxes would 
normally be different. These measures are intended to be, in effect, a profit tax equivalent 
– to assess the effect of a package of indirect taxes on profits. This measure (tj) is 
calculated for industry j as: 
 
 tj = (Tj/GOSj).100       (5.1) 
 
where Tj are total taxes, net of subsidies, for industry j (production and imports) 
and where GOSj is the gross operating surplus for industry j. Data for both were taken 
from the Annual Input-Output Accounts data (published on-line and in hard copy by each 
country). It should also be noted that this measure of indirect taxes is net of subsidies, and 
can be negative in the rare circumstances where payments received exceed the taxes paid. 
Of the sample of industries covered in Table 1 this occurs in several industries (minus 
sign).  
The taxes included in these calculations comprise federal excise taxes and customs duties, 
state and local sales taxes, property taxes (including residential real estate taxes where 
applicable), motor vehicle licenses, severance taxes and other taxes on business 
production. Subsidies are the monetary grants paid by the government to private business 
or to other government enterprises (“A Guide to NIPAs” 
http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipaguid.pdf). The taxes excluded from these 
calculations are taxes on corporate income, whether paid to the Indonesian, Chinese or 
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South Korean Internal Revenue Service, state governments or governments of other 
countries. 
 
5.4. RESULTS 
 
The results presented in Table 5.2 suggest considerable variation between one 
industry and another with regard to the effects of indirect taxes relative to gross operating 
surplus. A number of industries exhibit rates of indirect taxation which are consistently 
high in relation to gross surplus in all sample countries, for example, tobacco and 
beverages.  
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Table 7(5.2): Comparison of average effective indirect tax rates by sector 
 
 
Continue   
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In this section (table 5.2), I present estimation by industry of the importance of 
indirect taxes in relation to gross operating surplus. In many respects these are similar to 
average effective tax rates. This table measure the actual expenditure by Indonesia, China 
and South Korea businesses on a range of different taxes, net of subsidies. As these net 
taxes are measured in relation to gross surplus not in relation to their tax bases, as result 
some of the rates are very high.  
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The result presented in table 5.2 suggest considerable variation between one 
industry and another in the effects of indirect taxes relative to gross operating surplus. A 
number of industries exhibit rates of indirect taxes which are very high more than 800 % 
of gross operating surplus. The magnitude of the numbers as result of the effect of indirect 
taxes as percentage of the gross operating surplus. For instance, if you raised price 10 
dollar and the profit on the product is 10 cent, anything affecting prices or total cost is 
going to have very big impact because it is much larger than profit. Also profit is very 
sensitive to intervention because what is left from the total revenue after total cost very 
often is very small percentage, for example the percentage on the corporate tax (income 
tax). In other words anything that affect revenue and cost is quite powerful and it is part 
of the investigation. Government policy on taxes often only focus on profit incentive 
rather than total cost or revenue. It appears tax rates on corporate income (statutionay) do 
not have much impact on profitability but it does in theory using input output table which 
it shows the taxes sectors actually paid and indicate significant distortions to profit 
percentage.  This impact does not apply in a country which have tax holiday policies.  
 
It is only those services in education and social sectors which are persistently very 
low across all three countries. With this variation in the importance of indirect taxes to 
industry earnings there are some plausible grounds for suggesting that the allocation of 
inward investment might affect not only one industry rather than another but also one 
country rather than another. It is clear that for at least some of the taxes included in this 
calculation the incidence of taxation may not fall wholly on the firm or even fall on the 
firm at all. For example, it is clearly possible that either all or part of the burden of sales 
taxes will be transferred to consumers. Likewise it is possible that firms might pass on 
the burden of other taxes to their workers in the form of lower wages. It is also worth 
noting that it is not just indirect taxes which determine this ratio but also fluctuations in 
gross operating surplus. To assure data accuracy, the high rates are experiences in all 
across three countries. It is noticeable that South Korea has much more industries with 
high indirect tax rates compare the rest of the sample countries. This perhaps as reflection 
of the macro-economic downturn on gross operating surplus. 
 
The concern of this study is whether indirect taxes may have affected the pattern 
of inward FDI, by industry sector, in these three countries. It does not directly measure 
flows or stocks of FDI but considers the effects of taxes on the underlying incentives to 
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invest.  Issues of the incidence of taxation are, therefore, only of indirect concern. Should 
this analysis find that indirect taxes have little effect on inward FDI it may be reasonable 
to question whether firms bear any of the burdens of indirect taxes. Conversely, a finding 
that indirect taxes do have a significant effect on the pattern of inward FDI, by industry, 
would suggest that at least some of the tax  falls upon firms.  The table below is a summary 
of equivalent indirect tax paid by producers which is net tax on production of each sector 
divided by operating surplus. Net tax on production refers to various taxes, extra charges, 
and fees levied on the production units on their production, sale and business activities or 
land and labour use. 
 
Table 8(5.3); Summary average effective tax rates 
 
 
The table above presents a summary of 77 sectors. The average indirect tax rate 
imposed on producers in China and South Korea (52.24 percent and 66.19 percent) is 
higher than their listed corporate tax rate (22 percent and 25 percent). This could be an 
indication that the investor should look for further substitution of available resources 
rather than rely on the attractiveness of the host country’s direct tax rate. This is in line 
with a study by Desay, Foley, and Hines (2004) which documented that indirect tax 
payments in some countries are much larger than income tax or corporate tax. The 
Indonesian indirect tax rate is 11.27 per cent on average which is lower than its corporate 
tax rate at 25 per cent. Although taxes will not be the only parameters of destination 
attraction in this study, a simple comparison of taxes across sectors in each selected Asian 
county is an interesting starting point. Later on in the study, tax variables will be tested 
further using a regression model, and this will show how they interact with other factors 
related to the country’s stability, such as governance and corruption.  
 
Apart from the average effective tax rates, the standard deviation indicates the 
dispersion among sectors. South Korea has a significantly high standard deviation 
compared to the other two countries (Indonesia and China). This could be because one 
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particular sector in the country has extremely low indirect tax (-1024.20 percent) possibly 
due to high subsidies. On the other hand South Korea’s petroleum sectors have the highest 
indirect tax at 819.25 per cent which highlights distortion arising from lack of subsidies. 
 
The table above shows a list of average effective indirect tax rates paid by 
producers in various sectors. In each country, some sectors indicate lower rates than 
others. The findings show that undoubtedly, indirect taxes on producers provide 
significant profit incentives for investors to divert resources, thereby necessitating future 
production moves from one sector to another. This aims for foreign investor that choosing 
which industry to invest based on the attractiveness taxes (indirect taxes) impose on each 
industry. In contrast, although investors generally look at the corporate taxes in a 
particular economy as a measure of investment attractiveness, this study’s preliminary 
findings show that, across the sampled countries, corporate taxes are fairly similar, with 
both Indonesia and China reporting 25 per cent while South Korea recorded 22 per cent.  
This study results indicate that the effects of indirect taxes on the profits of each sector 
are significantly different across countries, as shown in Table 5.2 above. For example, 
overall, the metal ores sector has the lowest indirect tax rates with South Korea having 
the lowest rate at 3.27 percent compared to both China (45.48 percent) and Indonesia 
(5.55 percent), while the tobacco sector has the highest indirect tax rates in which 
Indonesia’s rates are comparatively lower than those of South Korea and China.  The 
comparison above shows that each country has potential investment location benefits 
either for Asian investor or for countries outside Asia, and that distance, and any related 
costs such as transport, mean that intra-Asian investment can be attractive. 
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5.5. INTRA-ASIAN COMPARISON 
 
FDI flows between Asian countries are not small; a rough estimation shows that, 
in 2004, they accounted for 40 per cent of Asia’s total inflows (Kwan & Cheung 2006; 
UN conference on trade and development (UNCTAD) 2006: Chapter 2).   
 
Table 9(5.4): Comparison indirect tax intra Asian country 
 
 
Table 5.4 is aggregate sector from input output table South Korea, China and Indonesia, 
the table presents a summary of indirect taxation, to enable any of the selected countries 
to assess the potential for bilateral FDI with the other two countries. So for instance, for 
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South Korea, Indonesian taxation would be more positive for most industries compared 
to Chinese taxation, particularly for the petroleum and coal product sectors; South Korea 
would be better off investing in this sector in Indonesia than in China; whilst for China it 
would be a good move to invest in either South Korea or Indonesia as most sectors show 
positive signs. Although, for China, Indonesia seems overall to be the better option for 
investment, for one sector (no.17), Electricity, gas, steam and water supply, South Korea 
offers a better rate. 
 
5.6. PRICE TAKING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
In this study, the findings also rest on the assumption that the tax burden paid by 
sectors will not be passed on to customers in the form of higher prices because the 
countries are price takers in the world market. For an import and export competing sector, 
taxes will affect the supply and demand of products in the sector as described below 
(Chamberlain, 1995).  
 
Figure 5(5.1): Supply and demand (Chamberlain, 1995) 
 
 
 
Using the assumption, it could means that China, Indonesia and South Korea 
could fall in category country who are price taker if a) that a significant proportion of 
economic sectors in these countries are open to international trade; and b) that each 
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country has a sufficiently small share of global markets that it is unlikely to affect world 
prices. So that, table 5.4 and 5.5 are created to see the proportion of these countries trade 
share in the world and using the same input output table (South Korea 2005, China 2007 
and Indonesia 2008) through their export to sale ratio and import penetration.  
  
The table below (table 5.5 & 5.6) shown here presents two standard indicators of 
the importance of trade to any individual sector. First is import penetration which 
measures the percentage of domestic consumption accounted for by imports. Under these 
assumptions prices do not change as a result of tax because domestic taxes do not change 
international prices. Secondly, the export to sales ratio measures the percentage of 
domestic production which is exported. The implication of this assumption is to change 
the incidence of the tax. From these two assumptions this study will try to identify how 
indirect tax affects the cost, and therefore the profit, to domestic producers which will 
attract foreign direct investment attention; that is, whether a certain product can 
advantageously be produced in certain locations or whether investment in that particular 
sector would be wise. Table 5.4. demonstrates significant variation in indirect tax rates 
among the three selected Asian countries. While there are minor differences in 
corporation tax among the countries, the variation in indirect tax proportions could 
arguably affect the overall profit to corporations. As conclusion, the initial findings of the 
study suggest that the effect of indirect taxes on profit incentives vary considerably and 
in an arbitrary.  
 
 
In Chamberlain’s analysis the tax shifts the supply curve inward to S* therefore 
raising prices from Po to P1 in each case. Where this study differs is that it introduces a 
world supply curve Sw that is perfectly elastic. In international economies this is known 
as the small country assumption; that domestic prices are determined in relation to given 
world prices. This description is misleading since the country does not need to be ‘small’ 
in any normal sense. It is only necessary that the country faces given world prices for the 
world supply curve to be horizontal. 
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Table 10(5.5): Indicators of trability by sector 
 
Source: Input-output table (China 2007, Indonesia 2008, and South Korea 2005) 
 
Table 5.5 above presents the tradability of sectors in each country sample compare 
to the rest of the world. It is not necessary for both indicators to be substantial for a good 
to be regarded as ‘traded’. Much trade theory would predict that goods tend to be either 
exported or imported, not both. The results in Table 5.5. above shows that almost all 
goods sectors in the selected Asian countries are substantially traded and, in many cases, 
are highly exposed to international trade.  
  
The next issue to address is the extent to which Asian countries face given world 
prices. Ideally these questions would be directly addressed by an analysis of prices, but 
such analysis is lengthy and subject to data limitations and conceptual difficulties, so here 
we adopt an alternative approach. For a sample of 77 commodities, we measure the share 
of these three countries in total world exports. The sample consists exclusively of goods, 
not services, for reasons of data availability. As can be seen here (table 5.6), for the vast 
majority of the sample, the share of each country in total mean world exports and imports 
is relatively small at less than 3%, except for China which achieves almost 10% although 
this is still considered low in terms of world trade. Taken overall, the findings support the 
working assumption that world prices are not likely to respond in the short or medium 
term to national taxes imposed by these countries.  
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Table 11(5.6): Share in total world export/import of selected products 
 
 
5.6. CONCLUSION  
 
The focus of this chapter is the effects of indirect taxation on the industrial 
composition of inward direct investment in selected Asian countries (South Korea, 
Indonesia and China). The measure of indirect taxes (in relation to gross operating 
surplus) presented in Table 5.2 shows that the total value of indirect taxes is sufficiently 
large that the (ex ante) possibility exists that taxes might have substantially affected profit 
incentives and can be significant. The variation between one sector and another also 
confirms the possibility that profit incentives for one sector relative to another cannot be 
ignored without further analysis.  
 
The main finding of this chapter is that this significant difference between indirect 
taxes could become the starting point from which to investigate further the effect of taxes 
on the profitability of inward FDI. This could help to confirm the existence of a potential 
distortionary effect on the pattern of South Korea’s, Indonesia’s and China’s inward FDI 
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by sector, resulting from the impact on relative profit incentives arising from indirect 
taxes. Some of the indirect taxes included in the comparison are sales and excise taxes, 
for which one might expect the tax burden to be passed on to the consumer. Desai, 2004 
examined the impact of indirect taxes on US foreign affiliate, it has shown evidence that 
the higher the local indirect tax rates associate with reducing of US affiliate foreign assets 
in that location. This chapter is working toward similar path using different countries and 
focus on different industries as the object to compare the effect of the indirect tax rates. 
In addition, this chapter examines a package of indirect taxes rather than the effect of any 
individual tax.  
 
As some of researcher previously (Carlton, 1983; Moore, Steece & Swenson, 
1987; Hines, 1996; Ondrich & Wasylenko, 1993; Papke, 1991) emphasize that taxes 
should influence investor decisions with regard to location of their investment. 
Nonetheless, this finding is of considerable importance as a foundation from which to 
investigate the effect of taxes on inward FDI at sector level. The implication of assuming 
that the sector concerned is a) traded and b) faces given world prices is to change the 
incidence of the tax. Under these assumptions, prices do not change as a result of tax 
because domestic taxes do not change prices. Output falls by a larger amount than where 
there is no international trade because prices do not rise and the incidence of the tax falls 
only on firms, who cannot pass on the increased costs in higher prices. In summary open 
trade at given world price implies that taxes affect profit not price.  
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CHAPTER VI: COUNTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS OF TAX 
AND GOVERNANCE EFFECTS ON INWARD 
INVESTMENT 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent times, the discussion on the importance of FDI has moved from whether 
developing countries should attract FDI, to how developing countries can attract FDI 
(Asiedu and Lien, 2011). Asian countries have adopted several policies that are aimed at 
attracting FDI. For instance, due to the financial crisis of 1998, to rebuild the confidence 
to invite foreign activities, they have sought to restore and maintain macroeconomic 
stability through, amongst others, an improved regulatory framework for FDI by: 
strengthening the rule of law; engaging in trade liberalisation; and improving legal 
institutions, telecommunications and transportation infrastructure (UNTACD, 1999).  
 
Many studies have examined the reasons why investors preferred FDI to 
exporting. One reason is the relative cost of exporting, for example, transport costs, and 
evidently, such that engaging in FDI is more profitable than exporting. Host countries 
which see FDI as having the potential to help their economy will be interested to know 
what the factors that attract FDI are. If they know what factors determine FDI location, 
the host country may be able to concentrate on these factors. This particular chapter is 
centered on the role of governance in selected Asian countries as host economies. 
Previous empirical studies have considered a variety of host countries both developed and 
developing (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Papanastassiou and 
Pearce, 1994; Mudambi, 1995). The findings from this chapter will contribute to the links 
between governance and FDI in Asian countries some of which have lower income and 
some, higher income. 
 
Over the years, there has been vast change in host country attitudes to and policies 
towards FDI, especially when the host countries believe that FDI activities add to gross 
capital formation and the balance of payments without the risk associated with additional 
loan repayment. The host country also expects to have the benefit from foreign investment 
to increase competition and give rise to positive technological externalities and spillovers. 
Any of these latter effects encourage governments to create an effective business climate 
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environment for the investors. Frequently, various grounds for pessimism have been 
expressed regarding investment in most countries in Asia due factors associated with 
government such us complexity, bureaucracy or regulations. Thus it is important to build 
a reputation for having good regulations that are controlled by government (Stein & 
Daude, 2007; Disdier & Mayer, 2004; Du, Lu, & Tao, 2007; Urata & Kawai 2000; Wei, 
2000). Despite various academic studies on the advantages or disadvantages of FDI, the 
vast majority of policy-makers tend to believe that FDI could play a positive role in 
economic development. Among the various policy instruments designed to attract FDI, a 
key role is played by investment benefits as broadly understood, which may impact the 
size, location or sector of a FDI project (OECD 2003, p.12 and pp. 17-20; WTO, 2006, 
pp. 48-49). Usually the most attractive instruments among the policies consist of financial 
incentives (mostly subsidies and tax allowances). Although there are a significant number 
of country level regression studies of the determinants of inward FDI which include tax 
very few focus on Asia specifically. Likewise only a small number of such studies 
consider governance as a determinant. The focus on Asia and the use of both tax and 
bureaucracy as determinants is a contribution of this chapter. 
 
In this chapter, the focus is governance role as a determinant factor that affects 
FDI inflows and stocks and it will be investigated and analysed on a country level basis.  
The analysis will be conducted using two models: FDI inflows and stock as dependent 
variables. To examine the effect of governance and regulation in selected Asian countries 
this study will follow the OLI framework by Dunning and the determinant of FDI as 
theoretical foundation. The link between governance and FDI spans two sets of influences 
– country level and firm level.  Since governance is predominantly national it makes sense 
to consider variations in both FDI and governance at the country level.  That is, variations 
in governance are predominantly a country-level phenomenon. They result from actions, 
practices and institutions of predominantly national governments.  Analysing the process 
at country level, therefore, makes considerable sense. However, if governance is 
predominantly a country-level issue, its consequences are not. The effects of governance 
on FDI are felt at the level of individual firms or even individual investment projects. To 
analyse these effects requires firm level analysis which will be investigated and discussed 
in the later chapters. It is to combine both sets of demands that this whole thesis combines 
a country-level analysis of the links between FDI and governance with a firm-level 
analysis of the effect of governance on the performance of foreign-owned firms in Asia. 
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For the analysis at country level and the analysis at firm level it is clear that the 
effects of governance on FDI or the performance of foreign-owned firms should not be 
analysed in isolation. That is, governance indicators are but one set of many possible 
determinants of the location of FDI.  Both theory and the existing empirical literature 
point towards setting governance within a broader set of determinants. As this study will 
investigate, the governance impact in two set of analysis, accordingly, both the country-
level and firm-level analysis are formulated within the wider contexts of the determinants 
of the location of FDI and the determinants of the performance of foreign-owned firms. 
The sample for the country-level analysis comprises 22 Asian countries. At the firm level, 
analysis, of necessity, needs to be more focused. The later discussion (next chapter) 
concentrates on a sample of firms’ performance in related to governance and tax in 
selected Asian countries. 
 
6.2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE COUNTRY-LEVEL 
ANALYSIS 
 
Data 
The country level analysis more closely follows the empirical literature on the 
determinants of inward FDI based on the predictions of OLI theory. The relevant chapter 
analyses the effects of tax and government regulation on inward FDI at the country level. 
This is estimated as part of a wider specification of the determinants of the location of 
FDI. The main interest variables influencing FDI in this section will be national tax and 
regulation. The other control variables are established from the OLI concept of motives 
FDI (market size, resources, efficiency, and strategic asset seeking). For this part of the 
analysis, economic regressions are applied (OLS and fixed effect) to 23 countries during 
the period 2002-2020 (nine annual observations for each). The data are collected from 
several sources such as UNCTAD (FDI measures), World Development Indicators 
(market size, natural resources and other control variables), and World Bank Governance 
Indicators.  
 
The (annual) data for the country-level analysis were collected for a total of 22 
Asian countries over the period 2002-2010. For analytical purposes I ranked these 
countries by GDP per capita and divided the sample into two sub-samples – higher 
income and lower income.  Details of the countries included in each are set out below. 
113 
 
With one exception all variables were taken from one of two World Bank databases:  
World Development Indicators (WDI) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
The combination of data for 22 countries over time periods provided a maximum of 198 
observations. In practice there are missing observations so the actual sample size for 
estimation varied according to the model specification but was always substantially less. 
Based largely on economic and econometric reasoning, data availability and previous 
studies on impact governance on FDI, a panel data model to examine the impact of 
governance among other factors, on FDI inflow and stock in lower and higher income 
Asian countries. 
 
The data for the country level analysis were taken from the World Development 
Indicators database produced by the World Bank. The sample comprised 22 different 
Asian countries which are divided to two categories, higher income and lower income 
country (see table below).  
 
Table 12(6.1): Lower and Higher income countries in ASIA 
 
 
Methodology  
 Three different methodology analyses are used to measure the impact of taxes 
and governance on inward FDI:  
Regression analysis 
Regression techniques are commonly used in cross-sectional or panel model 
studies of determinants (inward) FDI. The regression form is:  
 FDIi = I0 + j Χji + εi                                           6.1 
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Where FDIi is inward foreign direct investment flows into country i and Χji is the jth 
explanatory variable of country i.  
 
Cross-sectional data for individuals, firms or countries might have heterogeneity 
in terms of unobservable specific effects to cross-section units or time periods (Hsioa, 
1986). Therefore time-series and cross-section studies, which do not account for this 
heterogeneity, inherit the risk of obtaining biased results (Baltagi, 2005). In this context, 
modelling FDI determinants among countries increases the heterogeneous investment 
flow among countries. The equations in this study are estimated using (a) OLS; (b) panel 
fixed effects (country level analysis only) and (c) the cross-sectional equivalent of a panel 
fixed effects model, the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) model. The choices that 
different estimators were intending were partly to assess the robustness of key findings 
and partly to allow a choice of different assumptions with respect to the underlying model.  
 
OLS estimation 
This study applies OLS in both country and firm analyses; the estimation is very 
standard but it gives some interesting information; for instance, whether there exists a 
statistical relationship among variables of interest. OLS is arguably the most widely used 
method for the linear statistics model. The common form of OLS is below:  
  Yi = β0 + β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 + …. + βkXip + εi                                     6.2 
Yi is the value of case i on the outcome variable, β0 is the regression constant, Xij is i’s 
score on the Jth of p predictor value in the model, βj is predictor j’s partial regression 
weight, and εi is the error of case i. 
 
Most researchers are often interested in testing the null hypothesis that specific 
element in β is zero or creating a confidence interval for that variable using a sample-
derived estimate combined with an estimate of the sample variance of the estimate. The 
validity of the hypothesis test and confidence level as implemented in most statistical 
computing packages depends on the extent to which the model’s assumptions are 
satisfied. The OLS regression has five assumptions to fulfil: (1) the Ys are generated 
according to the model specified in equation 1: (2) the X values are fixed (rather than 
random): (3) the errors are uncorrelated random variables with (4) zero means, and (5) 
constant variance. The condition that the OLS estimation needs to be aware of is the 
existence of heteroskedasticity when the errors between predictors are related. This is 
because the condition of homoskedasticity has been violated.  
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The coefficient β tells us how much taxes and governance are higher on average. 
Some control variables are introduced in each level of analysis (country and firms).  
The pooled OLS estimation is considerably the simplest methodology in regression 
analysis, which is more suitable for static cross-sectional data analysis. However, for 
time-series dimensions this method fails to account for the unobserved country-specific 
(fixed) effects that cause an omitted variable bias, which is then picked up by the error 
term and to control for the potential endogeneity problems. The correlation between some 
of the independent variables and country-specific effects is again picked up in the error 
term.  Empirical studies on FDI which apply OLS regression analysis, for instance 
Balasubramaniam et al. (1996), use 46 developing countries for 15 years, investigated the 
impact of technology and spillovers in host countries and the result was that FDI has a 
positive effect but only for export promoting host countries.   
 
 Panel fixed effects and LSDV 
In this study, modelling international trade or FDI among countries increases 
heterogeneous trading or investment relationships among those countries. In order to deal 
with heterogeneity as a result of increasing diversity in country samples, several papers 
introduce the panel data model such as fixed effect or random effect into the equation. 
Matyas (1998) puts forward that large country specific effects should be treated as non-
observable random effects in the case of large country samples. Egger (2000) suggests 
that the fixed effects model would be the right choice if data samples include countries, 
which belong the same regional blocs such as the Asian region (ASEAN and China). 
Membership of the same regional bloc is determined by cultural and political similarities 
between countries or geographical distances between them. Therefore, these country 
specific effects should not be treated as non-observable random effects.  
Cheng & Wall (2005) argue that the fixed effects model could be a better choice 
as long as the specification includes country-pair fixed effects. The fixed effects model 
deals with unobserved heterogeneity by removing individual effects along with any time-
variant variables through a transformation. Given observation with an intercept, the fixed 
effect model can be written as follows:  
Yit  = βk χit + δ ᴢi +ᴜi + eit                               6.3 
 
Where χit represents variables that vary over individuals and time, β is the coefficient on 
χit and ᴢi is time-invariant variables with a vector of dummy variables δ, and ᴜi capturing 
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cross-sectional and time effects, while eit is the disturbance balance term (Baum, 2006 
and Wooldridge, 2002). A panel is normally considered to have data which vary both by 
time and cross-section.  Essentially the same model can be used, as is done in this thesis, 
by using dummy variables to capture unobserved effects by, say, country and by sector.  
Although the specification is essentially that of the panel fixed effects model it is referred 
to as the least squares dummy variables model (LSDV) because it uses (in this case) cross-
sectional rather than panel data. 
 
The methodological approach is intended to be firmly within the tradition of 
empirical studies of the determinants of the location of FDI described by Blonigen (2005) 
as Partial Equilibrium Analysis of External Factors Affecting FDI Decisions and 
Location”. The central question of interest in this chapter concerns the influence of 
governance issues on the location of FDI in Asian countries. To address this empirical 
model it includes the governance variables listed above.  However, the view of this and 
almost all other studies in the same tradition is that governance is but one of many sets of 
possible influences on the location of inward investment.  The statistical consequences 
(endogeneity) of excluding a variable which is correlated with the dependent variable and 
one or more of the other independent variables are severe. For example, if such omitted 
variables exist then OLS estimators are biased and inconsistent.   
 
The model specified is estimated using a panel regression analysis. Two different 
panel estimation techniques (pooled ordinary least square and fixed effect) are used in 
this study. From the theoretical perspectives, the researcher is expected to examine the 
most suitable technique through a number of standard diagnostic tests on a given dataset. 
In practice, however, it is often difficult to know which technique is most appropriate 
since each of the techniques has its own strength and weakness. For instance, a pooled 
regression model implicitly assumes there are no problems of omitted variables in a 
model, which is hardly true. The fixed-effect specification allows for intercept shifts for 
each country. It takes care of the problem that may arise from omitting important 
variables from the model; this is accomplished by creating dummies for all but one 
country in the sample. The consequence of this is an indication of reduction in degrees of 
freedom, the severity of which deepens as the size of the sampled countries increases.  
 
One approach to reducing these risks is to include a series of “control” variables 
to try to reduce the risk of an important omitted variable.  In this chapter, the specification 
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of the main conceptual foundation for these control variables is the OLI paradigm and, in 
particular, Dunning (2000).  For this reason market, resource and strategic asset-seeking 
variables are included within the specifications of the empirical model. As noted in the 
review of literature a considerable number of papers dealing with the effects of 
governance on inward FDI exists. To capture such effects a governance variable is 
included in this study specification.   
The empirical model specified for both FDI inflows and inward FDI stocks was: 
 
lnFDIjt = β0 + β1.tradegdpjt + β2.market1jt + β3.market2jt + β4.oilgdpjt + β5.natrgdpjt + 
β6.technjt + β7.govjt + β8.goveffjt + β9.reguljt+ β10.corrupjt + β11.totaltaxjt + ujt 
……….(6.4) 
 
Where subscript j indicates country and t time, lnFDIjt is either the log of FDI 
inflows or log of inward FDI stocks (that is, the same general specification applies to each 
of two different FDI dependent variables) and ujt is an i.i.d. disturbance term. This study 
is heavily influenced by OLI paradigm as motive of FDI so that the controls variables are 
built from these motives and are described details in later section - 6.3 
Equation 1 was estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS).  However, there are a number 
of reasons why this OLS specification might be at risk of endogeneity, with the 
consequence that OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. Amongst these are (a) 
omitted variables and (b) measurement errors that are correlated with both the dependent 
variable and one or more independent variables.  One way to try to reduce the risk of such 
endogeneity is to use a (double) fixed-effects panel estimator to try to capture the 
unobserved effects of any omitted variables or measurement errors.  This results in the 
following specification: 
 
lnFDIjt = β0 + β1.tradegdpjt + β2.market1jt +  β3.market2jt + β4.oilgdpjt + β5.natrgdpjt + 
β6.technjt + β7.govjt + β8.goveffjt + β9.reguljt+ β10.corrupjt + β11.totaltaxjt + ηj +  θt +  vjt 
……(6.5) 
Where ηj is a vector of country fixed effects, θt a vector of time fixed effects and vjt an 
i.i.d. disturbance term. 
 
In summary, this country-level analysis reports two different estimators – OLS 
and panel-fixed effects. Since it is impossible to know for sure what the risks of 
endogeneity are, this allows the reader to choose between three different possible sets of 
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assumptions: first assumption is any variables omitted from or any measurement error 
associated with equation 6.1 is unlikely to be correlated with both the dependent and one 
or more independent variables (choose OLS estimates). Second, Any endogeneity arising 
from equation 6.1 is likely to be effectively captured by using fixed effects (choose panel-
fixed effects estimates), it also has been tested using  Hausman statistic for fixed 
effects versus random effects and the result is chi-sq (3) = 27.1 and p=0.000. Based on 
this result the econometric model in this study is estimated by fixed effects. An ideal set 
of results would find no real differences between each estimator, in which case we could 
conclude that the panel-fixed effects estimator help support the view that endogeneity is 
not a problem of significance with the OLS specification (equation 6.1).  In reality such 
findings are not common. 
 
6.3. VARIABLES 
6.3.1. Dependent variables: 
 This study use two dependent variables:  
1. FDI inflows – Net inward flows of FDI as a percentage of GDP (source: WDI) 
2. FDI inward stocks – Net inward stocks of FDI as a percentage of GDP.  
 
 Data on inward stocks were nominal values and taken from the UNCTAD 
database on FDI and data on GDP were taken from the WDI database. Kernel density 
functions for both these dependent variables are presented in both table 6.3 and 6.4, 
together with the kernel density functions of the logs of each variable, plotted against the 
comparable normal distribution. As can be seen using the log of both variables is much 
closer to the normal distribution than the untransformed variable. Accordingly the log 
values labelled lnfdiflow and lnfdistock were used in our analysis. 
 
In keeping with a number of the empirical studies of the determinants of inward 
FDI, for example that by Chidlow et al (2009), the model in this study is based on OLI 
theory as expressed by Dunning (1998, 2000) and others. OLI theory specifies a range of 
key motives for the choice of a location for inward FDI. Not all of these will necessarily 
be of consequence in any particular set of circumstances but, if they are, we should expect 
to observe the following effects of motives. Market-seeking motives – a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between consumption and inward FDI. Efficiency-
seeking motives – a statistically significant and positive relationship between inward FDI 
and multi-factor productivity. Resource-seeking motives – a positive and significant 
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relationship between natural resource intensity and inward FDI. Strategic asset-seeking 
motives – a statistically significant and positive relationship with technology. Trade-
openness effects – a positive and statistically significant relationship between both 
exports to sales ration and import penetration and inward FDI. 
 
Independent variables used without further transformation:  
1. International trade as a percentage of GDP (tradegdp), taken from the WDI 
database and used as an indicator of the degree of integration of the country 
concerned into the world economy. 
2. Oil rents as a percentage of GDP (oilgdp), taken from the WDI database and used 
as one indicator of resource-seeking effects. 
3. Natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP (natrgdp), from the WDI database 
and used as another indicator of resource-seeking effects. 
4. The aggregate indicators for government effectiveness (goveff), regulatory quality 
(regul), and corruption (corrup) taken from the WGI database. Higher scores of 
these variables indicate “better governance” such as less corruption and more 
government effectiveness. 
5. The total tax rate, as a percentage of commercial profits, from the WDI database. 
 
6.3.2 Variables combined using factor analysis (principal components): 
 
A common problem with data in FDI and other empirical studies is that there are 
a potentially large number of influences, many of which are closely correlated with each 
other.  Using such variables inevitably increases the risk of multicollinearity in the model. 
To limit such risks this study used factor analysis to combine several groups of variables 
into one or two principal components. In this way I can convert variables that have 
possibility of correlation into variables that linearly uncorrelated.   The variables so 
created were: 
The first and second principal components, market1 and market2, generated from a series 
of market-seeking variables (GDP, GDP per capita, population density, the share of 
consumption in GDP, GDP growth rate and the urban population as a percentage of the 
total), all of which were taken from the WDI database. The first principal component 
(techn) from a series of strategic asset-seeking variables  (the number of broadband 
subscribers per 100 people, internet servers per million people and computer services as 
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a percentage of total exports). The first principal component (gov) derived from the voice 
and accountability and political stability indicators from the WGI database.  
Correlation matrices for the independent variables are reported in Table 6.2 below. 
 
Table 13(6.2): Correlation matrices for independent regression variables (Country level 
analysis) 
 
 
The correlation matrices above are for all countries and it shows few of the values 
are high. It because these variables are from the principle component not the basic data.  
 
6.3.3 Chow Test 
 
In some studies which use regression analysis, one is often interested in finding 
whether sets of coefficients in two linear regressions are equal, and others are interested 
in finding whether the intercepts differ, given that the slopes are equal. According to 
Chow (1960), to test the equality between sets of coefficients in two linear regressions, 
one starts with the assumption that both are equal. A regression equation is fitted to the 
combined sets of observations, i.e. excluded and selected, and the residual sum-of-
squared (RSS) is computed. Next step, a regression equation is fitted to the data without 
assuming the sets are equal. Likewise, the RSS is obtained. Chow shows that the ratio 
difference between these two sums, the latter sum, adjusted for the corresponding degrees 
of freedom, will be distributed as an F-ratio.  
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This thesis uses the Chow test to test equality of sets of coefficients in more than 
one regression. This test tells whether two regressions are different or not, without 
specifying the difference, which if any, would be something due to a difference in 
intercepts term or slope coefficients. The original paper by Chow (1960) showed that his 
method (Chow test) could help the researcher in determining whether or not  newly 
collected data exhibit the same relationship between dependent and independent variables 
as the previous data. Preliminary estimation comprised estimation of equations 1 and 2 
(for both stocks and flows separately) for a pooled sample and for both sub-samples 
(higher and lower income) separately. These were used to conduct Chow tests for 
parameter constancy to establish whether it was valid to combine higher income and 
lower income countries into a single sample for Asia.  The results of these tests are 
reported in Table 6.3 below. In all cases the null hypothesis (that parameters are the same 
in both sub-samples) can be rejected at 90 percent or higher confidence levels. That is, it 
suggests that there are statistically significant behavioural differences between lower and 
higher income countries in the estimated model.  In consequence separate estimates were 
derived for both sub-samples. 
 
Table 14(6.3): Chow test for pooling the two sub-samples 
 
 
 
6.4. COUNTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNANCE EFFECT ON INWARD 
INVESTMENT 
 
6.4.1. Flows of Inward Direct Investment 
The results of the country-level analysis of net inflows of FDI (relative to GDP) 
are presented in Table 6.3 for each of the two estimators – OLS and panel-fixed effects. 
For both lower and higher income countries the results using the panel-fixed effects 
estimator are tricky to interpret because of the likely presence of multicollinearity which 
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can be reduced but not eliminated. In both cases the high value of the mean variance 
inflation factor suggests such a problem.  In consequence, individual coefficients using 
the panel-fixed effects estimator are likely to be tricky to interpret. That is, whilst 
multicollinearity does not affect the explanatory power of the overall model, estimates of 
individual coefficients lack precision. 
 
Results 
Lower Income Countries 
The results for governance and related variables differ between the OLS and Panel 
fixed effect estimators. To some extent it is to be expected that different estimators 
produce different results. There is some consistency between both estimators with respect 
to control variables but little with respect to the governance ones. With OLS none of the 
governance variables are significant except for corruption, which has a negative sign, 
implying net FDI inflows are higher where corruption is worst. This finding is not unusual 
as a previous study by Bardhan (1997) found that in the presence of a rigid regulation and 
inefficient bureaucracy, corruption may helping foreign firm doing business with 
speeding up the process of decision making.  The results also indicate that lower income 
countries as preference location for their natural resource advantages. It shows the 
significance result on both oilgdp and naturalgdp. It is common for developing countries 
to have such advantage (Dunning, 2009) these countries become target destination of 
investment which are resource seeking rather than strategic asset seeking. Although the 
corruption problem is high in these countries but seem not discourage investor.  
  
With the Panel fixed effect estimator none of the three governance indicators are 
statistically significant. The results of the Panel fixed effect model, therefore, suggest that 
governance variables are not as important as other factors to have impact on net inflows 
of FDI.  In terms of control variables natural resources are shown to be a statistically 
significant and positive influence on net inflows of FDI for lower income countries. This 
result is robust since all the estimators produce a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient. Oil revenues are statistically significant but negative with both OLS and panel 
estimators. This suggests that resource-seeking motives are an important determinant of 
FDI inflows in the lower income countries but not with respect to oil. This perhaps the 
existence of government interference and also the nature of oil sector which depends on 
relative power and bargaining position vis-à-vis the host government rather than the 
political institution in place. There is some evidence that market seeking (market1) has a 
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statistically significant effect on FDI inflows but this effect is positive with both 
estimators. Openness to trade (trade as a percentage of GDP) and the total tax rate have 
statistically significant effects on net FDI inflows with the OLS estimator and Panel fixed 
effect. 
 
Higher Income Countries 
At 95 percent confidence levels none of governance variables are statistically 
significant with either the OLS or the panel-fixed effects estimators.  This would suggest 
that governance issues are of much less consequence in understanding net FDI inflows 
into higher income countries than into lower income ones. Few control variables are 
found to be significant. The total tax rate and trade openness are positive and statistically 
significant in OLS estimates but not in Panel fixed effect. This suggests that endogeneity 
may have been important in driving some of the results in the OLS regression.   
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Table 15(6.4): Regression analysis of flows of FDI by country 
 
 
6.4.2. Stocks of Inward Direct Investment 
The results of the country-level analysis for inward stocks of FDI (relative to 
GDP) are presented in Table 6.5. As with the analysis of flows, for both lower and higher 
income countries, the results again exhibit a high degree of multicollinearity with the 
panel-fixed effects estimator, as shown in the high values of the mean variance inflation 
factor.   
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Lower Income Countries 
For the governance variables both the political variable and regulatory efficiency 
variables are positive and statistically significant with both the OLS and panel-fixed 
effects estimators. Government efficiency is not statistically significant with OLS or 
panel-fixed effects. Corruption is statistically significant but negative with OLS but not 
statistically significant and positive with Panel fixed effect. 
Of the control variables trade openness (trade as a percentage of GDP), market seeking 
(market1 and market2) is statistically significant with the OLS but with Panel fixed effect 
estimators. Natural resources variable is statistically significant with both the OLS and 
Panel fixed effect estimators. Trade openness and market1 are positive in both cases and 
market2 negative in both cases. Natural resources are positive with OLS but negative with 
Panel fixed effect. Strategic asset seeking is not statistically significant with OLS but 
negative and statistically significant with panel-fixed effects estimators. This implies, as 
one might expect, that FDI tends to be associated with lesser levels of technology in lower 
income economies. 
 
Higher Income Countries 
The political variable is negative with both the OLS and Panel-fixed effect 
estimators but only statistically significant with OLS.  This implies that voice, 
accountability and political stability, whilst positively affecting inward FDI stocks in 
lower income countries, have the opposite effect in higher income ones.   Government 
efficiency is statistically significant but negative with both OLS and panel-fixed effects 
estimators. Regulatory efficiency is statistically significant and positive with the OLS but 
not statistically significant and positive with Panel-fixed effect estimators. Corruption 
(control of) is not statistically significant and positive with both estimators. 
 
With respect to the control variables trade openness is positive and statistically 
significant with all estimators but market-seeking variables are statistically insignificant 
with both estimators.  Oil revenues are negative and statistically significant with the 
panel-fixed effect estimator but not with OLS. Within our sample this suggests that FDI 
in higher income Asian economies is focused away from the oil-rich economies. Natural 
resources, technology and corruption, with a few small exceptions, tend not to be 
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statistically important determinants on inward stocks of FDI in the higher income Asian 
economies 
  
Table 16(6.5): Regression analysis of stock inward FDI by country 
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6.5. OVERVIEW 
 
The country-level analysis needs careful interpretation. For the reasons given in 
the data and methodology section a selection of estimators was chosen to deal with 
possible endogeneity in the model. Under ideal circumstances the results would be so 
robust that they do not vary according to choice of estimator, type of investment measure 
(flows or stocks) and type of country (high or low income).  Reality is different and 
different estimators do produce different results. Nonetheless the results presented here 
do support some important conclusions which are there are important behavioural 
differences with respect to inward FDI between higher and lower income countries. 
Including other determinants of FDI as control variables is important. Trade openness 
and natural resources in particular, are of significance in most variants of the 
specification. In most variants of the model at least two of the governance indicators are 
statistically significant. This supports the view that the relation between inward FDI and 
these governance variables is worth exploring. The data lacks sufficient precision for 
some of the specific inferences to be robust so the country-level findings need to be 
supported (as in this paper) with some more detailed firm-level analysis. 
 
6.6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is widely accepted amongst development economists that countries with 
relatively good governance tend to have more stability and grow faster, while countries 
with relatively weak governance tend to have less stability and grow slower. Accordingly, 
elements of good governance are expected to play an important role in determining the 
direction of FDI inflow and growth rate of an economy. However, despite its likely role, 
assuring foreign investors to engage FDI and economic performance, the qualitative 
nature of governance makes it difficult to measure accurately. Studies that investigate the 
impact of FDI inflows revealed various results; for instance Li and Resnick (2003) in 
their study of democratic institutions and FDI flows to developing countries. They 
discovered as much as democratic instruction improved rights protection, which 
encourages FDI inflows, whereas increased democracy also reduces FDI received by less-
developed countries. Another similar study carried out by Asiedu and Lien (2011) 
investigated the interaction between democracy, FDI and natural resources. They found 
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out that democracy impact on FDI in this case depends on the importance (share) of 
natural resource in the host country’s exports, whether low or high.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter provides evidence of links between FDI and 
governance at the country level for a sample of 22 Asian countries. This evidence 
suggests that lower income and higher income countries are behaviourally different in 
this respect. The analysis does not consider the effects of governance on FDI in isolation 
but as part of a wider set of determinants of the location of FDI. It suggests that treating 
governance in this way is important – that to exclude other determinants might create 
biased and misleading results. Overall, the complexity of the issue and the quality of 
available data is such that the effects of specific governance indicators do not produce 
results that are robust for all possible estimators or specifications. Nonetheless the more 
general finding that good governance has a positive effect on inward FDI in Asia is shown 
to be robust. Therefore, the result suggests that if the host countries are benefiting from 
the FDI activities, thus to have higher inflows of FDI or stock FDI are important so that 
good governance plays an important role to attract FDI.  
 
The positive results between corruption and FDI in this study is not new. 
Association between corruption and FDI have been widely explored by scholars (Wheeler 
and Mody, 1992; Mauro, 1995; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2000; Wei, 2000a). 
Although the finding from previous studies showed mostly a negative relationship 
between corruption and FDI, it still has not reached the expected conclusion that 
perceived high level of corruption in the host countries deter FDI as they did not find a 
significant relationship. However, some of the previous studies also showed some 
positive results that corruption may increase FDI in the presence of a rigid regulation and 
an inefficient bureaucracy to speed up the decision making process (Bardhan, 1997). 
Similar finding by Houston (2007) that corruption has positive effects on economic 
growth in countries with good institution. This study finding some positive results of 
association between corruption and both stock and inflow FDI but they are not significant. 
As it was mentioned earlier that like governance variables corruption is no different. It is 
as part of a wider set of determinants of the location of FDI. 
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CHAPTER VII: FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS LINKING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF FOREIGN OWNED FIRMS TO 
TAXES AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As discussed in the review of literature there are a very large number of empirical 
studies which examine the determinants of inward FDI. Comparatively few actively 
consider the role of taxes or of government bureaucracy. In consequence there is not a 
strong body of evidence to confirm or reject the view that tax and bureaucracy act as 
deterrents to efficiency seeking investment.  Such evidence is scarcer for Asia.  This 
chapter provides such evidence. Blonigen (2005) provides a review of the relevant 
studies. This chapter, firstly, analyses the effect of government and taxes on firm 
performance using OLS regression techniques. In order to explicitly incorporate firm 
heterogeneity it, secondly, conduct propensity score matching analysis of the effect of 
taxes and government on firm performance. 
 
Governance and taxes are predominantly a country regulatory environment 
phenomenon but the consequences are not. The effects of governance and taxes as part 
of government policy on FDI are felt at the level of individual firms or even in an 
individual investment project. To analyse these effects requires at least a firm level 
analysis.  A fundamental reason why firms are engaged in FDI activity (within the OLI 
paradigm) is because of the presence of the advantages of economies of scale and other 
characteristics that give them market power, so that they can overcome the disadvantages 
of being foreign and compete with a local firm in the host countries. As for the 
government policies (regulation and taxes) these can clearly become important factors 
that affect FDI through their consequences and industry structure. This chapter will 
explore the relationship between firm performance and taxes and governance in host 
countries. 
 
Tax and governance related issues such as bureaucracy and corruption are part of 
economic and institutional environment for investment.  This study follows similar 
approach by Dollar (2005). The country level analysis found the relationship between 
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governance and FDI in aggregate. The purpose of this chapter is to see how taxes and 
governance affect firm performance, if at all.  That is, the chapter focuses on the effects 
of tax and governance on firm performance in three Asian economies.  It analyses the 
link between tax and performance not between tax and investment (which was covered 
in the earlier country analysis). It assumes that adverse effects on firm performance would 
imply that tax and governance have an impact equally on both domestic and foreign 
business activities including investment.  
 
In this chapter evidence is presented on the impact of tax and governance on firm 
performance for three Asian countries:  Indonesia, the Philippine and Vietnam. In the 
previous chapter the country level evidence suggest that corporate income tax and 
governance do affect the aggregate inflow of FDI. An important mechanism is by 
affecting the profits that firms receive.  The effects of corporate income tax are an obvious 
potential influence, covered in the previous chapter.  What receives less attention is how 
they affect profits and other aspects of performance before taxes on corporate income are 
paid.  As was demonstrated in Chapter IV indirect taxes have the potential to substantially 
affect “pre-tax” (more accurately pre income tax) profits.  The object of this chapter is to 
provide some evidence of such effects arising from the system of tax and governance.  
 
This chapter addresses two fundamental and related questions. Firstly it asks 
whether or not all firms in the three countries, whether foreign owned or not, exhibit 
statistically significant effects of tax and governance on firm performance.  One reason 
for so doing is sample size. When all firms are included there are enough observations to 
adequately analyse each country separately as well as the three combined.  Secondly, it 
repeats the analysis but for firms with some foreign ownership. For data reasons the 
analysis of foreign owned firms in only conducted for the three countries combined and 
not for each country individually.  Conducting the analysis separately for all firms and 
for those that are (part or wholly) foreign owned means that any effects specific to foreign 
ownership, as opposed to all firms, can be identified. 
 
In the wider context FDI can be argued to help the economy to be more productive 
and more profitable. The phenomena of large difference in growth rates within countries 
and cities is one of the reason of some studies interest to investigate and questioning why 
some location in developing world grow rapidly, while other stagnates (Dollar et al, 
2005). Similar to the approach of Dollar (2005) study, this chapter explores the hypothesis 
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that variations in the regulatory environment could affect these. Taxes and the regulatory 
environment (bureaucracy) can be influential both at the country and at the firm level. 
The effect of taxes on FDI has been an interesting topic in both aspects, for both the 
international and public economist. Although the obvious analysis of taxes and its FDI 
relationship has shown that higher taxes discourage FDI, however, this study agrees with 
the investigation by Blonigen (2005) argued that the effect of taxes on FDI can vary 
dependent on the type of taxes, the measurement of FDI activity, and the treatment of tax 
in the host and home countries.  
 
The analysis in this chapter use three different methodological approaches. The 
effects of taxes and bureaucracy on firm performance are estimated, along with those for 
a number of control variables using OLS and LSDV regression techniques.  The 
widespread use of such techniques allows for ready interpretation.  All methodologies 
have limitations and an important limitation of regression analysis with firm level data is 
that it does not explicitly allow for firm heterogeneity.  To better deal with firm 
heterogeneity this chapter also presents a propensity score matching analysis.  That both 
approaches yield similar conclusions suggest the findings to be robust with respect to the 
choice of each estimator.  
 
7.2. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT  
 
It is common to use various different performance measures in empirical research, 
March and Sutton, (1997) provide the review some of this literature. This study using the 
following measures of firm performance: 
- Sales per worker  
- profit per worker 
- Growth in output (sales) over a 3 year period 
- Exports as a percentage of total sales 
 
Performance as measurement of an outcome is not a rare topic in management, 
economic and finance studies. The interest in using performance as a measurement has 
increased as a topic in published journals (March and Sutton, 1997) that have included 
the performance of firms or organisations as dependent, independent, or control variables, 
and among those studies where accounting and financial measurements are applied.  In 
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the literature on corporate financial performance there are many alternative measures of 
firm performance. For example concepts of accounting and economic performance 
(Pierre J. Richard, 2009) can encompass three specific outcomes: financial performance 
(profit, ROA, ROI), product market performance (sales, market share, etc.), and 
shareholder return (total shareholder return, value added, etc.).  
 
Firms as organisations are heterogeneous in their resources and capabilities, and 
how and where they choose to use them (Barney, 1991). In this study, firm size is one of 
the control variable as it is likely that local or foreign and small or big firms perform in a 
different manner. In the organizational literature there are three common approaches to a 
firm’s performance measurement. The first is where a single measure is applied which is 
not a direct measure of performance but is assumed to be closely identified with 
underlying performance (e.g. Hawawini et al., 2003; Hilman & Keim, 2001; Robert & 
Dowling, 2002; Spanos, Zaralis, Lioukas, 2004). The second approach is where the 
researcher uses several different measures to compare analysis with different dependent 
but identical independent variables (e.g., Baum & Wally, 2003; Miller, 2004; Peng, 
2004). The third approach is where the researcher aggregates dependent variables, 
assuming convergent validity based on the correlation between the measures (e.g., Cho 
& Pucik, 2005; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003). The justification of the approach depends on 
the objective measure of performance. This study follows the second approach as I 
measured the relationship using two dependent variables (sales per worker and profit per 
worker) and identical independent variables.   
 
Due to the type of survey and data that this study has used it has, therefore, applied 
productivity to measure firm performance. The sales or profit per worker are widely used 
measures of organizational productivity and of profitability respectively. The main 
benefit of these type of measures are that each provides a single index that can be used to 
compare firms’ performance.  
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7.3. OLS AND LSDV ESTIMATES 
 
7.3.1. Data  
Data for the firm level analysis were taken from World Bank enterprise surveys 
for each of three Asian countries: Indonesia the Philippines and Vietnam.  These surveys 
are conducted using a questionnaire that is standardized to a large extent but the 
questionnaire actually employed in any one country also has some significant national 
variations.  At best this creates a time consuming task of matching replies to the same 
question set in different questionnaires and at worst it creates problems of compatibility 
which prevent some countries being combined into the same sample. For details of World 
Bank enterprise surveys see: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
As a consequence of these issues the number of countries for the same time period (2009) 
included in this firm level sample was substantially fewer than in the country level 
analysis. The countries included were Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam.  
 
These countries are all ASEAN members, but they do not represent and are not 
intended to be representative of either Asia or ASEAN as a whole.  This study of firm 
level analysis should be seen as moving from the wider Asian perspective of the country 
analysis to a tighter focus on these ASEAN countries.  Nor is the firm level analysis 
intended to be representative of the whole economy of any of the countries included in 
the sample.  The intention is to produce, in effect, a small number of econometric “case 
studies” covering the small number of ASEAN countries for which consistent data is 
available. To achieve the best use of the available data, this study will analyze the impact 
of tax and governance on firm performance in three different techniques:  OLS, Least 
Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) and propensity matching score analysis.  
 
The World Bank enterprise surveys encompass both domestic and foreign owned 
firms. For the first analysis both all firms, domestic and foreign, are included in the 
sample but a foreign ownership variable was used to capture behavioral effects linked to 
the degree of foreign ownership.   In the second analysis firms with at least some foreign 
ownership are included in the sample but those with no foreign ownership excluded. 
 
There are a number of previous studies, whilst not normally focusing on foreign 
owned firms, have estimated the links between firm performance on the one hand with 
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governance and business climate indicators on the other.  An example of this type of 
analysis is provided by Dollar et al (2005). Individual specifications can and do vary but 
a generic version of such a model would comprise of three aspects. First, more than one 
dependent variable capturing different aspects of firm performance (and, hence, separate 
regressions for each dependent variable). Second, a series of governance and related 
indicators and third, a series of control variables intended to capture other effects on firm 
performance. 
 
A specification of this type would apply to an individual selected Asian country 
but the sample may, as with Dollar et al (2005), include firms drawn from multiple 
countries.  The approach taken in this study is to apply separately a common specification 
of this type to each country individually and all three combined. Two different dependent 
variables, sales per worker and profit per worker (in $), are used. The specification (OLS) 
using sales per worker was: 
SPit =  SPit =  α0 +  α1 .Agei  +   α2 .Sizei  +   α3.Exporti + α4compi  + α5.buri +  α6.Corrupti 
+  α7.skillworkeri +  α8.educationi +  α9.capita1i +  α10.capita2i +  α11.govtbidi +  α12.taxi 
+ α13.KPW1i + α14.KPW2i + α15.foreign1i + α16.infrai +  wi   (7.1)   
 
Where subscript i denotes firm, subscript j dummy country, national and sector and where 
wi is an i.i.d. disturbance term.  The specification with profit per worker (PPWi) as the 
dependent uses an identical specification as the right hand side of equation 7.1. 
 
As with the country level analysis it is unrealistic to rule out a number of possible 
causes of endogeneity.  For example, the possibility of both measurement errors and 
omitted variables cannot be excluded.  Firm level survey data almost inevitably involves 
a significant number of missing observations and, in any case, is cross-sectional. This 
rules out GMM estimation.  A fixed effects estimator, more properly the least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, remains feasible so a second specification using the 
LSDV specification to capture the impact of unobserved variables and measurement 
errors was used. This was defined as: 
SPit = α0 +  α1 .Agei  +   α2 .Sizei  +   α3.Exporti + α4compi  + α5.buri +  α6.Corrupti +  
α7.skillworkeri +  α8.educationi +  α9.capita1i +  α10.capita2i +  α11.govtbidi +  α12.taxi 
+ α13.KPW1i + α14.KPW2i + α15.foreign1i + α16.infrai +  δi + θt +εit  (7.2)   
where δi  is a vector of sector fixed effects,  θt  a vector of country fixed effects and where 
εit is an i.i.d. disturbance term.  
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7.3.2. Variables  
Dependent variables:  
For each country two different variables were used to measure firm performance: 
1. Sales per worker (SPW), measured in US $, defined as sales divided by total 
permanent employees.  
2. Profit per worker (PPW), measured in US $, defined as profit which total 
sales minus total cost and divided by total permanent employees.  
Independent variables:  
1. Years of establishment (age), defined as the total years of operation as indicator 
of experience. 
2. Firm size class from micro (0) to large (3), measured based on number of 
employee (question a6a) 
3. Competition (comp) as total number of competitors (other similar businesses) in 
the domestic market (question e2). 
4. Foreign ownership (foreign1); any positive percentage foreign share in the firm 
(0,1), variable based on question b2b. 
5. Bureaucracy (tax admin, labour regulation and business license/permit) as a 
perceived obstacle.  Mean score of responses for each of the four categories, 
scored from 0 (no constraint) to 4 (severe). 
6. Corruption, extent to which this is an obstacle (also scored from 0 to 4); question 
j30f 
7. Skilled production workers, % of total, questions L3b and L4b 
8. Average number of years of education for production workers (question L9) 
9. Capita1: the net book value of assets (question n6a and n6b) 
10. Capita2: replacement cost of assets (question n7a and n7b) 
11. Govt bid is whether firm bid for a government contract; (0,1) variable based on 
question j6a. 
12. Tax, the extent to which tax rates are a perceived obstacle (scored from 0 to 4), 
question j30a. 
13. KPW1 defined as the net book value of assets divided by total employees 
14. KPW2 defined as the replacement cost of assets divided by total employees. 
15. Infrastructure (infra) defined as average score of the extent of perceived obstacles 
(scored from 0 to 4) arising from electricity, telecommunication and transport. 
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For example if the score of electricity, telecommunication and transport is 1,2 
and 3 so the average score will be 2. 
 
7.3.3. All firms 
Combined sample 
Governance and tax variables 
Table 7.1 presents the results of the firm level regression analysis for all firms 
(local and foreign) and all sample countries. Tax has a statistically significant positive 
effect (but only at 90 percent confidence) on sales per worker with the OLS specification 
but not with the LSDV estimator.  Bureaucracy does not have a statistically significant 
effect on sales per worker with either estimator. Both tax and bureaucracy variables are 
not statistically significant on profit per worker according to the fixed effects (LSDV) 
estimator, however bureaucracy is statistically significant at 90 percent with the OLS 
estimator. With sales per worker and profit per worker as the dependent variables most 
of the firm characteristics (control) variables are significant (size, labour, capital, foreign 
ownership and education). Turning to the analysis using profit per worker as a dependent 
variable shows a similar result: that firm characteristics factors such as size, skill worker, 
education, capital and foreign owned are significant and positively affect performance.     
 
Control variables 
The degree of foreign ownership is statistically significant and positive with both 
the OLS estimator and cross section fixed effect (LSDV) estimator.   This confirms an 
unexpected and perverse finding: that exporting has a negative and statistically significant 
effect upon firm performance using sales per worker. Size is statistically significant and 
positive with both the OLS and LSDV estimators for both performance variables.  With 
foreign owned variable both sales per worker and profit per worker measurement of firm 
performance the coefficient are both positive and statistically significant at 99 persent 
indicate that the higher foreign ownership the higher sales per worker or profit per worker.  
Export is statistically significant and negative with both estimators on both firm 
performance measurements. This suggests that performance is better when the company 
focus on domestic market or, possibly, when competition is less fierce.    
 
The effects of education cost per worker on both firms’ performance 
measurements are, as might be expected, positive and statistically significant as firms 
with more highly educated employees most likely to have better performance. The 
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coefficient for the age of the firm is negative and statistically insignificant according to 
both estimators with both measurement performances as the dependent variable.  This 
suggests that older, more experienced firms are not necessarily more profitable than 
newer ones, perhaps lacking flexibility in adjustment.   As a general proposition all other 
control variables such as corruption or bidding for government contracts, are always or 
almost always statistically insignificant for both dependent variables and both estimators. 
Table 17(7.1): Firm analysis all countries 
 
 
According to theory, size and age should affect firm performance. A larger firm 
is more likely to have possibilities to exploit economies of scale and scope, allowing 
larger firms to operative more effectively and so generate superior performance relative 
to smaller firms (Penrose, 1959). An alternative point of view suggests that size is 
correlated with market power (Sheperd, 1986) and with market power comes x-
inefficiency and inferior performance (Leibenstein, 1976). With respect to age, it is also 
open to differing predictions. The older the firm, the more experience and, it is argued, 
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Variable
OLS Fixed effect OLS Pixed effect
Age -.0000559  -0.0001182 -0.0002459 -0.0003277
 .000237 0.0001964 0.0002752 0.0002686
Size .6765276*** 0.5256849*** 0.6090107*** 0.4836788***
.0555298 0.0548492 0.0665724 0.0697663
Export -.629464*** -0.597158*** -0.91667*** -0.763748***
.2343015 0.2175523 0.2896959 0.2850764
Competition .0290215 0.0038221 -0.0620031 -0.0130031
  .0442204 0.0411444 0.0528565 0.0523771
beuracracy .1149176 0.1974121 0.3432493* 0.2118183
.1723742 0.0411444 0.2067894 0.202888
corruption -.0186697 -0.0014329 -0.0039106 0.003788
.0376586 0.0345239 0.0449461 0.0439678
skillworker .0005529*** 0.000963*** 0.0011546*** 0.000986***
 .000423 0.0004099 0.0004994 0.0004928
Education .3165565*** 0.2278345*** 0.2745608*** 0.2552395***
.0377581 0.0355833 0.0455746 0.0463368
Capital1 -1.74e-08***-0.0000000144*** -0.0000000143*** -0.000000014***
3.38e-09 3.24E-09 4.02E-09 3.95E-09
Capital2 -4.12e-14 -4.91E-15 -4.09E-14 -1.3E-14
8.47e-14  8.15E-14 1.01E-13 9.89E-14
Govtbid -.0324767 -0.0595083 -0.1118627 -0.0647818
 .1344546 0.1236665 0.1637826 0.1620383
Tax .1467724*** 0.0361859 0.024375 0.0250489
.042164 0.0401904 0.0506774 0.0514008
KPW1 .0000194*** 0.0000163*** 0.0000128*** 0.0000143***
3.17e-06 0.00000301 0.00000393 0.00000388
KPW2 2.29e-06*** 0.00000164** 0.00000191 0.00000171
 1.14e-06 0.0000011 0.00000143 0.0000014
Foreign1 .8754863*** 0.7137571*** 0.9514985*** 0.8838253***
.1284319 0.1206085 0.1553698 0.1530613
Infra .1011754*** 0.1290366*** 0.1515525*** 0.1389594***
.0553132 0.0506543 0.0663481 0.0650974
R-squared 0.19 0.33 0.1818 0.2325
Adjusted R-squared0.17 0.32 0.1732 0.2156
F stastistic 37.78 28.21 21.05 13.79
F: degree of freedom1720 1893 1611 1593
Sales per worker Profit perworker
139 
 
the greater the benefits from learning by doing (Stinchombe, 1965), giving older firms 
superior performance. However some suggest that the older the firm the more they are 
prone to inertia and unlikely to have flexibility to adjust in a rapidly changing 
environment As a result older firms may lose out in the performance stakes to younger 
(Marshall, 1920). 
 
Indonesia 
This section replicates the analysis for the combined sample but for Indonesia 
alone. Table 7.2 shows that, in Indonesia, Bureaucracy has a statistically significant (at 
90 percent confidence) impact on both performance indicators with both estimators (OLS 
and LSDV). Surprisingly the coefficient estimates are positive, implying that perceived 
obstacles from bureaucracy are associated with better performance. It is unlikely that 
bureaucratic obstacles are themselves a cause of better performance.  A possible 
explanation is that more efficient firms are more likely to have perceptions of 
cumbersome bureaucracy. If this is correct then a dual causality exists when a predictive 
variable (sales per worker and profit per worker) depend on the variable of prediction 
(obstacle of bureaucracy) and it is possible that the regression results for Indonesia are 
biased. As this is one of the possibilities analysis on the positive result of the association 
between the bureaucracy obstacle and firm performance, to reduce such risk (bias) a 
propensity score matching will be applied in the later analysis.    
 
Perceived obstacles arising from tax rates have no statistically significant effects 
with either estimator or either performance indicator. For Indonesia the regression 
evidence does not support the view that tax rates affect performance. The variables which 
appear to be consistent statistically significant are size, education, foreign owned (all 
positive and significant at 99 percent confidence) and infrastructure (like bureaucracy 
significant at 90 percent and positive rather than negative). For Indonesia the corruption 
variable has a statistically significant negative effect of performance in three of the four 
cases.  It means the lower the obstacles of corruption (less corruption) the better the firm 
performance which is a result I would have expected.  
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Table 18(7.2): Firm analysis Indonesia (all firm) 
 
 
 
  
Variable
OLS fixed effect OLS fixed effect
Age -0.0002302 -.0002998   -.000351  .0004309*
.0002672 .0002657   .000286 -.0002831  
Size 0.7785222***  .6056383 *** .8949726***   .7074853***
.0890431  .0970961 .0953125 .1035121
Export 0.2550281  -.0236992 .2239483   -.0437825   
.6397418   .6359625 .6848271 .6777239
Competition 0.0260816 .0545401  .0237165    .0576226  
.0571251  .0573957 .0611634  .0611735
beuracracy 0.5107543*  .4966711* .4743245*     .4512263*   
.2739269  .2737084 .2933402 .2917927 
corruption -0.0981261* -.0673511 -.1369116***     -.103483*   
.0579943   .0580109 .0621481 .0619174
skillworker 0.0008251*  .0009121 * .0007852*  .0009075*  
.0004896   .0004837  .0005241  .0005155
Education 0.3186457***  .2645898*** .3503553***   .289451***   
.0554268 .0562018 .0593761 .0599502
Capital1 0.00000623 6.82e-06  5.99e-06    6.82e-06  
4.85e-06   4.80e-06 5.20e-06  5.12e-06
Capital2 -0.00000000205*** -2.21e-09*** -.02e-09***   -2.19e-09***  
7.15e-10  7.06e-10 7.66e-10  7.52e-10
Govtbid 0.2133188 .3334471   .4325103*    .5740144**  
.2688551  .270275 .2915705  .2918903
Tax 0.0163326  -.021353 .0267728   -.0129669   
.0804932 .0800602 .0861778 .0853205
KPW1 0.0014972 .0015542 .0016436  .0016621   
.0011696  .0011555  .0012522 .0012316 
KPW2 0.003874*** .0040603*** .0037349***   .0039356***  
.0012032  .0011866  .001288  .0012645 
Foreign1 1.060455***  1.01874*** 1.087719***   1.03907***   
.2724954  .2708211 .2917196 .2886141
Infra 0.1239243* .1095554* .1536274*  .1301025**  
.0754644  .0750725  .0811172  .0802847
R-squared 0.3330 0.3658 0.3431 0.3809
Adjusted R-squared  0.3194 0.3411 0.3297 0.3569
F stastistic 24.56 14.86 25.66 15.84
F: degree of freedom 787 773 786 772
Indonesia
Sales per worker Profit perworker
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Philippines  
The results for the same analysis applied to the Philippines data are reported in 
Table 7.3.  In the case of the Philippines the coefficients for bureaucracy are not 
statistically significant for 3 of the 4 models, the exception being OLS estimates with 
profit per worker (positive and significant at 90% confidence). Perceived obstacles 
arising from tax rates have no statistically significant effects on sales per worker but have 
statistically significant (at 95%) effects on profit per worker. Again it is difficult to argue 
that higher taxes result in higher profitability, particularly given the potential importance 
of indirect taxes discussed in Chapter V.  Again it is more likely that more efficient firms 
are more prone to perceive tax as a problem. Perhaps their efficiency means that they 
have many fewer internal constraints and focus more on external ones. If this is the case 
the consequences for the regression estimates are again dual causality and a risk of bias. 
Some of the control variables firm size, foreign ownership and capital per worker (KPW1) 
are positive and statistically significant at 95% or higher confidence.  None of the other 
control variables were systematically statistically significant at 95% confidence. 
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Table 19(7.3): Firm analysis Philippine (all firm) 
 
 
 In this analysis like the other two countries (Indonesia and Vietnam) the data was 
gathered from survey conducted by World Bank and Philippine has the most un-
answered questions fewer as result less colour data. Using the same regression model 
but less data affect the explanatory power as a result.    
 
Vietnam 
The same analysis was repeated for Vietnam and the results are reported in Table 
7.4.  As was the case with the Philippines perceived bureaucracy constraints were not 
statistically significant for either performance indicator or with either estimator (OLS or 
LSDV).  Tax rates (perceived constraints) were, as with the Philippines typically 
statistically significant at 90% confidence and positive.  As a result the same concerns 
apply to the estimates for Vietnam: it is not plausible that higher taxes cause better firm 
Variable
OLS fixed effect OLS fixed effect
Age 0.0001612 .0000513   .0002213   -.0003092   
.0004039 .0003894  .0004938 .0004855
Size 0.5159302***  .3177465***  .4153488***  .2485959**  
.0990599  .0997126  .1269006  .1302663
Export -0.6596828*  -.7069785**   -.7325777* -.7950356 * 
.3530471 .3396522  .4839115  .4741642
Competition -0.001688 -.02557  -.0649594  -.120801   
.0966632  .0935959  .1229316 .1215609
beuracracy 0.2065807  .1985325   .4330905*   .3844421    
.2427655  .234687  .3118752 .307136
corruption 0.0338711   .01194  .0186271  -.0161222  
.0574224  .0554999  .0730035  .0719877
skillworker 0.0000242  .0005316   .0003346   .0002513   
.0012526 .0012154  .0017564 .0017405
Education 0.1358716* .1215992*  .1485021*    .1222215  
.0716197  .0705244 .0932614  .0924437  
Capital1 -0.0000000223** -1.91e-08*   3.00e-08***  -2.50e-08* 
1.11e-08 1.07e-08 -1.48e-08   1.46e-08
Capital2 2.21E-10  1.88e-10   3.73e-10    3.18e-10      
2.24e-10 2.16e-10    3.02e-10 2.97e-10  
Govtbid -0.0764723 -.1551774  .0565765  -.0036113  
.2150778  .2080823  .2760065  .2723242 
Tax -0.0577954 -.0748364  -.1719638**   -.1802325** 
.0668209    .0642905   .0866929   .0852035  
KPW1 0.0000122***  .0000105***   .0000117**  9.98e-06**
3.75e-06   3.60e-06   4.92e-06   4.81e-06  
KPW2 0.000000717 7.32e-07  2.44e-07 -7.95e-07   
2.16e-06  2.09e-06   2.74e-06 2.70e-06  
Foreign1 0.5785446***  .4544035***   .6424022***  .5432438**   
.1819183 .1787446  .2339075 .2337487
Infra 0.1019456  .0967333  .1045692   .1012535  
.0973412  .0942487  .1271872  .1256284  
R-squared 0.1259 0.2215 0.0876 0.1575
Adjusted R-squared   0.1026 0.1801 0.0603 0.109
F stastistic 5.39 5.36 3.22 3.25
F: degree of freedom  599 584 536 522
Philiphine
Sales per worker Profit perworker
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performance so it is likely that strong performance alters perceptions of taxes. Since direct 
taxes are normally paid on profits it should not be surprising that profitable firms see them 
as a more serious obstacle.  This has the same implications as before: two-way causality 
and possible bias. To reduce this risk, this study apply propensity score matching in the 
later on.  
 
For the control variables firm size, education, foreign ownership and capital per 
worker (KPW1) are all statistically significant at 95% confidence or higher and positive. 
The remainder of the control variables are typically not statistically significant. 
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Table 20(7.4): Firm analysis Vietnam (all firm) 
 
 
7.3.4. Foreign only firms (OLS and LSDV) 
This section repeats the analysis but for the sample of firms with at least some 
foreign ownership.  Since this greatly reduces the sample size the analysis is applied only 
to the pooled sample of the three countries (Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam).  The 
results are presented below in Table 7.5. 
 
 
 
 
Variable
OLS fixed effect OLS fixed effect
Age .0003698  .0003886   0.0002061  .0002358   
.0004391  .000418 .0005966 .0005723
Size    .499225***  .4357883***  0.4849444***   .3531489 ***
.087423  .0865112 .1265582   .1262244  
Export -.7532136*** -.6808791 *** -0.4870353 -.3055747  
.2768425   .266053 .3835473  .3719478
Competition  -.1431527** -.1422741**  -0.1877611* -.1976451*
.0713056   .068687 .107582   .1041379
beuracracy    .1850205  .1441103  -0.2834436 -.4301663  
.4620794  .4432243 .6652817  .6423568
corruption   -.0921167 -.1065184*  0.0662266  .0407828  
.0783075   .0747981 .1114949  .1074203 
skillworker .0011228   .0018207 * -0.0001325   .0008816  
.0012709  .0012298 .0017835  .0017398
Education  .1736769***  .1790659*** 0.2826321***   .2789127 ***
.0574307   .0556535  .0841104    .0821917
Capital1 -3.61e-09 -1.48e-09   -1.29E-08 -1.04e-08  
1.83e-08 1.78e-08  2.55e-08   2.51e-08
Capital2 -2.76e-14  6.75e-15  -5.94E-14 -1.91e-14 
8.06e-14  7.72e-14 1.10e-13   1.06e-13 
Govtbid  -.131184 -.2259726* -0.1242992 -.1971455  
.1598475   .1565583 .2295896  .2264013
Tax .139283**  .1144043*   0.1678898* .1296065*
.0624123  .060103  .0888337   .0862274
KPW1 .000042***   .0000428*** 0.0000331***  .000035*** 
6.31e-06   6.17e-06 8.85e-06  8.71e-06
KPW2 2.10e-06*  1.75e-06   0.00000284*  2.44e-06  
1.34e-06   1.30e-06 1.85e-06  1.81e-06
Foreign1 .8603249***   .6486835***    1.151095***   .8881519 ***
.1951606    .1875332 .2759304  .2670159  
Infra   .1269006  .1271128    0.0157496 .0110187  
.0971587  .0927914 .1390131  .1337252
R-squared 0.3144 0.4015 0.2136 0.3061
Adjusted R-squared 0.2921 11.06 0.1849 0.2589
F stastistic 14.07 0.3652 7.45 6.48
F: degree of freedom  491 478 439 426
Vietnam
Sales per worker Profit perworker
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Table 21(7.5): OLS and LSDV foreign only firms 
 
 
 
For the sample of firms wholly or partly foreign owned the results are much 
clearer than for all firms. Perceptions of the extent to which bureaucracy is an obstacle 
have no statistically significant effect on firm performance as measured by sales per 
worker and by profit per worker. This applies to both OLS and LSDV estimates.  
Likewise there were no statistically significant effects of the degree to which tax rates are 
a perceived constraint. 
 
For the sample of foreign owned firms several of the control variables are 
systematically statistically significant at least 90 percent confidence and have a positive 
effect on firm performance.  These are age, education, capital per worker (KPW1) and 
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growth.  The remainder of the control variables are typically not statistically significant.  
The results with respect to the control variables share much in common with those for all 
firms. The same variables such as education and capital intensity are positive and 
statistically significant with both samples. There are also important differences. For the 
sample of foreign firms age of the firm has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on firm performance but for all firms it is statistically insignificant.  In contrast firm size 
is typically significant in the “all firms” data (foreign and non-foreign firms) in previous 
sample (7.3.3) but statistically insignificant in only foreign firms sample.  
 
The results with respect to the control variables do suggest important behavioural 
differences between domestic and foreign owned firms.  This leads to several conclusions. 
Firstly, unlike the full sample, the results suggest no statistically significant effects of 
either tax or bureaucracy on foreign owned firms.  Secondly, the absence of perverse 
findings that either bureaucracy or tax actually enhances performance reduces concerns 
with respect to reverse causality. There is less to suggest a risk of bias.  Finally the 
comparison of results between all firms and foreign owned firms does suggest that are 
important behavioural differences between domestic and foreign owned firms.  The 
findings of the regression analysis are useful but not conclusive. Further analysis is 
needed to deal with the effects of this heterogeneity in behaviour.  
 
7.3.5. Conclusions of the Regression Analysis 
 
For the sample which includes all firms the results give rise to some concern. 
Examination of the combined sample of all three countries would lead one to conclude 
that neither bureaucracy nor tax rates have statistically significant effects on firm 
performance.  Previous studies such as Dollar (2005) have also used multi-country studies 
but the analysis on a country by country basis raises concerns. Results which suggest that 
either bureaucracy or tax rates are associated with better performance must raise questions 
concerning causality.  The possibility of reverse causality exists: that profitability in 
particular increases the sensitivity to tax rates.  Care needs to be taken here. The analysis 
here uses a measure of profit before taxes on corporate income are paid.  Profit taxes 
cannot directly affect these underlying gross profits but profitability can create a concern 
about profit taxes.  Firms with no significant pre-tax profits will not expect to pay much 
profit tax. 
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The likelihood that the regression models involve a reverse causality from 
performance to perceived tax constraints also creates a risk that their estimates are biased.  
The OLS and LSDV estimates are useful in highlighting some key features but are not 
wholly reliable because of these concerns.  For this reason a propensity score matching 
approach was also used. For the sample which includes only foreign owned firms the 
analysis for the three countries combined is even more conclusive with respect to tax and 
bureaucracy. There were no statistically significant effects on firm performance of either. 
With respect to control variables there are some differences which suggest important 
behavioural variation between domestic and foreign owned firms. This also suggests that 
the analysis needs to be supported by propensity score matching. 
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7.4. PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
 
7.4.1. Overview 
Propensity score matching is used in the firm level analysis.  Matching techniques 
are more commonly used for cross-sectional than time series or panel analysis, where 
they are more naturally suited.  The two key variables in a propensity score matching 
technique are the treatment variable and the outcome variable.  The treatment variable 
needs to be a (0,1) variable but the outcome variable can either take on any value or itself 
be a (0,1) variable. 
The matching approach can be seen as an extension and development of a simple test.  
The sample can be divided into two sub-samples using the (0,1) treatment variable. For 
example, in the firm level analysis the sample can be divided into those firms who report 
bureaucracy (treated) as a significant constraint and those firms who do not (untreated).  
Using a performance indicator such as, say, sales per worker the mean for each group can 
be calculated. A t-test between the two means can then be used to assess whether there is 
a statistically significant difference between the treated (problems with bureaucracy) 
firms and the untreated.   
 
Although a straightforward approach a simple t test for the difference in means 
between the treated and untreated sub-samples is subject to bias if the two groups do not 
compare like with like. For example, firms reporting problems with bureaucracy may be 
smaller or less experienced than those who do not.  The matching approach comprises the 
careful selection of a control group of untreated firms to match the key characteristics of 
firms included in the treated group.  The firms included in the “matched” control group 
should share all observable key characteristics in common with those in the treated group 
other than the treatment itself. 
 
In the matching approach a series of control variables are used to estimate the 
propensity score. This is done by using a probit model to estimate the probability of 
treatment (whether or not the firm has significant problems with bureaucracy).  The probit 
model estimates the probability of observing a treated firm using a number of variables. 
For example, the probability of observing constraints arising from governance may be 
related to firm size, sector, age of the firm, exporting and foreign ownership. 
Once a “matched” control group has been created a t-test for the difference between the 
mean of the treated and untreated sub-samples is conducted.  So, for example, if the 
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difference in the mean sales per worker is negative and statistically significant it implies 
that the treatment (bureaucracy) is associated with lower sales per worker.  There are two 
possible problems that may arise. Firstly, the control group may not adequately match the 
treated group in all the observable characteristics. This is known as “bias on observables”. 
Since the relevant variables are observable it is possible to test for differences between 
the treated group and the control group.  There is also the possibility of “bias on 
unobservables”. This is similar to omitted variable bias in a regression model.  If a key 
variable has been omitted from the matching process then the results are biased.  For 
example, suppose the nationality of the firm affects both the treatment (bureaucracy) and 
the outcome (sales per worker) but is excluded from the matching process. This exclusion 
may well mean that the t tests for the treatment effect are biased. 
 
This section builds on the preceding firm level regression analysis by using a 
propensity score matching approach.  This technique is described in more detail in the 
methodology.  At heart it is simple. It compares the mean value of an “outcome” variable 
between a sample of firms who have been subject to a “treatment” with a sample of firms 
that have not.  In this case the “outcome” variable is each of four different indicators of 
firm performance and the treatment variables are firms perceptions of the severity of 
obstacles created by, firstly, tax rates and, secondly, bureaucracy.  The analysis tests 
whether tax rates and bureaucracy (separately) had statistically significant effects on firm 
performance. 
Comparing means between two sub-samples is a fairly simple approach.  A matching 
approach tries to compare the “treated” group with a control group that is selected to be 
as similar as possible in all key observed characteristics.  In so doing it offers a key 
advantage that the regression model cannot. It explicitly takes into account firm 
heterogeneity.  
 
The analysis is presented below in the following way. Firstly, the results for the 
combined sample (Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam) are analysed. Secondly, the 
analysis for each individual country is reported and discussed.  Selection of the control 
group was in each case using kernel density matching and standard errors for treatment 
effects were bootstrapped. 
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7.4.2. Data and Variables 
 
The data used for the matching analysis was taken from the same sources as the 
earlier regression analysis: the World Bank Enterprise surveys of Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam. All three surveys were conducted in 2009. 
The analysis used four different performance indicators: 
1. Sales per worker (spw), in local currency but converted into US $ for the com-
bined sample. 
2. Profit per worker (ppw), also in local currency but converted to US $ for the com-
bined sample 
3. Growth, the % change in the firm’s output between 2006 and 2009. 
4. Export, the share of exports in total sales. 
5. The treatment variables were:  
6. Tax rates was measured as 1 for all firms who rated tax rates as a “major” or 
“very severe” obstacle,  zero otherwise 
7. Bureaucracy was given as the mean score of four different administrative 
obstacles (customs, business licensing, tax administration and labour regulation).  
For each the degree of difficulty was scored from 0 to 4, with 0 representing “no 
obstacle” and 2 a “moderate obstacle”. Valued as 1 if the firm’s mean score was 
more than 2 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Matching analysis requires a number of variables (“observables”) on which to select 
a suitable propensity score and an appropriate control group.  As far as possible these 
should capture all important differences between “treated” and “untreated” firms. 
The variables used as observables were: 
1. Foreign ownership , foreign1, (1 for any % foreign ownership, 0 for none) 
2. Firm size class, size1 (0 micro, 1 small, 2 medium and 3 large) 
3. Export (as defined above, used as an “observable” for the first three performance 
indicators only) 
4. Infrastructure obstacles, Infra,  the mean score of three different infrastructure 
obstacles (each scored from 0 to 4) 
5. The age of the firm in years, age. 
6. The main market was national, as opposed to local, national, (0,1) 
7. The firm bid for a government contract (0,1), govbid. 
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8. The degree of severity to which corruption posed a problem, scored from 0-4, 
corruption. 
The sample sizes used were Indonesia 1242 observations, Philippines 1139 
observations and Vietnam 1002 observations 
 
7.4.3. All firms 
 
The combined sample (Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam) 
1. Using Tax Rates as the Treatment Variable 
Table 7.6 below reports matching tests for each of the four performance indicators (sales 
per worker, profit per worker, growth and exports) using tax rates as the treatment 
variable.  For none of these variables could we reject the null hypothesis that tax rates 
have a significant effect on firm performance at 90% confidence or higher.  The evidence 
of the sample suggests that perceived difficulties with high tax rates make no statistically 
significant difference to firm performance according to each of the indicators. 
 
Table 22(7.6): Matching test with tax rates as the treatment-combines sample 
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Figure 7.1 below provides a graphic representation of bias on observables, before and 
after the matching procedure. 
 
Figure 6(7.1): Bias on observables-tax rates, combines sample 
 
 
Table 7.7 presents summary data for the selection on observables, with tax rates 
as the treatment.  It should be noted that the t test for a difference in means between the 
treated and untreated group after matching would lead to acceptance of the null 
hypothesis (of no difference in the means) at 90% confidence or higher.  The matching 
process (with respect to observables) therefore seems satisfactory. 
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Table 23(7.7): Selection on observables-tax rates, combined sample 
 
 
2. Using Bureaucracy as the Treatment Variable 
Table 7.8 repeats the matching tests reported above (in Table 7.7) but using 
bureaucracy as the treatment variable.  Again there are no statistically significant effects 
at 90 percent or higher confidence. Like tax rates there is no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that perceived difficulties with bureaucracy have a significant harmful effect 
on firm performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection on Observables - Tax Rates, Combined Sample    
Variable Unmatched Mean   % reduction t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
foreign1 U 0.20205 0.17959 5.7  0.93 0.352 
 M 0.20486 0.18311 5.5 3.2 0.66 0.51 
        
size1 U 1.9178 1.9432 -3.2  -0.5 0.614 
 M 1.9201 1.924 -0.5 84.9 -0.06 0.954 
        
export U 0.18983 0.21061 -5.7  -0.9 0.37 
 M 0.18691 0.18245 1.2 78.5 0.15 0.879 
        
infra U 1.3544 0.75356 66.6  11.9 0 
 M 1.3304 1.3256 0.5 99.2 0.06 0.952 
        
burcy U 1.512 0.54301 129.2  24.26 0 
 M 1.4844 1.4476 4.9 96.2 0.53 0.593 
        
age U 26.575 22.295 3.9  0.68 0.5 
 M 26.552 31.073 -4.2 -5.6 -0.4 0.692 
        
national U 0.41096 0.39384 3.5  0.56 0.576 
 M 0.41319 0.37641 7.5 -114.9 0.9 0.367 
        
govbid U 0.10959 0.07607 11.6  1.98 0.048 
 M 0.10764 0.11976 -4.2 63.8 -0.46 0.647 
        
corruption U 2.1336 0.74579 107.9  19.02 0 
 M 2.1076 2.057 3.9 96.3 0.44 0.659 
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Table 24(7.8): Matching test with Bureaucracy as the treatment-combine sample 
 
 
Figure 7.2 below presents a visual summary a graphic of bias on observables, before and 
after the matching procedure 
 
Figure 7(7.2): Bias on observables-bureaucracy, combined sample 
 
 
 
Table 7.9 presents summary data for the selection on observables, with bureaucracy as 
the treatment.  As with the tax rates case the null hypothesis (of no difference between 
Matching Tests with Bureaucracy as the Treatment - Combined Sample  
       
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 84805.6 782991.0 -698185.4 2681810.6 -0.26 
 ATT 86041.6 1477185.1 -1391143.5 1199333.0 -1.16 
       
ppw Unmatched 12633.4 26261.1 -13627.7 28126.8 -0.48 
 ATT 12849.1 28962.5 -16113.4 10174.4 -1.58 
       
growth Unmatched 0.8667 18.2328 -17.3661 36.6769 -0.47 
 ATT 0.8763 27.1760 -26.2998 28.4424 -0.92 
       
export Unmatched 0.2464 0.2036 0.0428 0.0347 1.23 
 ATT 0.2421 0.2034 0.0386 0.0301 1.28 
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the mean of the treated and control groups) cannot be rejected for any of the observables 
so it is concluded that matching on observables was satisfactory. 
 
Table 25(7.9): Selection an observables-bureaucracy combine sample 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
1. Using Tax Rates as the Treatment Variable 
This section repeats essentially the same matching analysis but for Indonesia rather than 
the full sample.  Table 7.10 reports the matching tests for a difference between the mean 
of the treated and control groups, using tax rates as the treatment. Results are given for 
each of the four performance indicators.  They show no statistically significant effect (at 
90 percent or higher confidence) of perceived high tax rates on any of the performance 
indicators. 
 
Selection on Observables - Bureaucracy, Combined Sample    
Variable Unmatched Mean   % reduction t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
foreign1 U 0.26891 0.17179 23.5  2.72 0.007 
 M 0.2735 0.26684 1.6 93.1 0.11 0.909 
        
size1 U 2.0588 1.9091 18.6  1.98 0.048 
 M 2.0427 2.0411 0.2 98.9 0.02 0.987 
        
export U 0.24639 0.20359 11.2  1.23 0.218 
 M 0.24376 0.22417 5.1 54.2 0.39 0.693 
        
infra U 1.9552 0.77411 131.5  15.88 0 
 M 1.9231 1.8135 12.2 90.7 0.85 0.399 
        
age U 37.193 24.36 8.2  1.1 0.273 
 M 37.444 38.926 -1 88.5 -0.06 0.953 
        
national U 0.47059 0.39935 14.4  1.55 0.122 
 M 0.47863 0.48876 -2 85.8 -0.15 0.877 
        
govbid U 0.17647 0.07882 29.5  3.77 0 
 M 0.17094 0.15786 3.9 86.6 0.27 0.788 
        
corruption U 2.6807 0.80437 159.8  16.89 0 
 M 2.6667 2.5888 6.6 95.8 0.49 0.625 
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Table 26(7.10): Matching with tax rates as the treatment-Indonesia 
 
 
Figure 7.3 and Table 7.11 below provide evidence with respect to bias on observables. 
Both suggest the matching process to have been adequate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matching Tests with Tax Rates as the Treatment - Indonesia   
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 1178600000 23042000000 -21864000000 7844200000
0 
-0.28 
 ATT 1248800000 23962000000 -22713000000 2580000000
0 
-0.88 
       
ppw Unmatched 3090588.51 3246870.06 -156281.55 5684927.59 -0.03 
 ATT 3297518.76 1132276.28 2165242.48 3174816 0.68 
       
growth Unmatched 0.5906 27.8675 -27.2769 77.5519 -0.35 
 ATT 0.6278 36.1709 -35.5432 42.9290 -0.83 
       
export Unmatched 0.2304 0.1047 0.1258 0.0411 3.06 
 ATT 0.1814 0.1528 0.0286 0.0660 0.43 
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Figure 8(7.3): Bias on observables-tax rates, Indonesia 
 
Table 27(7.11): Selection on observable-tax rates, Indonesia 
 
 
 
Selection on Observables - Tax Rates, Indonesia     
Variable Unmatched Mean   % 
reducti
on 
t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
foreign1 U 0.09302 0.0929 0  0 0.998 
 M 0.1 0.08704 4.4 -
10101.1 
0.2 0.845 
        
size1 U 2.1628 1.7801 45.6  3.01 0.003 
 M 2.1 2.0434 6.7 85.2 0.29 0.769 
        
export U 0.24651 0.10985 42  3.15 0.002 
 M 0.195 0.19187 1 97.7 0.04 0.966 
        
infra U 1.7636 0.7418 105  7.83 0 
 M 1.6125 1.5002 11.5 89 0.5 0.616 
        
burcy U 1.6705 0.51446 147  11.39 0 
 M 1.5313 1.4646 8.5 94.2 0.38 0.707 
        
age U 67.093 31.937 14  1.28 0.203 
 M 70.7 79.464 -3.6 75.1 -0.12 0.906 
        
national U 0.46512 0.44262 4.5  0.29 0.773 
 M 0.5 0.50323 -0.6 85.7 -0.03 0.977 
        
govbid U 0.09302 0.04235 20  1.56 0.12 
 M 0.1 0.08069 7.7 61.9 0.3 0.767 
        
corruption U 2.0698 0.68169 108  7.64 0 
 M 1.975 1.9001 5.9 94.6 0.24 0.812 
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2.  Using Bureaucracy as the Treatment Variable  
Table 7.12 reports the results of the matching analysis for Indonesia, using 
bureaucracy as the treatment variable.  As with the combined sample there was no 
statistically significant effect of perceived bureaucratic obstacles on any of the four 
performance indicators. 
 
Table 28(7.12): Matching test with bureaucracy as the treatment- Indonesia 
 
Figure 7.4 and Table 7.13 provide evidence concerning bias on observables.  Both support 
the view that the matching process was suitable. 
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Figure 9(7.4): Bias on observables-bureaucracy, Indonesia 
 
Table 29(7.13): Selection on observables- bureaucracy, Indonesia 
 
The Philippine 
1. Using Tax Rates as the Treatment Variable 
Selection on Observables - Bureaucracy, Indonesia     
Variable Unmatched Mean   % 
reduction 
t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
foreign1 U 0.25926 0.09653 43  2.74 0.006 
 M 0.21739 0.27285 -14.6 65.9 -0.43 0.67 
        
size1 U 2.4074 1.8039 73  3.79 0 
 M 2.3043 2.2956 1.1 98.5 0.04 0.972 
        
export U 0.29259 0.11291 52.3  3.25 0.001 
 M 0.29783 0.27368 7 86.6 0.21 0.834 
        
infra U 2.0802 0.75716 130.2  8.13 0 
 M 1.9493 1.6928 25.2 80.6 0.86 0.392 
        
age U 19.148 33.802 -11.9  -0.44 0.661 
 M 19.565 71.746 -42.4 -256.1 -0.77 0.443 
        
national U 0.48148 0.4359 9.1  0.47 0.64 
 M 0.47826 0.46497 2.6 70.9 0.09 0.93 
        
govbid U 0.11111 0.04827 23.1  1.46 0.145 
 M 0.04348 0.08475 -15.1 34.3 -0.56 0.578 
        
corruption U 2.4444 0.71946 139  7.49 0 
 M 2.3478 2.3876 -3.2 97.7 -0.1 0.92 
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Table 7.14 reports matching tests for the Philippines with tax rates as the treatment 
variable.  For three of the performance indicators (sales per worker, profit per worker and 
growth) perceived problems with tax rates have no statistically significant effect. For 
exports there is a statistically significant and negative effect. Firms who perceive tax rates 
to be a major or severe problem have a significantly lower share of exports in their total 
sales. 
Table 30(7.14): Matching test with tax rates as the treatment- Philippines 
 
 
Figure 7.5 and Table 7.15 below provide evidence with respect to bias on observables. 
Both show the matching process to have been appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matching Tests with Tax Rates as the Treatment - Philippines   
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 2155065 4612675 -2457610 1756473 -1.40 
 ATT 2158009 3530254 -1372245 2210193 -0.62 
       
ppw Unmatched 1161164 3273835 -2112671 1635934 -1.29 
 ATT 1165055 2559140 -1394085 2057858 -0.68 
       
growth Unmatched 52.9967 8.4863 44.5104 28.3447 1.57 
 ATT 53.2407 5.3591 47.8816 53.3880 0.90 
       
export Unmatched 0.1750 0.2265 -0.0515 0.0287 -1.80 
 ATT 0.1730 0.2408 -0.0678 0.0381 -1.78 
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Figure 10(7.5): Bias on observables- tax rates, Philippines 
 
 
Table 31(7.15): Selection on observables- tax rates, Philippines 
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1. Using bureaucracy as the Treatment Variable 
Table 7.16 presents the relevant matching tests, with bureaucracy as the treatment.  
Bureaucracy has no statistically significant effects on any of the performance indicators. 
 
Table 32(7.16): Matching test with bureaucracy as treatment - Philippines 
 
 
Figure 7.6 and Table 7.17 provide evidence concerning bias on observables.  Both support 
the view that the process of selection on observables was of a reasonable standard. 
 
Figure 11(7.6): Bias on observables-bureaucracy, Philippines 
 
Matching Tests with Bureaucracy as the Treatment - Philippines   
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 1750002 4280136 -2530134 2761145 -0.92 
 ATT 1770590 4354041 -2583451 1992670 -1.30 
       
ppw Unmatched 835863 2965663 -2129799 2570787 -0.83 
 ATT 856152 2889585 -2033434 1854381 -1.10 
       
growth Unmatched 0.6398 19.4510 -18.8112 44.8643 -0.42 
 ATT 0.6578 35.1492 -34.4914 32.6044 -1.06 
       
export Unmatched 0.2139 0.2154 -0.0014 0.0452 -0.03 
 ATT 0.2084 0.1786 0.0299 0.0537 0.56 
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Table 33(7.17): Selection on observable-bureaucracy, Philippines 
 
 
Vietnam 
1. Using Tax Rates as the Treatment Variable 
Table 7.18 sets out matching tests for the Vietnam using tax rates as the treatment 
variable.  For each of the four performance variables there was no statistically significant 
effect of perceived obstacles posed by tax rates on firm performance. 
Selection on Observables - Bureaucracy, Philippines     
Variable Unmatched Mean   % reduction t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
        
foreign1 U 0.28767 0.26129 5.9  0.49 0.623 
 M 0.29577 0.24287 11.8 -100.5 0.71 0.481 
        
size1 U 1.9589 1.8871 9.2  0.75 0.452 
 M 1.9718 1.8832 11.4 -23.5 0.68 0.499 
        
export U 0.21781 0.21808 -0.1  -0.01 0.995 
 M 0.21197 0.18816 6.1 -8818.1 0.38 0.701 
        
infra U 1.8722 0.80948 119.5  10.38 0 
 M 1.8263 1.9293 -11.6 90.3 -0.61 0.543 
        
age U 22.425 19.853 17.8  1.52 0.128 
 M 22.408 21.58 5.7 67.8 0.34 0.735 
        
national U 0.46575 0.24624 46.9  4.14 0 
 M 0.46479 0.43188 7 85 0.39 0.696 
        
govbid U 0.21918 0.07527 41.3  4.26 0 
 M 0.19718 0.15541 12 71 0.65 0.517 
        
corruption U 2.8904 1.2419 139.8  10.59 0 
 M 2.8732 2.6867 15.8 88.7 1.02 0.309 
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Table 34(7.18): Matching test with tax rates as the treatment- Vietnam 
 
 
Figure 7.7 and Table 7.19 give details of bias on observables.  Both imply that the treated 
group and the selected control group are well matched on observables. 
 
Figure 12(7.7): Bias on observable-tax rates, Vietnam 
 
Matching Tests with Tax Rates as the Treatment - Vietnam   
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 592019458 415812029 176207429 125638106 1.40 
 ATT 592019458 498200696 93818761.5 151000000 0.62 
       
ppw Unmatched 200941459 107936453 93005006.3 122975932 0.76 
 ATT 200941459 121128695 79812764.6 79600000 1.00 
       
growth Unmatched 2.2785 4.1163 -1.8378 12.4848 -0.15 
 ATT 2.2785 2.2775 0.0009 3.1470 0.00 
       
export Unmatched 0.1983 0.3143 -0.1160 0.0713 -1.63 
 ATT 0.1754 0.2468 -0.0713 0.0481 -1.48 
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Table 35(7.19): Selection on observables-tax rates, Vietnam 
 
 
2. Using bureaucracy as the Treatment Variable 
Table 7.20 presents the standard matching tests, with bureaucracy as the treatment.  
For three of the four performance indicators bureaucracy has no statistically significant 
effects on firm performance. For sales per worker there is a statistically significant effect 
at 95% confidence.  Contrary to expectations the effect is positive, suggesting that 
bureaucratic obstacles improve rather than restrict firm performance.  Whilst there is 
insufficient information to be sure of the reasons for this it is, perhaps, more likely that 
more efficient firms feel more constrained by bureaucracy than firms whose own 
performance is poor. 
 
Selection on Observables - Tax Rates, Vietnam     
Variable Unmatched Mean   % reduction t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
        
foreign1 U 0.15625 0.16607 -2.6  -0.15 0.885 
 M 0.15625 0.13508 5.7 -115.6 0.24 0.814 
        
size1 U 2.1875 2.2054 -2.3  -0.13 0.898 
 M 2.1875 2.1916 -0.5 77.1 -0.02 0.983 
        
export U 0.16906 0.31918 -40.5  -1.98 0.048 
 M 0.16906 0.23824 -18.6 53.9 -0.8 0.428 
        
infra U 1.1615 0.74494 57.8  3.41 0.001 
 M 1.1615 1.1258 5 91.4 0.18 0.858 
        
burcy U 0.89844 0.38705 76.3  5.66 0 
 M 0.89844 0.87481 3.5 95.4 0.12 0.905 
        
age U 14.781 13.032 14.1  0.82 0.415 
 M 14.781 14.086 5.6 60.2 0.22 0.83 
        
national U 0.78125 0.54286 51.7  2.65 0.008 
 M 0.78125 0.68951 19.9 61.5 0.82 0.414 
        
govbid U 0.15625 0.11429 12.2  0.72 0.473 
 M 0.15625 0.12879 8 34.6 0.31 0.758 
        
corruption U 1.2813 0.32857 93.5  6.62 0 
 M 1.2813 1.2953 -1.4 98.5 -0.04 0.966 
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Table 36(7.20): Matching test with bureaucracy as the treatment- Vietnam 
 
 
Figure 13(7.8): Bias on observables- bureaucracy Vietnam 
 
Matching Tests with Bureaucracy as the Treatment - Vietnam   
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 771358288 425607654 345750634 204109863 1.69 
 ATT 843300902 285596715 557704187 263115991 2.12 
       
ppw Unmatched 223399585 124127060 99272525 90445071 1.1 
 ATT 88949205 64761682 24187523 278154697 0.09 
       
growth Unmatched 2.9911 0.9784 2.0127 1.9983 1.01 
 ATT 0.2504 0.5900 -0.3395 0.6359 -0.53 
       
export Unmatched 0.5000 0.2575 0.2425 0.1316 1.84 
 ATT 0.5000 0.2981 0.2019 0.1789 1.13 
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Table 37(7.21): Selection on observables -bureaucracy, Vietnam 
 
 
 
7.4.4. Foreign firms only  
 
This section repeats the propensity score matching analysis for the sample of firms 
with some foreign ownership.  As with the regression analysis this was conducted only 
for the three countries combined into a single sample and (for reasons of sample size) not 
for each country individually.  
1. Using Tax Rates as the Treatment Variable 
Table 7.22 reports the matching tests with perceived constraints with tax as the 
treatment. 
Selection on Observables - Buraucracy, Vietnam     
Variable Unmatched Mean   % reduction t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
        
foreign1 U 0.33333 0.14948 42.3  1.51 0.131 
 M 0.5 0.50993 -2.3 94.6 -0.02 0.981 
        
export U 0.5 0.26559 58.1  1.76 0.079 
 M 0.575 0.78245 -51.4 11.5 -0.78 0.466 
        
infra U 2.1667 0.74098 201.3  6.5 0 
 M 2.0833 2.2467 -23.1 88.5 -0.62 0.559 
        
age U 7.2222 13.461 -72  -1.56 0.12 
 M 7.75 10.96 -37.1 48.5 -1.67 0.146 
        
national U 0.66667 0.57216 19  0.57 0.572 
 M 0.75 0.75 0 100 0 1 
        
govbid U 0 0 .  . . 
 M 0 0 . . . . 
        
corruption U 2.2222 0.35567 209.8  6.9 0 
 M 1.75 1.4603 32.6 84.5 0.29 0.778 
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Table 38(7.22): Matching test with tax rates the treatment-combines sample 
 
 
The results suggest that there is no statistically significant effect of tax rates on any of the 
four performance indicators for foreign firms. Selection on observables checks are 
presented in Figure 7.9 and in Table 7.23 below. These suggest the control group of 
foreign firms nor reporting tax constraints is well matched with the treated group (those 
with perceived tax constraints). 
  
Matching Tests with Tax Rates as the Treatment - Combined Sample  
       
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 90142.8 129672.2 -39529.3 84273.5 -0.47 
 ATT 69841.1 118958.3 -49117.2 65214.4 -0.75 
       
ppw Unmatched 31573.3 64856.4 -33283.1 76090.1 -0.44 
 ATT 33651.5 39236.2 -5584.8 29291.4 -0.19 
       
growth Unmatched 0.4784 1.6316 -1.1532 1.9330 -0.60 
 ATT 0.5371 0.6654 -0.1283 0.3175 -0.40 
       
export Unmatched 0.4033 0.5631 -0.1598 0.0617 -2.59 
 ATT 0.4281 0.5278 -0.0997 0.0907 -1.10 
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Figure 14(7.9): Bias on observables-tax rates, combined sample 
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Figure 15(7.23): Selection on observables-Tax rates combined sample 
 
 
  
Selection on Observables - Tax Rates, Combined Sample    
Variable Unmatched Mean   % reduction t-test  
 Matched Treated  Control %bias in bias t p>t   
size1 U 2.1356 2.4972 -48.3  -3.62 0 
 M 2.18 2.2659 -11.5 76.3 -0.54 0.591 
        
export U 0.4 0.55531 -34.5  -2.47 0.014 
 M 0.4466 0.44752 -0.2 99.4 -0.01 0.992 
        
infra U 1.3164 0.7722 59.9  4.78 0 
 M 1.2733 1.2359 4.1 93.1 0.2 0.844 
        
burcy U 1.6794 0.68704 131.5  10.67 0 
 M 1.5483 1.4422 14.1 89.3 0.67 0.501 
        
age U 16.576 15.736 6.7  0.5 0.619 
 M 16.78 15.637 9.1 -36 0.46 0.649 
        
national U 0.38983 0.29444 20.1  1.47 0.142 
 M 0.38 0.36729 2.7 86.7 0.13 0.897 
        
govbid U 0.10169 0.06667 12.6  0.97 0.335 
 M 0.08 0.05415 9.3 26.2 0.51 0.61 
        
corruption U 2.1695 0.84722 106.3  7.98 0 
 M 1.96 2.0746 -9.2 91.3 -0.44 0.662 
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2. Using bureaucracy as the Treatment Variable 
Table 7.24 reports the matching tests for the foreign firm sample but using 
bureaucracy as the treatment variable. Again, there is no statistically significant effect of 
perceived bureaucracy constraints on any of the four performance variables. 
Table 39(7.24): Matching test with bureaucracy as the treatment-Combined sample 
 
Figure 7.10 and Table 7.25 provide evidence of matching on observables, which suggest 
the selected control group is adequately matched. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matching Tests with Bureaucracy as the Treatment - Combined Sample  
       
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       
spw Unmatched 216451.6 122156.7 94295.0 123102.0 0.77 
 ATT 176612.6 86494.1 90118.6 153457.2 0.59 
       
ppw Unmatched 20157.3 64729.5 -44572.2 111534.8 -0.40 
 ATT 20829.2 17582.6 3246.6 23857.9 0.14 
       
growth Unmatched 0.5888 1.6154 -1.0265 2.8126 -0.36 
 ATT 0.6092 0.3393 0.2699 0.3619 0.75 
       
export Unmatched 0.4226 0.5828 -0.1602 0.0835 -1.92 
 ATT 0.4367 0.4326 0.0041 0.1124 0.04 
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Figure 16(Figure 7.10): Bias on observables-bureaucracy, combined sample 
 
 
Table 40(Table 7.25): Selection on observables-Bureaucracy, Combined sample 
 
 
-50 0 50 100 150
Standardized % bias across covariates
size1
export
age
govbid
national
corruption
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Unmatched
Matched
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7.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The firm level analysis is complex at the country level and has data limitations. 
The analysis presented in this chapter provides evidence of links between firm 
performance and the two interest variables which are bureaucracy and tax. Using 
regression techniques with the pooled sample (the three countries combined) neither of 
these two variables has a significant impact on firm performance (table 7.26).  This 
conclusion applies both to all firms in the sample and to (separately) firms with some 
foreign ownership. 
  
Table 41(Table 7.26), summarized result of all countries combined 
 
 
When the analysis is repeated for each country individually some issues emerge 
from the regression analysis (Table 7.27). Firstly there are perverse results where 
bureaucracy is found to have a positive and significant effect on firm performance in 
Indonesia and where tax was found to have positive and significant effect in Vietnam.  
These results are not just implausible but raise questions about possible reverse causality 
(that high performing firms notice constraints more). This means a risk of bias in the 
estimates. Secondly, the estimates for the control variables suggest important behavioral 
differences between domestic and foreign firms.  The regression analysis is a useful first 
step but highlights the need to also use propensity score matching. 
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Table 42(Table 7.27): Summarized firm performance in each country 
 
 
 
Most of the existing work on the relationship between institution factors and firm 
performance assumes that the institution factors are constant within a country (Dollar, 
2005). The empirical link that this thesis establish between the institutional factors and 
firm performance for both local and foreign investment in host countries with conducting 
the matching analysis the number of performance indicators was expanded to four, adding 
sales growth and exports (as a percentage of sales) to sales per worker and profit per 
worker.  The results of the matching analysis were very clear.  It was run a total of five 
times. Four of these included both domestic and foreign firms: the pooled sample and 
each of three countries individually. The last was for a pooled sample of foreign firms 
only.  In each of these five runs not one of the four performance indicators was found to 
have a statistically significant effect with either bureaucracy or tax rates as the treatment 
variable. The evidence of the sample does not support the view that either bureaucratic 
or tax rate constraints have significantly affected firm performance in the three countries.  
 
Most empirical studies on performance use the banking industry as a sample, 
while in this study uses manufacture companies based on sectors. This thesis follows the 
study by Dollar, Hallaward-Driemeier, and Mengistae’s (2005) which investigated firms’ 
determinants factors on performance that focus on the investment climate (infrastructure, 
role government, regulation) and ownership, and the result shown that those factors are 
matter but not according to the result on this study (thesis), this could be simply because 
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it uses different sample of data or these factors are not as important as other unobserved 
factors that affect firm’s performance (Harvey Leibenstein, 1976 ; Bastos and Nasir, 
2004; Williamson, O., 1967) 
 
Although this section of analysis did not support most of studies that found 
association between tax and governance and firm’s performance (Baumol, 1967; Hall, 
1967; Weiss, 1967), however, there are some important issues of interpretation in this 
thesis as a whole, chapter V demonstrated that indirect taxes have the potential to 
significantly affect “pre-tax” gross profits (those before taxes on corporate income).  
Chapter VI found that, at a country level, taxes and governance can affect aggregate 
inward investment.  The final analysis which discussed in this chapter finds no evidence 
to support a view that either tax or bureaucracy has a negative effect on firm performance.  
This finding applies equally to domestic and foreign owned firms.  Since none of the 
performance indicators are based on after tax profits the finding is consistent with the 
literature that finds taxes on corporate income to influence investment decisions.  What 
the analysis presented here shows is that the evidence does not support a view that either 
taxes or bureaucracy affect the underlying “pre-tax” profit. 
 
A fundamental limitation of this and similar research is the counter-factual.  The 
only available firm level data are for firms that exist.  These are the ones that decided that 
the constraints created by taxes or bureaucracy were not so severe as to prevent 
investment in the first place or subsequent dis-investment.  It is impossible to know about 
firms who closed or investment projects that never took place because of tax or 
bureaucracy problems.  The input-output analysis presented in Chapter IV suggests that 
the effects of indirect taxes must have acted as deterrent in some cases.  The reasons why 
some firms seem to cope with these and other, non-existent ones do not is an important 
topic for future research. 
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CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study analyses the impact of tax and governance on the volumes of FDI in 
Asia and the attractiveness of Asia as a location for inward FDI. Using data from a number 
of different Asian countries, the research was divided into 3 main analytical chapters: 
3. How important are indirect taxes, in relation to direct taxes, in affecting the 
potential profitability of inward investment in Asia?  How do indirect taxes 
change the incentives to invest in one sector over another?  (Chapter V) 
4. At the country level how conducive are governance regulatory and tax in Asian 
countries to encouraging inward foreign direct investment? (Chapter VI) 
5. To what extent do tax and bureaucracy adversely affect firm performance in some 
Asian countries and, hence, influence efficiency seeking motives for inward 
investment? (Chapter VII) 
 
8.1. INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS OF INDIRECT TAXES (CHAPTER 
V) 
 
The findings of the input-output analysis of China, Indonesia and Korea presented 
in Chapter V are very clear.  They show that, for some sectors, indirect taxes represent a 
substantially larger loss of revenues to investors than do direct taxes on profits.  The 
findings also show that, unlike profit taxes, the burden of indirect taxation varies 
considerably between one sector and another.  This distorts the returns to investment in 
one sector relative to another.  There have been very few studies on the impact of taxes 
on FDI especially in ASIA (with the exception of China). Using selected Asian countries 
data (sectors) to investigate the potential existence of distortion as result of different 
indirect tax impose on different sectors become one of the contribution of this chapter. 
Although, the role of direct taxes (on corporate income) on inward FDI has been well 
explored in the literature but there has been much less attention devoted to the impact of 
indirect taxes, none specifically dealing with Asia. Another contribution of this chapter 
is many studies on inward FDI are conducted at country level and Indirect taxes such as 
import tariffs operate at the sector level so that this study provides insights as to how 
indirect taxes alter incentives to invest in one sector rather than another. 
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8.2. TAXES AND GOVERNANCE AS DETERMINANTS OF THE 
LOCATION OF INWARD FDI IN ASIA (CHAPTER VI) 
 
Many of the empirical studies of the determinants of inward FDI are based on 
the OLI paradigm, as is the research presented in Chapter VI. The OLI paradigm has 
always acknowledged the importance of countries’ locational advantages as a key 
determinant factor of MNEs’ foreign production (Dunning, 1998). Empirical studies, in 
many cases, identify the factors that affect the locational choice for FDI. Among the 
variables used are labor costs, exchange rate and exchange rate volatility, taxation, 
regional integration, openness to trade, infrastructure, government stability, corruption, 
the quality of bureaucracy and politics. This study, which focuses on the role of tax and 
governance, uses almost all those determinants as part of control variables in the analysis.  
 
The country level regression analysis shows that there are statistically significant 
behavioural differences between high income and low income countries in Asia.  For this 
reason the regression analysis was run separately for each income group.   Results of 
particular note are those that exhibited a consistent pattern, giving a similar finding for 
both high and income groups and for both FDI flows and stocks.  Regulatory efficiency 
was consistently found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on inward 
FDI.  For other governance variables the results tended to vary according to estimator. 
Taking the panel fixed effects estimator (as less prone to omitted variable bias) good 
governance was found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on inward FDI 
stocks for higher income countries but not for flows or stocks in lower income countries.  
The total tax rate was found to have a statistically significant effect on FDI inflows in 
lower income countries but not on inflows for higher income countries. Although there 
are a significant number of country level regression studies of the determinants of inward 
FDI which include tax very few focus on Asia specifically. Likewise only a small number 
of such studies consider governance as a determinant. The focus on Asia and the use of 
both tax and bureaucracy as determinants is a contribution of this study. 
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8.3. THE EFFECT OF TAXES AND GOVERNANCE ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY SEEKING (CHAPTER VII) 
 
The analysis of firm performance used data from the 2009 World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys for Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.  Regression analysis suggests that, 
for most specifications, neither taxes nor bureaucracy had a statistically significant effect 
on firm performance for the pooled sample of all three countries.  This applies both to all 
firms (domestic and foreign) and to foreign firms only.  However, repetition of the 
analysis on a country by country basis yielded some perverse results which suggest a 
positive relationship between tax and firm performance (Indonesia) or a positive 
relationship between bureaucracy and firm performance (Philippines and Vietnam).  
These findings raise doubts about the possibility of dual causality and bias with the 
regression estimates. 
 
Propensity score matching was used to provide a check on the findings of the regression 
analysis, which also extended the number of performance indicators to four. The results 
of the matching analysis were clear.  For the pooled sample (all firms and all three 
countries), the sample of foreign owned firms and the sample of all firms for each 
individual country the results were the same: neither governance nor taxes had any 
statistically significant effect on firm performance. Within the FDI literature the effects 
of tax and bureaucracy on firm performance have been under explored. In consequence 
there is not a strong body of evidence to confirm or reject the view that tax and 
bureaucracy act as deterrents to efficiency seeking investment. Such evidence is more 
scarce for Asia. This study provides such evidence.  
 
8.4. LIMITATIONS 
 
 The input-output analysis of indirect taxes has several limitations and 
complications.  Firstly, input-output tables simply do not exist at any reasonable level of 
detail for most Asian economies.  It is not possible to provide a broad coverage of Asia 
for this reason.  The input-output analysis is useful and provides an original contribution 
but it can only focus on the distortions to incentives to invest in one sector rather than 
another. It cannot provide evidence that such distortions actually resulted in a distorted 
pattern of investment by sector in each of the countries covered. It is possible to show 
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that the underlying returns to investment are distorted by indirect taxes but not that actual 
flows or stocks of investment are affected by this.  Such analysis would require a counter-
factual. It would be necessary to have some sense of what investment in each sector would 
have been had the indirect taxes not been applied. Although this is a possible topic for 
future research it would be very challenging to undertake in any convincing way. 
 
The country level regression analysis is subject to the same limitations of much research 
using OLS or panel fixed effects techniques.  Common sources of concern would be 
various forms of bias.  The possibility clearly exists that an important variable correlated 
with both independent and dependent variables has been excluded is, not least because 
OLI theory offers such a rich selection of different possible influences on the locational 
decision in FDI.  If that is the case then there is a risk of omitted (confounding) variable 
bias.  The use of panel fixed effects helps to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias but 
cannot eliminate it. 
With the cross-sectional firm level analysis the same limitations apply to the regression 
analysis.  A further problem arises with the regression if there is two-way causality, if 
performance affects perceived problems with tax or bureaucracy as well as those 
problems affecting performance.  The risk is that, if such behavior exists, the regression 
estimates are again biased. 
 
Propensity score matching although useful for addressing some issues (firm 
heterogeneity in particular) with the regression model is still not without limitations.  It 
is known that matching estimators can be subject to bias on observables and bias on 
unobservable. The analysis finds no evidence of a problem of bias on observables.  Bias 
on unobservable remains a possibility, in a similar way to omitted variable bias in the 
regression model.  It is very difficult to be certain that the matching process did not 
exclude a confounding variable. 
A more fundamental limitation of the analysis, as with much empirical work, is the 
absence of a clear and workable counter-factual.  For example, the findings that tax and 
bureaucracy do not have a statistically significant effect on firm performance are based 
on a sample of firms that actually exist.  The investment projects that did not take place 
or those that were abandoned as a result of taxes or of bureaucracy are simply not 
observed.  In similar fashion the country level analysis uses data on FDI stocks and flows. 
These are the investment that took place despite taxes or bureaucratic obstacles. Those 
flows that were deterred are simply not recorded. 
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A further limitation to the study was data availability.  The input-output analysis could 
only be conducted for the three Asian countries with sufficiently detailed input-output 
tables. The firm level analysis could also only be conducted for those three countries for 
which common enterprise survey were available. 
 
8.5. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 While this study extent the literature on FDI in the context of South East Asian 
countries, two areas need to further investigation. One is that there is no evidence found 
in this study how open the selected Asian countries toward FDI and how the policy toward 
FDI change time to time as evidence improvement to openness. Furthermore, recent 
trends show that intra-regional FDI is powerful force for economic integration, therefore, 
it is necessary to investigate whether Asian neighbor investors are more resistant on the 
host country as result of culture and distance compare to non-Asian foreign investors. 
The other is that there is a scope using disaggregate FDI data at industry level and factor 
production instead of sales or profit. At the time research conducted, FDI data at industry 
level are inadequate in coverage to conduct an extensive econometric analysis. However, 
very recent data published by the World Bank are encouraging in this to be done.  
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